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A human being is a part of the whole called by us universe, a part limited in time and 
space.  He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separated from the 
rest, a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness.  This delusion is a kind of prison for us, 
restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us.  Our 
task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to 
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1 Beauchamp, T L., & Childress, J F., (2013) Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th edition, Oxford University Press, 
New York. 
2 Two orthographic representations exist in text: wholistic and holistic.  Preference is given to wholistic as this 
reading represents the integrated nature of bodily existence put forward in the thesis. 
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Introduction and Background 
 
 
Until the hospital doctor can look down on his dying patient whose life as he knows he cannot save and 
sees in him the chance of life for the patients of his colleagues; until donor organs are recognized by all 
of us as the pieces of human tissue they are, waiting to be burned or buried a few days after death; 
and until opting out legislation has been introduced to this country, making available for 
transplantation all viable organs unless the deceased in his lifetime has recorded his dissent, this tragic 
waste of life will continue.3 
 
The key aim of this study is to investigate and to provide a timely and practical alternative to 
the predominant bioethical model Principlism – a model that continues to be heavily 
criticised.4  The model outlined in Principles of Biomedical Ethics now in its 7th edition, was 
written originally in the mid nineteen seventies by Beauchamp the philosopher and ethicist 
and Childress the philosopher and theologian.5  Much of the criticism centres on the model’s 
lack of provision for practical solutions to the dilemmas faced by medical professionals day-
to-day.  The four principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice 
comprising the Principlist model remain firmly in place despite suggested alternatives and 
additions put forward by numerous eminent bioethicists.6  Instead Beauchamp and Childress 
over the years have acceded to their critics by including criteria from ethical alternatives 
such as Virtue Ethics in an effort to bolster their original framework, to little avail.  
Considered both simplistic and out-dated, Principlism needs revisiting in its entirety in order 
to provide a bioethical model that will meet the needs of medical staff and patients, given 
the rapid pace at which technology is advancing and the inevitable influence that such 
developments will have on bioethics in general.  In this study bioethics is read through Organ 
Donation and Transplantation.  I believe such an area of specialist medicine will present a 
robust challenge to Principlism, since transplant medicine sits at the extreme limits of ethical 
decision-making.  In this context.  Lesley Sharp observes that: 
 
Organ transplantation presents an ideal context for studying scientific morality 
precisely because it has long stood as a gold standard in clinical work, ceaselessly 
blending technical sophistication with medical innovation.  Economic, social and 
clinical stakes are extraordinarily high within this domain, legitimating especially 
bold undertakings.…Organ replacement is regarded by many as requiring among the 
most complex and prestigious surgical skills; a hospital’s stature may depend on the 
                                                          
3 Sells, R A., (1990) Organ commerce: ethics and expediency, Transplant Proceedings: 22:931-932 
4 See Chs.4 & 5 
5 Beauchamp, T L., & Childress, J F., (2013) 
6 See Ch.5 
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number of transplant surgeries its staff perform annually; and pronounced 
shortages of life-saving organs underscore the critical state of transplant medicine.7 
 
This research is especially influenced by experiences of healing and health improvement 
gained in my eleven years as a kinesiologist specialising in wholistic health.  No matter how 
awe inspiring transplantation medicine is, it is surely the responsibility of the medical 
professionals in this domain to take account of sociological, legal, philosophical and spiritual 
perspectives and the wider effects involved when they are operating in and making life-
changing decisions in such an intimate and sensitive setting.  Certainly it is within this context 
that I believe a highly developed sense of what it means to be ‘my body’ is demanded.8  The 
body as complex and multi-layered is a vital topic, and one that appears to have been largely 
overlooked in the process of the development of an appropriate bioethical framework for 
medical matters in general.  And furthermore within an ethical framework that seems to 
override what it means for us all to live ‘life in all its fullness’ that is a life that encompasses 
physical, mental and spiritual health.9 
 
It could be said that medical treatment of whatever kind needs to embody the ‘life in all its 
fullness’ principle, since it is germane to our overall state of health whether we are ill or not.  
But in the case of transplantation medicine it has particular significance in how organ donors 
and recipients are treated both pre- and post-operatively.  Apart from blood donation in no 
other medical circumstance is a third person, either living or deceased, involved in the 
restoration of a certain level of health to someone in dire need, and in many cases, of a 
stranger’s internal bodily input.10  Granted that shortage of organs and numerous other 
resources within the National Health Service (NHS) are at a critical level, and time spent with 
patients is at a premium, I am not advocating that clinicians have little concern for those 
within their care, rather that the ethics which underpins such care is both limited and 
limiting for the patient as well as the medical staff.11  It is critical that an approach which 
views humanity as wholistic, relational and meaningful, should focus on the wider needs of 
the patient; those needs which go beyond the physical, beyond the everyday, needs which 
                                                          
7 Sharp, L A., (2014) The Transplant Imaginary:  Mechanical Hearts, Animal Parts, and Moral thinking in Highly 
Experimental Science, University of California Press, Berkeley, p7. 
8 ‘my body’ refers to the body of each and every individual. 
9 Spillman, I D., (2016) Faith-based health care in The Lancet: 387:10017:429 
10 Although not the remit of this study, three parent families should be included here as medical technology 
advances with gene splicing and the implantation of donated normal genes to offset potential mitochondrial 
defects in the foetus. 
11 Frank, A W., (2004) The Renewal of Generosity: Illness, Medicine and How to Live, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, Ch.4. 
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reach into a narrative of their individual suffering and its consequences for the relief of ill 
health. 
 
Confronted frequently by medical demands such as the extract at the start of this chapter by 
Professor Robert Sells, a consultant surgeon, in his paper from the 1990 Transplant 
Proceedings - we might be forgiven for asking why the human body, our body, is considered 
in such a dispassionate and detached manner in the event of death.  His comment rather has 
both personal and ethical significance.  That there is a global shortage of organs for 
transplant begs the question - should we donate an organ or organs during our lifetime or 
indeed after death to help alleviate the chronic suffering of those waiting patiently for the 
phone call that advises them that a suitable organ is available, and thereby the chance of a 
longer life?12  The demand on us all is not to be underestimated.  What is our purpose in this 
context?  Is it that we couldn’t bear to see a loved-one die, or is it maybe that we have been 
cajoled into a decision which would leave us feeling guilty if we chose not to donate?  
Donation is highly complex.  It is not merely a matter of signing on the dotted line to a 
donation register.  Or even agreement to go along with presumed consent.  In the case of 
living donation the procedure involves vital cost to the donor, and in the case of deceased 
donation, to the relatives who might be faced with a very responsible decision on behalf of 
their loved one at an extremely emotional time.  Fuelled by increasingly sophisticated 
medical and scientific knowledge, there can be no doubt that we are in an age of dynamic 
biotechnological progress especially in the area of highly technical and complicated surgery 
such as the transplant of organs, requiring considerable expertise by those concerned.  The 
power of the clinicians to improve mechanically the quality and potential life expectancy of 
those who might otherwise remain chronically sick or indeed could die, has far-reaching 
consequences not only for medicine overall but for patients, and in this case for donors in 
particular.  I firmly believe that the Western medical model has hitherto remained narrow in 
its focus within today’s highly specialised and personal areas of medicine - areas that surely 
demand a fuller and more equitable interpretation of the human body than merely biological 
structure can begin to express. 
 
A major issue beleaguering humanity, which I maintain causes all manner of illnesses, both 
physical and mental has resulted from being caught up in the never-ending web of 
materialism.  Humanity has been seduced into believing that status, power and potential 
                                                          
12 Even in 2017 with improving figures for donation the ratio of those who will die compared with those who will 
receive an organ remains persistently at 3:1. See National Health Service Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) Activity 
Report for 2016-2017. 
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comes from acquisition on diverse levels, be it from goods - cars, house ownership, positions 
at work, and equally importantly to many, from how we look.13  The media, commercial 
markets and public institutions have nurtured this culture over centuries.  In short we have 
embodied capitalist materialism and the results are proving to be at the cost of humanity in 
all its fullness.  William Connolly the political theorist, in Capitalism and Christianity, 
American Style claims that the global dimension of capitalism entangles everyone with 
everything.14  One of the central tenets of this study is that we need to shift the popular 
interpretation of materialism as the acquisition of goods towards a more profound 
understanding of the meaning of matter itself. 
 
My research has covered a wide-ranging review of bioethical issues concerned with organ 
donation and transplantation enumerating an array of associated problems from the scarcity 
of suitable organs and discussions concerning the legal status of consent - both informed and 
presumed, to the examination of different models that have been proposed for establishing 
appropriate ethical practice in actual cases.  In addressing what is considered to be the 
dominant model of Principlism, Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics is 
cited since it is the text of choice for many medical schools globally.  This model is believed 
by some ethicists to have proven of worth for practitioners and patients providing some kind 
of rule of thumb or starting point.  Considerable space has been given however, to critiquing 
the ways in which existing interpretive and evaluative approaches within donor and 
transplant contexts are now failing to prioritise relationships of care, compassion and 
empathy between patients and medical practitioners as a means for promoting recovery, or 
engaging with suffering, pain and to some extent death in a deeply meaningful way.  Existing 
practices fail to give the notion of human embodiment its due at a time when medical 
technologies are advancing in sophistication, but rather tend still to value the capacity to 
express rational and intellectual control over medical matters rather than recognising and 
responding to affective or embodied states.  
 
Part of the problem lies in the patriarchal influence that over the centuries has been 
exercised within many institutionalised organisations of which medicine is a part.  Duality 
                                                          
13 Demographic data to establish social status.  See UK Census 2011 under People, Population and Community, 
Office for National Statistics, www.ons.gov.uk/census/2011/census accessed on 26/05/2016.  See also Bryden, I., 
‘Cut ‘n’ Slash’: Remodelling the ‘Freakish’ Female Form, in Althaus-Reid, M., & Isherwood, L., (2008) (eds.) 
Controversies in Body Theology, SCM Press, London, p29. 
14 Connolly, W E., (2008) Capitalism and Christianity American Style, Duke University Press, Durham, North 
Carolina, Ch.1. 
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between mind and body, God and not God, male and female and so on are issues that have 
had considerable impact on humanity in general.  James Nelson believes for instance that: 
 
We yearn for a new time when the dualism that has made spirit and bodies enemies 
of each other will be no more.  We yearn for a time when the dualisms that have 
made men fear and control women, that have made heterosexuals fear and control 
lesbians and gay men will be no more.  We long for the time when human sexuality, 
in spite of all its ambiguities, will be more integrated with our experience of the 
sacred and with the vision of God’s shalom.15 
 
Lisa Isherwood and Elizabeth Stuart argue that one of the dualisms perpetuated by 
patriarchy is the dualism of sacred/profane in which ‘women’s bodies have been placed on 
the profane side of the equation.’16  Patriarchy profanes menstrual and post-partum blood, 
linking it with death, disorder and chaos.  Thus the practice of patriarchy has been 
questioned by many a feminist theologian as it effectively excludes women, treating them as 
inferior, not only in the workplace but also in their everyday lives.17  That women share this 
flaw of constant flux with all matter is problematic in patriarchal domination since it disrupts 
belief in the divine as a static, unchangeable God of law and order that is ultimately pure 
spirit.  Yet quantum concepts have demonstrated that there is no dualism between spirit or 
energy and matter and matter itself is neither fixed nor predictable.  The whole of the 
universe is in fact a complex web of interrelationality in a constant state of flux.  Important 
points I shall be returning to in the chapters that follow.  
 
The heart of this study therefore offers the wider perspective of approaching the body not 
only as wholistic, relational and meaningful, but equally dynamic and creative, in direct 
contrast to the static, dualist model based on the mind-body Cartesian interpretation 
prevalent in much current medical practice.18  Alternative approaches to relieving pain and 
suffering base much of their praxis on esoteric anatomy.  That is, certain Indian and Chinese 
ancient traditional mappings of the subtle energy pathways that interpenetrate each and 
every system in the body and expand and interconnect outwards to those energy pathways 
implicated in the universe and beyond.  These mappings have formed the basis of such 
modes of wholistic healing as Ayurveda, Acupuncture, Kinesiology, Chiropractic and other 
systems of vibrational and energy medicine.  The thesis governing each of these modalities 
                                                          
15 Nelson, J B., (1992) Body Theology, Westminster, John Knox Press, Louisville, Kentucky pp15-16. 
16 Isherwood, L., & Stuart, E., (1998) Introductions in Feminist Theology 2: Introducing Body Theology, Sheffield 
Academic Press, Sheffield, p80. 
17 Isherwood, L., & Stuart, E., (1998) p81.  See also Bryden, I., at note 12. 
18 While considerable work is underway in bringing mental health into the main frame of clinical praxis, however, 
this development has yet to demonstrate any challenge to the standardised medical model as practised in the 
West. 
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rests on the belief that bodily health - physical, mental and spiritual - is maintained through 
the constant flow of energy through the body; when energy becomes stuck as a result of a 
traumatic event, the outcome manifests itself at the physical level as pain and illness, and at 
the subtle, invisible level as suffering.  I am however not advocating alternative methods of 
healing as any kind of approach to transplantation per se, rather that there are other ways of 
perceiving human being which have some relevance to treating the body with the greater 
understanding necessary to the process of complex medical decision-making.  I am using an 
alternate means of viewing the body thereby in order to assess the impact of treating it in 
any gender assignment as static and hence unchanging. 
 
Whilst mainstream medical science frequently dismisses alternative approaches as 
‘quackery’, the results of placebo effect, or just plain unscientific and therefore neither 
subject to rigorous testing nor repeatability, anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise.  
Numerous people have found long-lasting relief from seeking help through non-traditional 
medical methods, given the opportunity to express their illness through their own story to a 
practitioner who has both the time and the skills to listen.19  Equally, anecdotal evidence 
would support the significance of treating the body as an energetic or vital force dynamically 
interrelated with the universe.  Underpinned by twenty-first century quantum ideas of the 
building blocks of all that exists, the splitting of the atom into even smaller constituents for 
instance into electrons, protons, neutrons, quarks and so on, the notion that all matter can 
be interpreted as particles and waves of energy, lends further credibility to the view 
espoused by ancient Chinese concepts of the body which were proposed around 202 BCE to 
220 CE.20  Could it be as Catherine Keller suggests that: ‘the actual individual - yourself or one 
of your innumerable electrons - takes place as an actualisation; there is not an enduring 
identity of matter or of you; there is materialisation in this moment.  And the next moment.  
And the next.  And at each moment we can say that you enfold prior moments, and the great 
manifold of events - electronic, molecular, genetic, social - making up your universe; and in 
that moment unfold it all otherwise.’21 
 
The question remains however of whether any ethical model could be sufficiently dynamic to 
support not only current, well-established medical techniques but also the use of stem cells, 
gene editing and mitochondrial replacement involved in three-person parenting, 
                                                          
19 Patient stories on practitioners’ websites whilst I appreciate are equally marketing pitches, do offer important 
insights into the healing potential of alternative approaches.  See Kinesiology Federation under News: Case 
Studies and Client Testimonials at www.kinesiologyfederation.co.uk accessed on 16/02/2016. 
20 Kaptchuk, E J., (1983) Chinese Medicine: The Web that has no Weaver, Rider, London, p24. 
21 Keller, C., (2015) Cloud of the Impossible, Columbia University Press, New York, pp142-3. 
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xenotransplantation, or even of digital technology such as artificial neural networks involved 
in robotics.  Is it feasible to ask a robot to operate on a patient with ‘respect for their body’ 
for example?22  For robotics is increasingly where medicine in general and surgery in 
particular is heading.  Are we in fact moving into an era in which reflection on the nature of 
humanity becomes more and more pressing?  Is it time to consider such concepts as post-
humanity?  Whilst many advances are still in their infancy, it is important that progressive 
techniques are built into any potential ethical approach.  These will have increasingly 
meaningful impact on the future of how we wish the body to be seen including treatment 
either for restoration of a certain level of health or for the conduct of research.  Not to speak 
of the inevitable changes that such progress will bring, including ways in which we might 
view the body years into the future.23  Should any bioethical model reflect this dynamic 
representation of human being if it has any value in underpinning the medical decisions and 
surgical procedures involved in patient care?  Can we separate out from ethical frameworks 
co-operative/integrated decision-making from actual surgical procedures where mistakes 
could prove costly on every level for medical professionals?  As the blurring of boundaries 
between fleshy existence and biotechnology evolves, personal responsibility will become 
increasingly an area of concern.  Whilst sworn by fewer doctors, there is after all the 
Hippocratic Oath in its multiple modern forms to underpin individually responsible medical 
praxis.24   
 
The setting out of key ethical arguments in this study brings the reader into the picture 
through examination at depth of the issues involved in organ donation and transplantation. 
Which are themselves in a constant state of flux.  And also through a critique of the several 
ethical models offered as alternatives to Principlism, to ascertain their appropriateness in 
solving the problems that have been raised by a number of clinicians.  The typically Western 
medical construal of the body as mechanistic and standardised is shown to be limiting.  That 
we are embodied beings I believe will no doubt shift the emphasis away from an entirely 
rational account of the ethical requirements underpinning organ donation and 
transplantation.  It will further call into question the applicability of current ethical 
approaches to be helpful as guidance in responding to day-to-day medical dilemmas.  One of 
the major complaints of the current most popular model is that it is not expansive enough 
                                                          
22 Robotic surgery has been in use for more than a decade in multiple speciality areas such as cardiothoracic, 
colorectal procedures and some organ transplantations. See: www.nyulangone.org/ surgery-center accessed 
19/06/15. 
23 See Rosi Braidotti’s book The Posthuman (2013) Polity, Cambridge, and Coole & Frost (eds.) New Materialisms 
(2010) Duke University Press, Durham, New Carolina, for some interesting accounts of future perceptions of the 
body and their implications. 
24 www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic -oath-today.html accessed 10/10/14. 
 16 
and is simply an exercise to be gone through. 25  The bioethicist and one-time editor of the 
Journal of Biomedical Ethics Raanan Gillon, appears to defend vehemently the four principles 
model however, by asserting that those who see Principlism as simplistic and a mere ‘tick-in-
the-box protocol’ are misusing the system.26   But evidence has shown this so-called ‘tick-in-
the-box’ exercise to be the manner in which the model is used more often than not. 
 
We might ask as a consequence, why bioethical issues have remained so persistently 
problematic when there has been a notable framework in place for around forty years to 
offer at least some help in meeting the day-to-day dilemmas that medical profession have to 
deal with in the course of pursuing their aims.  Surely we should expect ethical input at the 
very least to offer reassurance that the appropriate courses of action in whatever 
circumstances are being undertaken and more importantly supported.  In fact the plethora 
of textual resources discussed in this study have demonstrated the need to go over old 
ground in an attempt to reach some or even more appropriate and thus improved ethical 
resolutions, yet relatively little improvement or amendment to the much used model has 
been revealed, or equally to the arguments put forward.  Noteworthy it seems that 
alternative models have fared little better.  More focus on the patients and their everyday 
challenges with illness is unquestionably significant.  The meaning of illness from the 
patient’s perspective, will inevitably exercise huge influence on their daily lives and future 
plans, and some further investigation apart from their individual case history might effect 
considerable improvement in medical practice.   
 
In turning to the application of bioethical models in general, despite the claims of 
Beauchamp and Childress to the universal applicability of their model, I don’t believe any 
model will ever accomplish the goal of being universalisable.  We are all individual.  Thus any 
model claiming universability will at best be framed along utilitarian or deontological lines.  
In this vein Gillon himself in the same paper defending the four principles admits:  
 
[The] four principles approach does not necessarily lead to better medical practice…  
I have also agreed that it does not provide a universalisable method either for 
dealing with moral dilemmas or for dealing with fundamental disagreements about 
the proper scope of these principles - but nor are there currently any other such 
methods that are both universalisable and widely accepted.27 
 
                                                          
25 See Rosamund Rhodes, Good and not so good medical ethics, and Wing May Kong, What is good medical 
ethics? A clinician’s perspective, the Journal of Medical Ethics 2015, 41:1:71 and 79 
26 Gillon, R., (2015) Defending the four principles approach as a good basis for good medical practice and 
therefore for good medical ethics in Journal of Medical Ethics: 41:111-115 
27 Gillon, R., (2015) 41:111-115 
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It is of concern that Gillon believes there are no other forthcoming models to replace 
Principlism, so who and what does the framework support?  Paradoxically Gillon goes on to 
suggest: ‘I have argued that none of these features undermines the acceptance of 
Principlism or the four principles approach - when properly understood - as affording a good 
and useful moral framework.  It is a framework that is compatible with other universalisable 
philosophies including deontological, utilitarian and virtuist approaches, as well as several 
others.’28  There appears to be an element of sitting on the fence here.  There is also a hint 
that the four principles are neither comprehensive enough nor cohesive, but rather require 
one or more bolted-on theories to make any claim that could be remotely considered 
universally applicable in their terms. 
 
It is not necessary to be an experienced and well-known bioethicist to notice that there is 
extreme customer discontent within the healthcare system.29  There is enough current 
evidence to show questions of the perception of the body in the twenty-first century - 
questions of value, doctor-patient relationships, ownership and agency, and issues of care 
and concern in treatment protocols remain vital.  In this vein, the Francis Report advised the 
need to make the patient and their care the centre of any medical enterprise.30  Thus any 
ethical input has to follow suit since it is clear from the research cited that treating patients 
mechanistically is neither producing patient satisfaction nor is it solving the problem of care 
either at the time, nor indeed in pre- or post-hospitalisation.  A deeper appreciation of 
alternative themes of the body and the nature of biotechnical progress in the twenty-first 
century as they individually and collectively impact on medical treatment and sensitive 
decision-making processes is both timely and paramount. 
 
An overview of the chapters 
 
Chapter 1 – The Approach – An Incarnational Perspective offers reasons why we need to 
focus on the body and arguments for avoiding Cartesian dualisms.  To accomplish such 
change, a variety of methods have been included that contribute to the overall thesis: 
medical, theological and philosophical theories, bioethical concepts, empirical findings, and 
reported experiences of patients and medical staff in general and transplantation medicine 
in particular.  The inclusion of such a large range of materials means that a traditional 
                                                          
28 Gillon, R., (2015) 41:111-115 
29 See Ch.4 p89 to this study. 
30 Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, (2013) Public Enquiry, Executive Summary, HMSO, London, 
www.gov.uk/publications/ otherwise known as the Francis Report. 
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methodological framework to guide the arguments in the research is not useful.  It is critical 
to place the diverse nature of bioethics into an appropriate context to appreciate the range 
of interrelated concepts that fall within its remit.  Such diversity underpins the rationale for 
using the term ‘approach’ rather than method.  Furthermore in order to position organ 
donation and transplantation within its own highly complex context, desk research based on 
informatics involving historical as well as current data was considered a sound basis from 
which to argue an alternative approach.  The discussion turns to incarnation theory albeit in 
secular form as the most relevant and indeed the most useful approach to argue against 
Principlism.  Incarnational theory resonates readily with alternative interpretations of the 
fluidity of humanity and beingness/becoming - and chimes with the philosophy that all 
matter as energy can be seen through the modern application of quantum physics principles.  
It also harkens back to ancient traditional views of the body that have been shown to have 
long lasting influence in complementary medical praxis.  Theories about humanity are thus 
presented in the study as complex and multi-layered, rather than reductionist and 
mechanistic. 
 
Chapter 2 maintains that it is inconceivable to be dealing with the body in any related 
context devoid of a deeply considered discussion of what the ‘body’ actually means.  Views 
from ancient Chinese and Indian maps of the body as energy are presented with pertinent 
summaries of the meaning and philosophical exegesis behind them.  The discussion moves 
on to linking and substantiating the mappings with a theoretical discussion of twenty-first 
century quantum physics in order to set out and argue the thesis that alternative approaches 
to medicine have a valid input into the meaning of bodily becoming.  The links between the 
body as a structure, as energy, as quantum concepts of particle and wave are established.  
Implied in this viewpoint is the suggestion that the body is inextricably connected at a 
profound level with all that exists.  As Lisa Blackman argues, the body is not a bounded entity 
but rather multiple, extending and connecting to other bodies human and non-human which 
produce different kinds of body and different ways of enacting what it means to be human, 
and shifts the emphasis to what bodies can become.31  And Ervin Laszlo contends the living 
organism cannot be reduced to the interaction of its parts without losing its ‘emergent 
properties’ - the very characteristics that make it living.32  Such scholarly wisdom serves as a 
metaphor for the faith, hope, trust and love which underlies the body’s own power and 
capacity for healing both sickness and suffering. 
                                                          
31 Blackman, L., (2008), The Body: Key Concepts, Berg, New York, pp1-3. 
32 Laszlo, E., (2006) The Chaos Point: The World at the Crossroads, Piatkus Books, London, p92. 
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Chapter 3 is critical in highlighting current issues in organ donation and transplantation that 
place this specialist area of medicine into its appropriate context.  It has especial significance 
in emphasising the fundamental support factors involved in any ethical decision-making, but 
more importantly acts as a contrast and grounding for arguing a focus on the body as 
narrative for other chapters.  In greater detail Chapter 3 calls attention to the growing 
concern for the lack of resources available for organ transplantation and the means by which 
health, legal, and ethical institutions underpin the whole donation and transplantation 
process.  It sets out current statistics including living and deceased donation, legal 
regulations for donation both within the UK and globally, and methods of consent for both 
donor and recipient.  And in this vein opens out the thorny issue of presumed consent in 
order to prepare the ground for more profound discussion in Chapter 4.33 
 
A critical analysis of those sources informing past as well as current ethical debates on the 
subject of transplantation medicine is presented in Chapter 4.  The intention is to highlight 
both the strengths and weaknesses of those debates in order to add weight to a proposed 
alternative approach to the main ethical framework that currently operates in the UK.  Organ 
donation and transplantation are both complex and complicated events, involving major 
surgical intervention into the body.  Together they remain ethically challenging issues for 
those effecting and those who are affected by the processes.  The getting of presumed as 
well as informed consent remain high on the bioethical agenda since individually they reach 
into the very nature of human being and perceptions of the value of the body.  Payment of 
any sort for organs and the insistence on altruistic organ donation are particularly 
problematic since the whole notion of altruism is difficult to ascertain.  The question revolves 
around whether we can gift anything purely for the sake of it, with no ulterior motive, when 
it may be reconciled within ourselves as a charitable act, particularly where relatives of the 
donor are concerned.  The issue remains that payment for organs is illegal in the UK, no 
money must change hands throughout the entire process.  There is a strong argument that 
payment for organs is considered to pave the way for the sale of organs in an open market 
with all that entails.  Organ trafficking however persists globally and those who are paid to 
donate are often the least able to benefit from medical assistance post surgery.  Ethical 
unease continues unabated in the matter of organ acquisition and transfer with the result 
                                                          
33 For information and to give a snapshot, a timeline in the specialised medical domain of donation and 
transplantation has been included in an appendix at the end of the study to show the progress of organ 
transplantation techniques and the management both legal and organisational in the UK. 
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that organ shortage is directly blamed in many instances on the lack of progress in solving 
such ethical impasses. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses both the dominant bioethical model - generally understood as 
Principlism, and further ethical models suggested by eminent bioethicists as replacements or 
additions to that proposed by Beauchamp and Childress.  Discussion considers a variety of 
ethical models, both current and historical, in order to lend force to my contention that most 
frameworks fail to live up to their original intention, which is to offer guidance on medical 
decision-making in order to provide benefit and a restoration of an improved level of health 
to the patient.  The progress of modern medicine continues to be rocky suffering from 
diverse shifts in the political arena including ways in which healthcare is dispensed.  Such 
shifts have impacted on the development of bioethics over the years and may account for 
the resistant manner in which the dominant ethical model remains in its original form and is 
still in use.  The four principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice 
comprising the framework are critically analysed in the chapter for their effectiveness in 
providing the support that medical professionals seek to underpin their decision-making.  
They each have significant drawbacks, although the concept of autonomy has made a major 
contribution towards the establishment of informed consent.  More problematic however is 
Beauchamp and Childress’s claim to a common morality that is universal in its application, 
such a claim appears paradoxical.  Bioethical models based on utilitarian principles eschew 
the individual in favour of the greatest good for the greatest number, and thus sit as a meta-
ethic far removed from day-to-day moral concerns.  Alternative approaches to Principlism 
discussed in the final section of the chapter reveal similar difficulties of being too generalist 
to overcome the problems associated with placing the patient at the forefront of medical 
decision-making.  However, greater space is allotted to the ethics of care model.  It has the 
potential to link more readily with a more fluid interpretation of the body rendered possible 
by adopting a narrative approach to overcoming the difficulties associated with the static 
model devised by Beauchamp and Childress. 
 
The discussion in Chapter 6 centres on story beyond the patient’s medical history, and 
though medical history is vital in assessing treatment protocols, I consider that the patient’s 
own story has significant relevance for their future wellbeing and healing.  Clarification of the 
difference between pain and suffering and the subject of the fear of dying is an important 
starting point since these sit under the surface of many a story within a medical context.  The 
conflation of pain and suffering is unhelpful.  The superficiality of pain and the depth of 
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suffering - which is considered to be deeply embedded in the subtle energy system, render 
pain to be treatable and suffering frequently to be ignored.  Narrative34 I believe, offers a 
gateway into patient suffering and thereby a prompt to begin the process of healing often 
before any treatment takes place.  Given that care requires paying close attention to the 
needs of the other, and in the case of transplantation to those involved in the process, the 
rationale for choosing narrative as an appropriate alternative to the traditional bioethical 
framework of Principlism is the focus of the discussion in this chapter.  A positive healing 
prognosis I believe rests on continued care throughout the process of pre- and post-surgery.  
The narrative input of both the donor and the recipient is fundamental to caring and thereby 
becomes instrumental in garnering support during times when either physically or 
emotionally their anxieties may be relieved.  Their experiences after all are unique in the 
intervention they are about to undergo.  Story puts both the patient (as both donor and 
recipient) and the doctor mutually at the forefront of inclusive decision-making in prolonging 
life or in circumstances where that is certain not to be the case.  In both situations however 
hope is established so that life can carry on however limited, by the medical practitioner 
committing and responding to the needs of the patient. 
 
A more fluid interpretation of what is ‘good’ for individuals and for those who are ill in 
particular is vital.  Viewing the body as multiple and porous, as ever becoming through the 
process of individuation, contributes effectively towards accomplishing the aim of grounding 
the seemingly intractable complexities of technical advancement especially within 
transplantation medicine.  It renders with greater clarity the effect on patients, donors, 
family and medical professionals.  The focus for Chapter 7 in establishing a rationale for 
narrative through the processes of multi-vocality and dialogue, offers greater insight into 
development of any ethical approach.  People tell stories not just to work out their own 
changing identities, but also to guide others who will follow them.  Ill people while still 
surrendering their bodies to medicine, increasingly try to hold onto their own stories through 
the process of gathering those around them who they can trust to support them as the 
people they are, unencumbered by the role they have assumed as a patient living through 
and experiencing illness.  The necessity of dialogue in maintaining identity through illness 
therefore cannot be underestimated.  When dialogue breaks down for any reason, the 
patient becomes finalised - cut-off from who they are with the result that their healing is 
curtailed, because they cease to exist.  For a plethora of reasons, time being one, doctors 
regularly finalise patients so that the patient is silenced and in effect so too is their healing. 
                                                          
34 See Ch.6 for a fuller explanation of narrative. 
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Chapter 8 points towards potential future developments in biotechnology and the kinds of 
influence such progress will exert on bodily becoming.  There is an urgent need to develop 
criteria to underpin bioethics since these will have impact on future legal rulings - which as 
the Timeline shows lag far behind progress in the field.  Moreover this chapter returns to a 
focus on the body as pivotal to the thesis in this study and the issues that were raised in the 
Introduction.  It brings into sharp relief the real need to progress beyond the frameworks 
currently in use.  Moving rapidly towards the merging of our ways of life with science and 
technology inevitably requires a different perspective on human being.  The discussion in this 
chapter therefore considers the idea of the posthuman as a metaphor for the development 
of any ethical input concerning the body, the nature of understanding being in general and 
within medicine in particular.  Such contemplation, albeit speculative is critical.  Arguments 
discussed concentrate on the central issue of how the process of the fusion of technology 
with the body and its functioning will impact on future bioethical approaches, given the 
blurring of the boundary between science and a fluid interpretation of the individual.  The 
chapter covers contemporary ideas on living matter, ethical problems that might be 
associated with future of biotechnology and posthumanity in relation to care.  
 
There is a good deal of scepticism surrounding biotechnical progress.35  The blurring of parts 
of the body with other persons, technical devices and non-human organisms renders 
humanity hybridised.  Devising new social, ethical and discursive schemes of subject 
formation will become increasingly pressing.  Posthumanity is the opportunity to deconstruct 
and recast the traditionally held anthropocentric form, function and meaning of the body in 
diverse ways.  It will be challenging because significant normative questions will no doubt 
ensue.  The question for bodily becoming is not whether such change is acceptable - 
although this is an important issue, it is rather more critically a case of how we manage the 
use of any technology that will impact on the health and well-being of the body in the 
twenty-first century and beyond.  What will an ethical approach to care look like given the 
immense concentration of effort in creating technical artefacts of such sophistication and 
complexity?  It seems clear that the ideal of perfection, precision and efficiency remains 
foremost in every imaginary field overriding the needs of care and concern for the individual.  
                                                          
35 The development and use of robotics in diverse environments traditionally served by a large often highly skilled 
workforce being the most significant at the time of writing this thesis.  See progress in surgery and defence for 












The Approach – An Incarnational Perspective 
 
Now, more than ever…our place in the universe and the place of the universe in us, is proving to be one 
of active relationship.  That is more than a scientist’s credo.  The separateness of our lives is a sham.  
Physics, mathematics, music, painting, my politics, my love for you, my work, the star-dust of my body, 
the spirit that impels it, clocks diurnal, time perpetual, the roll, rough, tender, swamping, liberating, 





A fluid interpretation of human being defies a step-by step, logical following of a set of 
processes/criteria that reach conclusive results.37  Bioethics being considered a ‘soft’ and 
messy problem area grounds the idea that approach would be a more fitting term to pursue 
in this study.  Trying to fit any static, bioethical model representative of the dynamic nature 
of human being into a traditional methodology is naturally problematic.  
 
This chapter focuses on the body and its meaning.  It will introduce the body as wholistic; the 
body as relational; the doctor-patient encounter; and bodily experience in illness including 
the implication of Cartesian dualist interpretations of the mind body split which has so long 
engendered the separation of the body from itself, and ultimately from all that is or 
continues to become in the cosmos.  As stated in the Introduction and Background, an 
                                                          
36 Winterson, J., (1997) Gut Symmetries, Vintage, New York, p84. 
37 Although quantitative elements were critical to position the underlying problems of organ donation and 
transplantation in terms of numbers and types of donated organs, gender and ages of recipients for instance, 
these criteria are not strictly within the sphere of my research.  They were however useful indications of the scale 
of the issues. 
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incarnational approach is reasoned as more appropriate to embody human being/becoming 
and therefore is the thread connecting each part of the study.   
 
In order to present an inclusive picture of both the problems of organ donation and those of 
transplantation, a crystallisation of medical and philosophical theories is presented including 
bioethical concepts, empirical findings, reported experiences of transplantation and ad hoc 
conversations with alternative therapists.  While the study is an eclectic mix - a smörgasbørd 
if you will of research into an ever developing biotechnology, ‘what do we mean by “body”?’ 
is the overriding theme on which the whole study is based.  The body is not merely a matter 
of structural and objective explication but encompasses a multiplicity of concepts that 
inevitably demand an approach capable of accounting for such complexity.  I argue therefore 
that without some understanding of what ‘body’ connotes a deeper appreciation of the 
value of humanity will not be afforded and thus the help to patients - who after all are 
bodies in dire need of appropriate and significant medical assistance - will not be 
forthcoming.  
 
The problem of any medical intervention is necessarily concerned with people: the clinician, 
the patient and in all cases those who have contact with both including relatives and close 
friends, and being ‘messy’, concrete solutions are rare.38  Ethics equally is a slippery subject, 
a veritable minefield - there are no hard and fast rules and even within the law numerous 
exceptions and controversial decisions exist.  The key question is why organ donation and 
transplantation is privileged here as an example above any other medical issue?  As 
previously discussed in the Introduction no other surgical procedure necessitates the input 





Bodily experience is foundational to our moral agency: our capacities for action and power, 
our abilities to tolerate ambiguity, our capacities for moral feeling.  The body has ethical and 
societal relevance in a host of ways.  Our bodily experience significantly colours our 
interpretations of social relations, communities and institutions that are the stuff of ethics 
and our words are vehicles by which we express ourselves in interrelationship with humanity 
                                                          
38 Contrast ‘soft’ problem such as solve the issues of Syria, with a ‘hard’ problem where solving a mathematical 
problem such as adding up a column of numbers would have a solution. See Checkland, P., & Scholes, J., (1990) 
Soft Systems Methodology in Action, John Wiley, Chichester. 
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and the world.  Richard Niebuhr points out that meanings and values arise out of the 
interaction of our bodily reality and our interpretive capacities as social relational beings.39  
Those meanings that contribute to our wholeness as body selves in relation are therefore 
what we deem authentically valuable and thus ethically important. 
 
Although the lived body in everyday life is not the explicit focus of our attention, we do have 
some conscious notion of it, it is me.  Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues that the role of my 
body is as both perceiver and perceived, there is no duality.40  Under normal circumstances 
therefore, I do not perceive my body purely as an instrument.  In contrast Jean-Paul Sartre 
illustrates his view of the body instrumentally, in an account of the act of writing, but he too 
sees the body as non-separate: 
 
I am not in relation to my hand in the same utilizing attitude as I am in relation to 
the pen; I am my hand …I can apprehend it - at least in so far as it is acting - only as 
the perpetual, evanescent reference of the whole series …my hand has vanished; it 
is lost in the complex system of instrumentality in order that the system may exist.  
It is simply the meaning and orientation of the system…  We do not use the 
instrument for we are it.41 
 
Whilst our everyday experiences are often taken for granted and our bodies are always with 
us we do have a sense of identity, of the characteristics that comprise our make-up.  
Personal identity encompasses what we are: this specific biological organism, with a history 
and memories, thoughts and particular character traits, all of which change over time.  Yet 
they are anchored in sameness because of the temporal connections existing between 
present, past and future.  My body is not just one body among others, it is unique to me, it is 
who I am as a direct result of the possibility of my experience.42  A person’s body constitutes 
their selfhood, not simply because it is some thing they possess or own.  Additionally we 
must not assume that our bodily condition is static, it is constantly changing - we go through 
stages of infancy, puberty and adulthood and we age.  These changes have the potential to 
modify who and what we are, our interrelationships with each other and the wider world.  
Consequently such changes raise significant normative questions. 
 
                                                          
39 Niebuhr, H R., (1960) Radical Monotheism and Western Culture, Harper & Brothers, New York, p102ff. 
40 Merleau-Ponty, M., (1962) Phenomenology of Perception, Smith, C., (trans), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
VI: pp136-137. 
41 Sartre, J P., (1956) Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, H E Barnes (trans), Pocket 
Books, New York, pp426-427. 
42 Mackenzie, C., (2001) On Bodily Autonomy, in Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine, Toombs, Kay S., 
(ed.) (2001) Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, pp422-423. 
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When illness strikes, the change is all too evident.  Drew Leder proposes when we are in 
pain, that pain is ‘ultimately a manner of being-in-the world.’43  Pain reorganises our lived 
space and time, our relations with others and with ourselves and its importance is only 
revealed when set within this broader context.  Pain disrupts life.  The body accordingly 
emerges as ‘an alien presence that makes a telic demand’ upon us.44  Pain frequently persists 
independent of its environmental cause and the new world which pain thrusts us into has a 
limiting effect.  We are no longer out there in the world but stuck in the world of pain.  
According to Elaine Scarry moreover, intense pain is ‘experienced spatially as either a 
contraction of the universe down to the immediate vicinity of the body or as the body 
swelling to fill the entire universe.’45  In pain we are ceaselessly reminded of the here and 
now.  Yet pain bizarrely effects certain alienation.  Doctors report that patients frequently 
describe their pain as ‘it’ separated from ‘I’ or ‘my’ for instance.46 
 
In the case of chronic problems as in disease, the contrast with acute medical issues is 
significant.  Dependency on drugs, regular visits to hospital and frequent protracted periods 
of hospitalisation and recovery render the patient removed from the meaningful context of 
job, home, family and friends - in other words from their world.  Even close family cannot 
share or fully understand the experience the patient is going through.  Space and time 
constrict the patient’s world to the world of the hospital.  The everyday world in which the 
patient had recently inhabited now appears inaccessibly remote.  As Leder suggests ‘A 
landscape is viewed not as a field of possibility but of difficulties to negotiate.’47  Disease, 
even more than pain is typified by complex patterns of dysfunction.  In disease we are 
actively dis-abled.  The onset of dis-ease brings into sharp focus personal vulnerability.  
Abilities that were previously in our control and belong to the habitual body have been lost 
and the loss of control intrinsic to that experience is accompanied by an acute awareness 
rendering the familiar world unpredictable.  The patient’s view on the world has dramatically 
changed - it is discontinuous.  Kay Toombs argues that patients find prior assumptions about 
what is every-day and familiar to be ‘strangely inadequate for interpreting the existential 
crisis.’48 
 
                                                          
43 Leder, D., (1990) The Absent Body, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p73. 
44 Leder, D., (1990) p77 
45 Scarry, E., (1985) The Body in Pain, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p4. 
46 White J C., & Sweet, W H., (1955) Pain: Its Mechanisms and Neurosurgical Control, Charles C Thomas, 
Springfield, p108. 
47 Leder, D., (1990) p81 
48 Toombs, S K., (1992) The Meaning of Illness: A Phenomenological Account of the Different Perspectives of 
Physician and Patient, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, p20. 
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Nonetheless we do tend to engage with our pain and the body becomes an object to dig 
around even when this causes more discomfort.  We surf the Internet, consult books on the 
body seeking for some kind of diagnosis or even ask friends or family for their opinion.  We 
reflect on the past looking for possible origins of the current problem.  When finally we 
consult a clinician we come to see our body ‘in a series of technologically and conceptually 
extended ways that would otherwise be unavailable to us.’49  My body becomes the object 
not just of perception and interpretation but of action and instead of simply acting from it, I 
act towards it.  I become the patient and lose sight of me.  Being a patient becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy.  Consultation with the doctor often is a meeting between strangers, in 
spite of its intimate nature.  It is in addition a meeting that is radically asymmetrical in the 
sense that the patient is the weak, help-seeking party asking for aid from the expert in health 
matters.50  It thus demands some shared understanding.  In the case of serious illness 
imparting such information risks superficiality marked by distinct difficulty in simplifying the 
highly specialised language involved, to create the necessary space for any level of mutual 
agreement and thence truly informed consent.  This asymmetrical encounter Toombs 
believes, results from a distinct lack of a shared set of ‘typifications.’51  In the first instance 
the lived experience of illness is a situation in which the doctor categorises the patient’s 
illness as a typified instance of a particular disease state, whereas the patient encounters 
their disorder as a unique personal event.  In living through illness, therefore the patient 
does not experience bodily disorder as simply a specific kind of disease but rather as the 
unique manner in which disease has control over their particular life situation.  ‘To grasp 
something as a typification is to consider it apart from its ongoing constitution in  
lived time.’52  Patients encounter illness in its ‘qualitative immediacy.’  Consequently in the 
experience of illness the taken-for-granted quality of daily life is called into question.  The 
integrity of the self is primarily threatened and this fundamental loss of wholeness cannot 
‘readily be interpreted in terms of naïve typifications.’53 
 
Asymmetry in the doctor-patient encounter has wide-ranging implications.  Choices for 
treatment, as Fredrik Svenaeus points out, reduce very much to whether to accept a specific 
procedure or not, rather than a meeting of ‘minds’ which will come to some agreement 
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about the best path of action.54  It demands a mutual trust and respect that renders the 
meeting an intense form of attunement.  It places demands on the clinician to understand 
the body as far more than an object for study and technical manipulation to a richer, more 
rounded perspective that should include ways in which illness affects the daily lives of the 
patient.  However, scientific typifications are characteristic of what Alfred Schutz and 
Thomas Luckmann call ‘[an] autonomous province of knowledge’ a knowledge which is only 
readily available to experts.55  Although it must be remembered that the clinician is able to 
interpret the illness of the patient in terms of their specific area of knowledge as both a 
specialised and scientific typification, and may wish to proceed with due haste ignoring the 
point that the patient does not conceive of their illness in the same manner. 
 
There is a direct correlation between the experiencer that is the patient, and what they 
experience.  This provides the grounds for the necessity of taking into account the manner in 
which each patient constitutes the meaning of their personal experience of illness and the 
way this influences their view of the world.  No two patients will ascribe exactly the same 
meaning to their illness.  As a result it becomes paramount to account for their individual 
world-view not only from their unique biographical perspective but also from the wider 
social context that is a feature of their historical and cultural backgrounds.  As Andrew Elder 
and Oliver Samuel suggest, the clinician’s lived experience is significantly different from the 
patient’s.56  Hence the doctor who can lay aside any preconceived notions about the 
patient’s illness is better able to recognise and set aside prejudgments which may get in the 
way of exploring the meanings inherent in the patient’s world.  Mary Midgley captures the 
essence of the problem beautifully: 
 
Microscopes, those splendid tools of modern scientific method are also its most 
significant symbol.  Microscopes reveal new patterns, patterns which can sometimes 
be of the utmost importance.  But they make the original macroscopic phenomena 
invisible.  When we want the facts at that everyday level, we have to put away our 
microscopes.  If (for instance) the problem is why certain people are anaemic, we 
must answer questions about their way of living as well as ones about the 
constitution of their blood.  For many of the most relevant of those questions, 
neither the microscope nor the scientific method that it serves is any use at all.  (For 
instance: are these people happy?  Are they fairly treated?  How are they trying to 
live?)  Different patterns different ways of thinking must be brought in.57 
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Biotechnological progress provides us with unprecedented capacity for change.  Thus in 
developing any ethical response to such progress we cannot simply assume that it is either 
beneficial or detrimental to humanity.  Any normative question must always ask whether 
there are good reasons for accepting the consequent changes to human embodiment, in 
other words to who and what we are, and to what may follow as a result. 
 
Reasoning an incarnational approach 
 
The main focus of this study is theoretical requiring an approach that considers in depth 
wholistic and relational concepts of the ‘fleshy’ experience of life,58 and more especially to a 
life riven by illness both acute and chronic.  I deemed qualitative research approaches to be 
more appropriate, to articulate and interpret meaning in humanity in general and life as a 
patient in particular.  Whilst inductive methods are useful for capturing insights and richness 
of data, the subjective nature of inductive research renders results open to criticism for their 
lack of repeatability and thus confirmation or refutation of hypotheses.  For this research 
however, the lack of repeatability is imperative since as a practising kinesiologist I found that 
no two patient experiences were the same and I found it to be the patients’ story and 
individual experience which became the foundation for recovery.  Such experience lends 
support for the argument that care seen through the lens of narrative and dialogue could be 
a useful ethical approach. 
 
However, the search for a suitable qualitative method to progress the study occasionally led 
me down the odd blind alley since the corpus of textual information and evidence covering 
the field of transplantation medicine is vast and very loosely linked, thus rendering a 
particular avenue of thought difficult to pursue.  In the end I chose to consider areas that 




I turned to the phenomenological approach to illness as a possible avenue worth pursuing.  
Since phenomenology is essentially reflective upon experience focusing on the taken-for-
granted assumptions of everyday life, it at first sight appeared to have some relevance.  Such 
reflection involves the disengagement, or distancing from our immediate and on-going 
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experience of day-to-day life in order to make explicit the nature of such experience and the 
intentional structures that determine the meaning of that experience.  In Edmund Husserl’s 
terms ‘bracketing out’.59  In medicine phenomenology explores the view of the body as 
experienced in comparison with the body as the object of enquiry.  In illness it is powerful in 
examining doctor-patient relationships for instance or the gap between the patients’ 
understanding of illness and the understanding of the doctor.  The argument would follow 
therefore that the phenomena of illness as it is lived is markedly distinct from the scientific 
identity of the disease state, both of which have important implications for doctor-patient 
communication, negotiation and a shared view of the body and its present problems. 
A phenomenological approach seemed very valuable save for the view that embodiment 
requires that medical professionals seek to: 
 
…promote capacities for dealing creatively with situations beyond personal 
immediate control, to experience pain and struggle as meaningful aspects of 
existence, to find hope in a commitment to shape the life one has been given within 
restraints so that it is expressive and personally significant, and to experience 
wonder, appreciation and joy for whatever level of activity one can carry out with 
altered capacities, [these] are emotional tasks that healthcare professionals must 
address in promoting authentic healing.60  
 
‘Authentic healing’ starts with both the professional and the patient acknowledging their 
commonality as persons, who share suffering along with the rest of humanity which is more 
than mere emotions can express.  What is required is a meeting that takes into account the 
wider issues and perspectives of each of the participants - the medical professional as well as 
the patient.  It is one thing to recognise there is something amiss in medical praxis but yet 
another to ‘promote capacities’ to deal with the lacuna.  A significant part of the answer 
comes from the patient herself rather than any medical professional ‘promoting authentic 
healing.’  Thus bracketing out, so much a feature of the phenomenological method turns out 
to be inappropriate when the goal is not so much to analyse the experience in its fullness as 
to come to terms with it from both the perspective of the patient and the medical 
professionals involved. 
 
In contrast, the salient feature of this study is a reconsideration of medical professionals’ 
approaches to caring and compassion through an engagement at some deeper level with 
what it means for the patient to be ill, to empathise by being alive to their suffering and not 
just their pain for, as I have implied, healing starts at the point of suffering, not merely with 
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analgesics or surgical intervention.  Through the process of a deeper engagement with the 
patient rather than the case history, the medical professionals are offered an opportunity to 
see things differently to open out their views and effect a change within themselves rather 
than merely the patient.  It is a call to look outwards to the wider picture.  As Rupert 
Sheldrake believes: all bodies, cosmic, animal and human have an effect upon one another 




Originally I wanted to ‘get my hands dirty’ and not view the topic at a distance.  My aim has 
always been to offer a practical outcome, but one that reflects a deep understanding of the 
issues at hand.  So whilst phenomenology gave me some useful ideas, it failed to offer 
insights toward a potential outcome that I feel should be by its very nature pragmatic.  
Ethnography became a possibility.  It would have offered that very opportunity for me to ‘get 
stuck in’ since in-depth interviewing and analysis requires just the active engagement I 
sought.  However, the point of this study is to take a fresher look at the problem and not get 
caught up with issues already well documented in academic texts and the media.  And, 
moreover, those firmly held by clinicians themselves, whose ideology seems so deeply 
entrenched in a dualist interpretation of the body.  
 
More meaningful deliberation and research I felt was required before coming up with a 
schedule of questions that would have offered sufficient ‘fruit’ to provide the practical 
alternative to that which is already in place.  Since ethnographic research is a lengthy process 
ultimately the ‘right’ questions were not forthcoming sufficiently to elicit the kinds of 
response that would offer the creative outcome I was seeking.  I believe this would have 
been almost certainly through an immature appreciation of the subject matter.   Indeed 
many potentially ethical issues are still forthcoming even as I am in the process of writing-
up.62  Ethnographers might disagree claiming that participant observation would offer just 
the opportunity to tease out the real issues, but I was not willing to take the risk of getting 
embroiled in myriad well-known debates supporting standard medical approach and praxis.  
However I do not rule-out ethnography altogether since it could play a significant role in 
substantiating the findings of my research in any future study within bioethics generally.  
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Finally on reading further about the body, body theology and the ethics of caring struck a 
chord, since they touch on wholistic, embodied awareness, and through continued research I 
became convinced that this would be the way forward for the rest of the study. 
 
Incarnation and the body 
 
Whilst this study is not theological in content, I have drawn on aspects of body theology as a 
helpful basis from which to argue that bodily becoming is a constant process, ever moving 
forward and linked to all that exists including divine existence which resonates with belief, 
faith, hope and above all love as essential human attributes.  Such an approach also chimes 
with the fluidity of all life as evidenced by the concepts and philosophies of quantum physics, 
which have gained much credibility in recent years.  The task of body theology focused on 
incarnation therefore is critical reflection on our bodily experience as the fundamental realm 
of connection to the divine, an experience that I believe to be significant.  According to 
James Nelson the Christian ethicist, incarnation doesn’t begin with doctrinal propositions, 
rather it starts with the ‘fleshy’ experience of life – ‘with our desires, our bodily aliveness and 
deadness, with the warm touch of a friend.’63  It is not however, a theological description of 
bodily life from a ‘supra-bodily vantage point.’ 64  We do not have bodies we are bodies.  
Incarnation therefore necessarily begins with our bodily/fleshy experience, even while it 
recognises that our experiences are filtered through interpretation of the apparent reality 
that we attach to our bodily life.  The more connected we are with bodily reality, the more 
we are able to accept the world we experience.  By contrast, the more distant from the body 
we are, the more separated we are from all that contributes to our awareness of our world, 
the greater the tendency to see the world as dualities, with either-ors, we or they, sick or 
well.  
 
Isherwood and Stuart believe that dwelling spiritually within the physical body entails 
removing oneself as far as possible from the reality of that body, and so the issue with 
dualism rests in the notion that all that is truly worthy lies beyond the body and ultimately in 
heaven.65  Routinely we have been taught not only is the body different from the real core of 
selfhood, it is also lower and must be controlled by that which is higher.  Our language 
therefore continues to be strongly dualistic.  The body appears radically different from me.  I 
have a body seems much more natural than I am a body, or even I am body.  Certain 
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experiences such as illness, aging and death seem to confirm the estrangement of the body.  
The body becomes an it, a burden, a thing to be borne, to be put up with, to be tolerated.  In 
illness the body feels alien to us, it isn’t unusual to hear someone say ‘I’m not feeling myself 
today.’  There is a disconnection and yet ironically we feel most fully ourselves when bodily 
connected with each other and the earth. 
 
Thus incarnational theory offers insights into the very nature of humanity, its embodiedness 
and its value, an understanding that looks both inward and outward to the interrelationship 
of the individual to others and to the wider world.  Caring is founded for instance in the 
sense of worth that I experience in the other.  It requires a sense of participation in the 
other.  It requires trust in the other.  In proposing that human life is fundamentally valuable 
not merely because human beings place value on it, a body theological approach centres on 
the idea of faith.  And whilst all judgements of value are based on faith - because we actually 
don’t know, if to become more fully human means to live with greater self-awareness, 
greater capacity for faith, hope and love, then according to James Nelson and Jo Anne 
Rohricht any specific biomedical decisions should be made in ways that nourish, enhance 
and enlarge these inherent human qualities.66   
 
By understanding humanity as embodied there is a shift from the traditional clinical 
approach to the body as a form of machine, to the ways in which consciousness affects the 
embodied self, and equally to the way in which embodiment influences and delineates 
consciousness.  The body therefore can be seen as the articulation and actualisation of the 
self.  Such understanding is not with the body object as studied by the anatomist or 
physiologist, but rather the body subject, the embodiment of our consciousness, our bodily 
sense of how we are in the world.  It concerns the interaction of the ‘givenness’ of our fleshy 
realities and the ways in which we interpret them.  It grounds an understanding of our bodily 
sense of connections to the world, our bodily sense of the space and time we are in and our 
bodily knowing of the meanings of our relationships.67  It involves reintegrating the body, 
seeing the body as the embodiment of consciousness, with our interactions with reality and 
the ways in which we interpret them: ‘re-integration of the body wholistically is not simply 
an abstract hope, a revelation from outside imposed on a very different reality.’68  Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin once commented that we have been taught to understand our bodies as 
fragments of the universe, as pieces completely detached from the rest, handed over to us 
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to inhabit.  Rather he proclaimed that the body is the very universality of things.  ‘My body is 
not part of the universe that I possess totally - it is the totality of the universe that I possess 
partially.’69  In this sense we are part of everything that ever existed and exists now.  In 
viewing the body as fundamentally a machine, René Descartes’ strong inclination was to 
view the earth’s body mechanistically, to see neither its organic wholeness nor the deep, 
connectedness which we all share.  By contrast bodily alienation implies that life’s very 
essence or core is rendered other than the earth.  I am not part of it, nor is it part of me - we 
are little more than proximal associates. 
 
In understanding both the givenness of our body realities and the meanings ascribed to 
them, some way of interpretation that nurtures the greater wholeness of life in relation to 
the divine, to each other and to the earth is fundamental.  Separating ourselves from our 
very embodiedness is illusory since being detached from the changes, needs and 
vulnerabilities of the body opposes the possibility of deep connections and the emotional 
intimacy with others.  Revealing our vulnerability enables us to sensitively and imaginatively 
enter into another’s story and empathically to welcome the other into our own.  It draws 
richly on the affective, on the imagination, on the poetic and on the intuitive.  Nelson 
believes ‘It is a capacity profoundly linked with body connection and with the bodily 
revelation which we are in need of.  When that capacity in us is alive and well, the presence 
of the creative and the divine is in us and in our relationships.’70 
 
Bodily becoming in a medical setting 
 
All our relationships are mediated through our bodies.  Through our emotions we interact 
with the world.  Our senses and bodily integrity ground our relatedness.  When the body is 
deeply alienated, dis-eased, the loss of connectedness to one another, to the world and to 
the divine is profound.  By embracing our suffering as part of being human we become just 
as alive to pain as to joy.  Suffering is shared and carried in the very heart of the universe.  In 
acknowledgement of this shared capacity to embrace it, we are in a sense re-incarnated, 
healed at the core of our being and as a result re-connected with our personal power, our 
potential.  Then and only then can we live deeply into all parts of our own story and into the 
stories of others. 
 
                                                          
69 Teilhard de Chardin, P., (1968) Science and Christ, Harper Collins, New York, pp12-13. 
70 Nelson, J B., (1992) pp96-99 
 35 
The implications for understanding and reconnecting personal power are immense.  In 
doctor-patient relationships the consequences are significant.  Granted that the doctor’s 
authority could be seen as resting within her expertise.  It is that all essential trust and faith 
in the doctor that underpins both patient/doctor relationships and the essence of caring.  All 
too often authority can be read as paternalism and much as paternalism has been frowned 
upon over the last century and indeed currently, it is interesting to note that as technology 
advances the risk of paternalism has once more become an issue.  Atul Gawande notes that 
increasing the time devoted to patients can give rise to an even greater chance of 
authoritarian approaches as the doctor aims to clarify and answer the patients’ worries and 
anxieties, relying as they do on their expertise and medical knowledge rather than an 
empathetic approach to the patient’s dilemma.71  Paternalism however, erodes faith and 
trust.72 
 
Carter Heyward the feminist theologian suggests that genuine creative authority, sacred at 
its root, is in our hands.  It moves us more fully into ‘our body-selves in relation’.  It touches 
and often frightens us as it calls us forth to become more fully who we are already: 
interdependent and mutual participants in this journey we call life.’73  It was Hannah 
Arendt’s perception that genuine authority has disappeared in our time because we have 
‘lost the primordial sources for it’ - sources such as faith, belief in a divine presence, in the 
nation, in marriage, monogamy and politics.74  From a feminist liberation theological and, 
moreover ethical point of view, however both external and internal notions of authority are 
inadequate.  Neither is born in, nor gives birth to mutuality as a vital life force that is the 
substance of love, friendship and voluntary co-operation at all levels of human engagement.  
When Hannah Arendt suggests that authority has disappeared because the primordial 
sources for it are lost, she is stating simply that in the mid to late twentieth century, ‘we 
westerners lost our footing.  We have nothing to believe in and we are looking in all the 
wrong places and directions to recover it.’75 
 
The experience of authority as organic and encouraging us to be who we are is the antithesis 
of the more prevalent ideas and experiences of authority as force, coercion or indeed 
violence.  The theologian John E Skinner understood the beginning point of authority as an 
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arche, that is, we need an initial reason for authority to experience it as redemptive rather 
than coercive or damaging.76  The value and meaning of authority in mutual relation rather is 
to shape justice.  Authority is not a possession, no one of us has it, it is our dunamis our 
dynamic power in relation.  The authority of God is not the power to create out of nothing 
but rather the power to co-create out of the fabric of our daily lives with justice and 
compassion.  According to Heyward, to be creative rather than coercive, real and not 
rhetorical authority must be shaped in the context of our movement into mutually 
empowering relationship.77 
 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the Lutheran theologian, notes that through divine powerlessness and 
suffering a new kind of power is revealed.78  Because we have been ‘conditioned’ into 
believing that power is one-way, top-down, it is seen frequently as the capacity to influence 
others while being minimally influenced ourselves and in this way it is both limiting and 
limited.  Such power severely curtails our understanding.  But understanding requires 
vulnerability and reciprocity.  The intensity and variety of outlook that can be entertained in 
the unity of the self without feeling defensive or insecure is liberating.  Moreover, it is 
perfectly within our power to encourage others to become freer in the development of their 
own diversity and uniqueness; in fact it is fundamental to caring and compassion.  
Powerlessness so often seen as weakness can be re-interpreted, reincarnated and our faith 
in life restored.  It is the gracious discovery of the communion between the divine and 
human life in flesh that results in our reincarnation in our becoming, in an awareness of 
being renewed into the fullness of life. 
 
Control of the body, however develops little understanding of emotional life and when 
emotions really take hold, they are likely to be overwhelming.  When in control of others 
entering into their subjectivity is almost impossible.  By contrast, relational power does not 
aim to control or diminish the power of another.  It is mutual empowerment, willing to be 
heard as much as to hear the other and to be positively influenced and reinforced by that 
hearing.  Does this hearing result in experiencing more of an acute awareness of our self 
hitherto unexplored or even unknown, and moreover of the Word made flesh?  For Keller if 
according to the prologue of Gospel of St John ‘the word became flesh and lived among us’ it 
                                                          
76 Skinner, J E., (1983) The Meaning of Authority, United Press of America, Washington, D.C. 
77 Heyward, C., (1989) p75 
78 Bonhoeffer, D., (1953) Prisoner for God: Letters and Papers from Prison, Bethge, E., (ed.), Fuller, R H., (trans), 
Macmillan Co., New York, pp124-131. 
 37 
is precisely the word through which all things came into being.79  And the same verse 
emphatically clarifies what is far less cited ‘What has come into being in the word was life 
(John 1:4).  All of it.’80  We do not just use words we are words, words are distinctive to our 
bodily reality. 
 
Alfred North Whitehead, the mathematician and philosopher whose work in the twentieth 
century focused on reality as interrelated processes rather than material objects, believes 
the very nature of the highest achievement for humankind is to develop empathetic feeling 
rather than objective rationality since the very nature of the world shows that it is not 
dualistic but relational.  We do not have to retreat from the world in order to understand it, 
we have to move more feelingly towards it.  Whitehead argues the energy that can be 
scientifically observed in the world is in fact ‘emotional intensity entertained in life.’81  It is 
this emotional intensity that fuels both the universal drive of evolution and the individual 
drive for goals. Although we are a distinctive part of the created order we are not detached 
from the rest of the cosmos.  We are in effect co-creators of the universe. Thus all matters 
are central in creating a future we all share however uncertain that may be.  As Whitehead 
suggests the way to chart this uncertain future is to look for patterns rather than absolute 




I do not just have a body, I am my body.  I am always interpreting myself as my body, 
creating my meanings as my body and using images and language to give significance to my 
bodily functions and dysfunctions, states of health and disease.  When we act on the 
assumption that our bodies are merely intricate machines suffering is not relieved but rather 
compounded.  We have been led to believe that physicians are responsible, even obligated 
to relieve suffering, and yet patients continue to suffer not only from their disease but often 
also from their treatment.  Yet the relief of suffering is considered one of the primary ends of 
medical education, research or indeed practice.  The recognition we are more than merely 
our physical bodies is central to the argument for an approach that reflects the complexity of 
the human body and critically underpins the thesis in this study.  The question lies in what 
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health might mean in a wholistic, relational and meaningful sense in comparison with how it 
is too frequently interpreted, and therefore what effect this will have on any future 
bioethical perspective.  The shift in emphasis away from the traditional clinical approach to 
the body, to the ways in which consciousness effects the embodied self and equally to the 
way in which embodiment influences and explains consciousness, is key.  What are ‘good’ 
reasons for accepting the consequent changes to human embodiment in any medical 
intervention, to who and what we are, and what may follow as a result?   
 
Bioethics after all was developed to support first and foremost those who could be 
considered vulnerable to the vicissitudes of a medical practice that frequently leaves them 
powerless within an environment from which they are distanced by virtue of the specialist 
circumstances in which they find themselves.  How should care and concern for the patient 
be processed?  How is trust between doctor and patient to be rekindled and power and 
authority to be negotiated?  These issues are fundamental to any exploration involved in 
creating any dynamic approach.  Both patients and physicians co-operatively need to make 
critical decisions about life-changing medical interventions.  This process requires sensitivity 
on the part of the patient and the medical professionals, strengthened by a much greater 
awareness of what it means to be humanly embodied.  It means an intense focus on 
listening, watching intently, understanding and interpreting faithfully the signs of the body 
and responding not just to the vital signs and ‘the case history’ but to the wider effects that 
illness and disease impose on the patients’ as well as on the professionals’ everyday lives.  
Because the medical professional too as listener and co-coordinator of the outcome of their 
expertise is co-creator of their own healing mediated through the story and subsequent 
caring for and healing of the patient.  As Rita Charon professes ‘I feel honoured to have 
found some fresh approaches to routine clinical work, because these new ways of being a 
general internist add to my pleasure in being a doctor…the practices [of narrative 
medicine]…have renewed me and given me added joy.’83  It seems that the onus is on the 
clinician therefore to engage at a meaningful level empathising with the patient’s voice that 
is so important in creating the healing of both doctor and patient in order to contribute to a 
better informed, more fulfilled, co-operative purpose that adds greater clarity to a 
moral/ethical outcome. 
 
In sum, Bernard Williams commented: even if ethical norms cannot be directly deduced from 
scientific research, the only way a conceivable ethics could be developed is by starting with 
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an investigation and analysis of human nature.84  That the world of human being is 
undeniably a world of meaning and ethics is clearly part of this sphere of analysis.  Chapters, 
6, 7 and 8 argue ethics through a care-centred, multi-vocal approach by way of narrative that 
addresses the dynamic nature of the individual and their illness.  But firstly Chapter 2 
explores the nature of human being in order to expand on the ideas discussed in the 
Introduction and Chapter 1. 
                                                          













Chapter 2  
 
Thinking through the Body 
 
The common division of the world into subject and object, inner world and outer world, body and soul 





The main theme of this chapter is to address the body and its complexity from a different 
perspective.  So much concentration on the lack of organs for transplantation and the push 
to reach very difficult national UK donation targets and transplantation rates within extreme 
financial constraints has diverted attention away from the prime rationale for undertaking 
transplantation in the first place.86  It seems inconceivable to be ‘tinkering’ with the body 
devoid of a deeply considered discussion of what ‘body’ actually means in order to develop a 
different ethical approach to support those who undertake such ‘tinkering’ and those who 
would be ‘tinkered’ with.87  In short, what is meant by the body should surely be of central 
importance. 
 
The links between the body as a structure, as energy, indeed as quantum concepts of 
particle and wave will be developed and discussed.  That is the body as inextricably 
connected at a profound level with all that exists.  Once argued, I believe that this will serve 
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as a metaphor for the faith, hope, trust and love which I understand to underlie the body’s 
own power and capacity for healing both sickness and suffering, motivated by an awareness 
of what it means to be ill seen through the lens of the patient’s story.  Whilst I don’t believe 
that narrative of whatever form is the complete answer to the problems encountered in 
using such a narrowly focussed and static bioethical framework as Principlism, I do think that 
story in whatever form is valuable as a stimulus for deeper discussion of the issues relevant 
to the patient-doctor encounter, since it is a living, dynamic snapshot at the time of the 
patient’s unfolding of their illness.  In any case I argue that narrative per se has an important 
place in opening out the difficulties faced by those involved in any delicate area of decision-
making.88 
 
The body and its meaning 
 
Blackman talks about ‘a body’ not as a singular, bounded entity or substance but rather as 
what she terms ‘the body multiple.’89  She argues that the body is not enclosed by the skin, 
where skin is to be understood as a kind of container for the self, but rather our bodies 
always extend and connect to other bodies, human and non-human, to practices, 
techniques, technologies and objects which produce different kinds of bodies and different 
ways of enacting what it means to be human.  In direct contrast to the narrow view taken by 
Beauchamp and Childress who maintain that the language of personhood is too unclear to 
‘resolve the problems of moral status’,90 Blackman seeks to demonstrate the dynamic nature 
of human being which embodies potential both complex and relational.  The idea of the 
body as simply something that we have and are is displaced as the focus shifts to what 
bodies can do, what bodies could become, what practices enable and coordinate the doing of 
particular kinds of bodies, and what makes this possible in terms of our approach to 
questions about life, humanness, culture, power, technology and subjectivity.  These 
represent some of the themes that radically reconstruct the idea of the body as substance or 
entity and we might say as distinctly human. 
 
The reformulation of the perceptions of body and bodies across the humanities has also 
demanded an imaginative re-engagement with ethical method.  If the body is not simply a 
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natural body - often seen as the rightful province of the life and biological sciences - then 
how can bodies be examined and interrogated through frameworks that have been 
understood as less inclusive and thereby less wholistic?  As Aristotle suggested ‘the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts.’ 91  Thus a way of accounting for and creating awareness of 
such bodily wholeness is paramount.  The concept that ‘the whole is more than the sum of 
its parts’ thus holds, for when the parts are integrated within the living organism, properties 
emerge and processes take place that are not the simple sum of the properties of those 
parts.  Laszlo argues that the living organism cannot be reduced to the interaction of its parts 
without losing its ‘emergent properties’ - the very characteristics that make it living.92 
 
What does it mean to think through the body from within our own bodies as well as within a 
specific discipline such as the medical sciences, for to ‘think through the body’ is a noticeably 
broader notion.  It requires critical reflection on how different perspectives enable us to 
approach the body in order to gain a fuller picture of what ‘body’ means.  How might we 
embody our own sense of subjectivity for instance?  We may feel that our sense of who we 
are is an amalgam of our physicality, biological processes and our place and position as 
particular kinds of social subject within diverse cultural milieux.  Indeed one of the problems 
central to the challenge to ‘think through the body’ is exactly how processes can be brought 
together that have traditionally been viewed as separate elements.  Imperative however is 
that we move beyond thinking of bodies as substances, as special kinds of things or entities, 
but rather to explore bodies as sites of potentiality, process and practice. 
 
The body as energy 
 
Kinesiology is one such practice that focuses on the subtle body and treats it as a series of 
energy flows that are equally considered the sites of our power, a power that motivates 
healing.  The therapy is informed by ancient traditional views demonstrating the importance 
laid on esoteric anatomy that has found its place in such current alternative perceptions of 
the body as evidenced by complementary medicine and therapies, including Yoga, 
Acupuncture, Chinese Medicine and Ayurveda.  Such therapies emphasise the importance of 
balancing and maintaining energy flow within the body as vital for bodily health and the 
relief of suffering. 
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According to Mircea Eliade one of the earliest Vedic identifications that became central in all 
later Indian esoteric traditions is that between the body and the universe.93  One of the key 
texts, a late book of the Ṛg Veda the Puruṣa Sūkta which is often quoted throughout the 
Hindu tradition is a famous hymn of cosmic man.  The hymn shows if the cosmos is in some 
sense sacred then so is society that manifests itself in a hierarchical order, an order that is 
also reflected in the structure of the body.  The scale of this order is identified as the purity 
or pollution associated with the body: the head, as the highest part of the body is the purest 
and the feet, the lowest part is the most polluted.  Social and individual bodies are 
reflections of each other and both are part of the larger structure or body of the cosmos.  
Gavin Flood argues that this integration of society and cosmos, of body and society was the 
sacred order of the universe.  As a sacred order it is eternal and unchanging brought to life in 
Vedic ritual, expressed in the hymns and clarified in texts of ritual exegesis.94  The material 
human body therefore in Vedic times was thought to be a gross manifestation of a subtle 
body, which in turn is a manifestation of a supreme body.  In other words understanding the 
nature of humanity through a wholistic lens was considered fundamental. 
 
The subtle body  
 
In certain eastern traditions, it is believed that extending and interpenetrating beyond the 
physical body are several subtle energy bodies of the human form.  Unlike our physical form 
these are not detectable by the five senses.  However, many subtle effects can be measured 
that appear to have no physical source, the healing energy of a healer’s hands is one such 
example.95  Once subtle bodies are incorporated into the physical body, the complexity of 
the human form becomes evident, in other words visible.  In essence the subtle energies 
associated with the physical form are well defined.96  Such complexity is shown in Figure 1.97  
The subtle body comprises several layers - popularly known as the auras.  While each layer 
                                                          
93 Eliade, M., (1937) Cosmical Homology and Yoga, Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Arts: 5:37:188-203. 
The Vedas are considered the earliest literary record.  They examine the nature of the universe.  Hymns, rituals, 
legends and magic were handed down orally to an exclusive male line – brahman – who were trained as priests 
from childhood as disciples of gurus and exhorted to maintain the accuracy of the texts in order to preserve their 
purity.  In fact the Vedic texts were only written down after many thousands of years, an act that was considered 
both polluting and sacrilege. 
94 Flood, G., (1996) An introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p188. 
95 By Kirlian photography for instance.  Although much debated, Kirlian believed that images created by Kirlian 
photography might depict a conjectural energy field, or aura thought, by some, to surround living things. Kirlian 
and his wife were convinced that their images showed a life force or energy field that reflected the physical and 
emotional states of their living subjects. They thought that these images could be used to diagnose illnesses. In 
1961, they published their first article on the subject in the Russian Journal of Scientific and Applied Photography. 
96 Judith, A., (2004) Eastern Body, Western Mind: Psychology and the Chakra System as a Path to the Self, Random 
House, New York. 




extends beyond the lower, it does not exist just as a layer in isolation around the body, but 
rather penetrates all the layers below it, and then extends further from the physical body to 
the wider systems within the cosmos. 
 
Interpenetrating and surrounding the physical body, the etheric body also known in Sanskrit 
as the Annamaya Kosha is the densest of all the subtle bodies.  Being closest in vibration to 
the physical body, it holds a subtle replica or etheric double of every organ in the body and 
of the body itself.  Interestingly the etheric aspect of an organ does not withdraw from the 
body when the physical organ is removed, at this level memory traces remain.98  In sum, the 
etheric body forms a primary interface between the electromagnetic energy flows of the 
physical body and the subtle energy flows of the other bodies. 
 
 
Figure 1: The subtle body – the auras 
 
Beyond the etheric body is the astral body the Pranamaya Kosha which is the realm of the 
emotions.  Here emotions exist as vibrational patterns that are believed to interface with the 
limbic brain.  This is thought to occur via stimulation of the electro-chemical/magnetic 
energy within the nerves in the survival centre of the brain, the amygdala, which is 
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responsible for the control of the ‘fight and flight’ response.  The next layer, the astral body 
is the mental body, the Manamya Kosha, consisting of higher and subtler vibrational 
energies, considered to be the realm of thoughts.  Here the self or ego becomes manifest, 
and the intellect expressed.  Like the other subtle bodies, the mental body equally has 
several layers.  The lower mental body is concerned with mental images obtained from direct 
sensory experience of and reasoning within the objective world.  At the lower mental level 
the vibrational patterns are translated into action through conscious intent.  Higher abstract 
reasoning and conceptualisation occur at the higher mental body.  Interrelating with the 
astral body to transfer/translate thoughts into feelings, the higher mental body is the layer 
where transcendent emotions are stimulated.  Emotions such as acceptance, compassion, 
empathy, unconditional love and forgiveness, become manifest at this plane.  The causal 
body, Anandamaya Kosha, interpenetrates at the highest of subtle vibrational energies.  This 
layer is the realm of the spirit, or higher self and connection to the divine.  It deals with the 
essence of things and is thought to be the true cause that lies behind the illusion of 
appearance, it is also the plane of devotion, of connecting with universal consciousness.  At 
the level of the mental body the self is manifested.  At the level of the causal body the oft-
called ‘soul’ or inner self is experienced, and the limits of physical time and space disappear. 
 
The auras are one way of accessing the body at the invisible level.  They signify the difference 
between pain and suffering, an important distinction I will be making later in the chapter 
discussing narrative.  The consequent loss of information for conflating pain and suffering is 
critical if we are to understand with any degree of confidence that the path taken to navigate 
through the decision-making process for any patient, donor and recipient is indeed 
appropriate pre- and post-surgery.  Equally relevant for transplant medicine is the 
observation that ‘memory traces’ remain even when an organ is removed and so heritage 
plays an important role for those donating an organ and for patients who experience some 
strange and puzzling characteristics of themselves after transplant.99 
 
Within certain yoga traditions the spiritual body is understood as the causal body since it is 
believed that what occurs in the physical body originates here - it is considered the ‘true 
cause’ of what is experienced.100  Thus at the causal level vibrational thought patterns are 
generated, which in turn stimulate astral states of emotion, which then generate etheric 
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patterns of pranic flows101 and patterns of ch’i which then become translated and 
transferred into the physiological and physical states of the body.102 
 
Ch’i and the meridians 
 
According to Ted Kaptchuk, the idea of ch’i or Qi as it is frequently seen in texts, is 
fundamental to Chinese medical thinking.103  It is said that everything in the universe, organic 
and inorganic, is composed of and defined by its ch’i.  But ch’i is not some primordial, 
immutable material, nor is it merely vital energy, although the word is occasionally 
translated in this way.  In ancient Chinese philosophy, matter and energy are not 
distinguishable, ch’i can be considered as matter on the verge of becoming energy, or energy 
at the point of materialising.  Ch’i is perceived functionally in Chinese medicine by what it 
does: it is the source of all movement including heartbeat, walking, aging, rejoicing, 
speaking; it protects the body from disease; it is the source of harmonious transformation 
such as transformation of the products of the digestion system into other substances: tears, 
blood products, sweat; it governs retention of the organs of the body in their proper place 
and prevents the loss of various bodily fluids and it regulates the body’s temperature 
depending on circumstances.104 
 
The Chinese recognise 14 major meridians or vessels with their own unique points that 
distribute ch’i around the body.  12 vessels are bilateral, with one running up or down the 
right and one up or down the left side.  A further two run centrally over the front and back of 
the body.105  These 14 meridians are called the cardinal or primary meridians, but they 
represent merely the most obvious of all energy flows within the body.  Each of the major 
meridians has a number of specialised points that regulate and direct energy flow through 
the pathways by interconnecting the meridians via myriad smaller vessels of varying size.  
The secondary vessels then connect to various aspects of bodily function.  So for each 
meridian, rather than a straight line flow of ch’i there is a web or orb of interconnecting 
energy pathways connecting each meridian with every other meridian in the body.  The 
Chinese envisioned the meridians to be grouped into Five Elements, each element being a 
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coupled pair - one being a yang meridian and the other a yin meridian.106  Each element 
representing a primary quality with the 5 qualities: earth, fire, metal, wood and water and in 
addition those five elements themselves being linked by the energy flow of ch’i, shown in 
Figure 2:107 
 
Figure 2: The meridians 
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According to Kaptchuk 108 the Chinese Meridian System dating back to around 2500 BCE has 
suffered adverse comments along with many other alternative therapies.  Some 
commentators see it as ‘hocus-pocus - the product of primitive or magical thinking.’  If a 
patient is helped by means of herbs or acupuncture, they see only two explanations, either 
the positive results were psychosomatic or it was the ‘happy result of a hit and miss pin-
sticking exercise.’109  In fact Chinese medicine considers important certain aspects of the 
human body that are not significant to Western medicine.  At the same time Western 
medicine observes and can describe aspects of the human body that are insignificant or not 
perceptible to Chinese medicine.  For instance Chinese medical theory does not have a 
concept of the nervous system.  Nevertheless Chinese medicine can be applied in cases of 
neurological disorder.  Equally use of certain terminology is seen as strange to the Western 
ear.  The Chinese for instance often refer to some diseases as being generated by 
‘dampness’, ‘heat’ or ‘wind’.  The perceptions of the two traditions reflect two different 
worlds, but both can heal the same body. 
 
The Western physician starts with a symptom, searches for the underlying mechanism - a 
precise cause for the specific disease.  Whilst the disease may affect various parts of the 
body, it is a relatively well-defined, self-contained phenomenon.  Precision in diagnosis 
frames a quantifiable description of a narrow area.  The physician’s logic by the same token 
is analytic, ‘cutting through the accumulation of body phenomena like a surgeon’s scalpel to 
isolate one single entity or cause.’110  The Chinese physician in contrast, directs attention to 
the complete physiological and psychological individual.  All relevant information including 
symptoms as well as the patient’s other general characteristics are gathered and woven 
together until it forms what Chinese medicine calls ‘a pattern of disharmony.’111  This pattern 
of disharmony describes a situation of ‘imbalance’ in a patient’s body.  The question of cause 
and effect is secondary.  It isn’t a case of the cause of the problem, but rather the 
relationship between the symptom and its cause.  Discerning the relationships among bodily 
events occurring at the same time become the interesting features.  It is the patterns of 
disharmony in both the patient and their link to the universe that consequently guide the 
framework for treatment. 
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To understand the patterns of the universe it is helpful to turn to quantum physics.  Such 
concepts that find expression in the further splitting of the atom to constituents such as 
particle and wave, are currently believed to be inextricably linked to the behaviour of matter 
both organic and inorganic in the entire cosmos.  For as Whitehead suggests, twentieth 
century quantum concepts have something relevant to say about universal phenomena as 
wholistic which will make significant inroads into linking entities previously considered as 
discrete.112  And the American feminist theorist and quantum physicist Karen Barad posits 
that ‘matter and meaning are not separate elements.’113  We ignore the microcosmic matter 
of the universe at our peril for as quantum concepts reveal the quantum non-location of the 
particle - the unknowing - opens us out to the understanding that each is in each and all is in 
all.  Such a position resonates with all that has been discussed so far giving further substance 
at a scientific level, to the concept of incarnation, and to the wholistic, relational and fluid 
body as discussed in Chapter 1 and furthermore to the discussions in subsequent chapters in 
this study.  Additionally, quantum ideas add depth and clarity to the mappings outlined 
above in revealing that when power and potential are inhibited, the interruption to the flow 
of the subtle body results in disharmony, imbalance and the profound effects of suffering 
that long-term manifest as pain. 
 
The body and quantum concepts 
 
I believe in one matter-energy, the maker of things seen and unseen.114 
Jane Bennett 
 
The classical view of nature began to crumble at the end of the 19th century when the basic 
building blocks of the universe turned out not to be basic after all.  The supposedly indivisible 
atom, of which all things in the world were said to be constructed, proved fissionable into a 
bewildering variety of components.  The elementary particles themselves dissolved in a swirl 
of energy.  It was Max Planck who discovered that light, like all energy, comes not in a 
continuous stream but in discrete packets of bound energy called quanta that refuse to 
behave like common-sense objects.  It appears that the behaviour of particles that carry 
light, matter and force until registered by an instrument of detection or another act of 
observation, have no specific position, nor do they occupy a unique state.  Ultimate units of 
physical reality then have no uniquely determinable location and they exist in a 
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superposition of several potential states at the same time.  Laszlo points out that the most 
amazing feature of quanta is their subtle but constant and apparently space-time 
transcending interconnection.  Thus the fundamental units of the physical world prove to be 
intrinsically and instantly entangled with each other - and that of course includes us.115   
 
Once two or more quanta enter the same state, they remain instantly linked no matter how 
far they may be from each other.  So when experiments on twin particles in a so-called single 
state are conducted and their spins cancel each other out to yield a total spin of zero, a 
strange thing happens.  No matter how far the twin particles are separated, when one of 
them is measured, the measurement on the other corresponds precisely to the results 
obtained from the first - even though the result could not have been determined in advance.  
It is as if the second particle ‘knows’ what is happening.  The information that underlies this 
knowledge appears to be conveyed over any finite distance and at the speed of light.  
According to Laszlo, non-locality tells us that all things in the world are interconnected, and 
all are part of more integrated ensembles known as wholes.116 
 
So it is that matter, at least at quantum levels undergoes a deconstruction.  As David Bohm 
puts it: an atomic particle might at best be described as a poorly defined cloud, dependent 
for its particular form on the whole environment including the observing instrument.117  In a 
medical situation for instance, the patient who comprises electrons, protons, neutrons and 
so on is dependent on the doctor’s observation/perception - rightly or wrongly.  It turns out 
however while light waves were really appearing as particles, particles were also really 
appearing as waves.  Laszlo comments: this is the province of Bohr’s theory of 
complementarity.118  What is happening within these seemingly contradictory appearances?  
Well it depends on how you measure it.  It depends on your perspective.  Unlike the particle 
however, waves by their very nature are not encountered singly but in their lapping and 
overlapping each other.  In overlapping which is to say interfering with one another, waves 
add together to form ‘superpositions’ - structures transcendent of classical ‘positions.’  Such 
entanglement forms what is understood as the quantum vacuum - a void that is actually a 
virtual sea of power and potential.   
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Could it be therefore that superpositions represent our ignorance?  Barad is quick to point 
out, not in the sense of our failure to know a classical object that is somehow hidden from 
us.119  Rather superpositions represent ontologically indeterminate states - a sea of 
possibilities.  As Keller implies, the mystery lies not in unknowability alone, but in the intra-
activity - the relationality that suspends the very notion of a thing as a bounded body or 
classical object.  The uncertainty expresses and explains an ‘ontological indeterminacy.’120  
What we are dealing with here is an open-system, a fluid and flexible relationality constantly 
overlapping and dynamic. 
 
Quanta are not unconscious matter.  They stem from the basic constituents of the complex 
fields that underlie the cosmos, and they are not unlike the qualities we associate with 
consciousness.  The atomic physicist Freeman Dyson has pointed out even elementary 
particles are endowed with a form and level of proto-consciousness.121  Conscious matter at 
a lower level of organisation, the neurons in the brain for example, generate conscious 
matter at a higher level of organisation in the brain.  In affirming that physic and psyche 
evolved together, reality is not reduced to structures made up in themselves of inert and 
insentient material building blocks nor is reality assimilated to a qualitative nonmaterial 
mind.122  We take both matter and mind as fundamental elements of reality but unlike 
dualism, there is no separation, merely different aspects of that same fluid reality.  Our 
reality.  Indeed Dyson proposes that: ‘Matter in quantum mechanics is not an inert 
substance but an active agent, constantly making choices between alternative 
possibilities.’123  Thus the so-called proto-consciousness of the quantum vacuum becomes 
localised and articulated, as particles emerge from it and evolve into atoms and molecules.  
On life-bearing planets they evolve further into cells, organisms and ecologies.  The human 
mind associated with the highly evolved human brain is a high-level articulation of the 
cosmic consciousness, emerging from the vacuum that infuses all things in space and time.  
This ‘absence’ or quantum vacuum is similar to that described as the Tao or the Void in many 
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Look, it cannot be seen – it is beyond form. 
Listen it cannot be heard – it is beyond sound. 
Grasp, it cannot be held – it is intangible. 
These three are indefinable, 
Therefore they are joined in one. 
 
From above it is not bright; 
From below it is not dark: 
an unbroken thread beyond description. 
It returns to nothingness. 
The form of the formless, 
The image of the imageless, 
It is called indefinable and beyond imagination. 
 
Stand before it and there is no beginning. 
Follow it and there is no end. 124 
 
The Tao Te Ching illustrates the different philosophies emanating from Eastern traditions.  In 
those traditions as in quantum field theory of twentieth century physics, emptiness has a 
kind of pregnant fullness and stillness is witness to truth.  Things, existence, the self, the 
body are held together by a permeating centre that cannot itself be seen or expressed.  The 
self cannot be lived or understood except in terms of the whole of creation that I experience 
as ‘I’.125 
 
Quantum concepts and matter 
 
For Barad scientific practice in quantum concepts reveals not what is already there, rather 
what is disclosed is the effect of ‘the intra-active engagement of our participation within and 
as part of the world’s differential becoming.  Not pre-existent but dis-closed, opened out into 
its concrete actuality, a co-incident of becoming.’  Matter comes to life ‘it feels, converses, 
suffers, desires, yearns and remembers.’126  Each wave spreads literally everywhere.  It is in 
effect, infinite, boundless, it spreads continuously but heterogeneously, and its potentiality is 
not merely a mathematical abstraction.  This potentiality exists in order that we come to 
terms with ourselves and with our actions.  Indeed we need to draw ‘this pragmatic 
anthropocentric theory as a useful distillation from an underlying non-anthropocentric 
structure’ as the quantum physicist Henry Stapp insists, such an ontology ‘places the 
evolution of our conscious process within the broader context of the structure of nature 
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herself.’127  Like Laszlo, he argues that every electron incorporates mental aspects into the 
process of the creation of reality.  Each event unfolds with a certain awareness.  So for each 
event that unfolds as an operation of the literally boundless relations that form the 
potentiality of the moment, we - that is humanity, have some responsibility.128  
 
The wave materialises as a particularity - that is as any quantum particle.  Such a discrete 
emergence exemplifies Whitehead’s ‘actual occasion of experience.’  Thus the actual 
individual - yourself or one of your innumerable electrons - takes place as an actualisation; 
there is no enduring identity of matter or of you; there is only materialisation in this 
moment.  Each particularity is a distinct re-composition of its world.  Whitehead maintains 
there is thus ‘a becoming of continuity, but no continuity of becoming.’129  The continuity of 
such a process is not then of a substance but of the past flowing in waves of potentiality out 
of which this present becoming actualises.  The past comprises our relations to what has 
already become, and so becomes the potential for our future becomings.130 
 
We have established that when two particles originally linked and then experimentally 
separated fly off in opposite directions, they remain immediately responsive to one another - 
no matter what the distance.  They remain entangled.  Thus entangled particles, even though 
spatially separate do not operate autonomously.  This is not simple randomness, it is 
indeterminacy enfolded in interdependence: non-knowability and non-separability get 
together - instantly at any distance.  Such a connection takes place because both events form 
a single creative act, they seem to feel each other - a single actual entity arising out of a 
common field of potentialities.  Contrary to some belief that an object over there does not 
care about what you do to another object over here, John Bell’s experiments have shown 
that an object over there does care about what you do to another object over here.131  What 
any creature is cannot be determined in separation from its formative relations.  And the 
lack of discrete entities according to quantum understanding works at any distance 
whatsoever.  It turns out that these inter-linkages that take place across any distance are just 
what many people mock as telepathy.  Sheldrake has written extensively on a similar notion 
that he terms morphic resonance, a concept he exemplifies in his book Dogs that know when 
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their owners are coming home.132  In other words the moment to moment becoming of each 
creature, each actual entity, suggests something quite other than - as Keller humorously 
proposes ‘the creation of increasingly “beefy beings” from an original void who then move 
discretely about within a relative emptiness.  The dizzying - chaosmic - alternative might 
translate poetically into the creatio ex profundis in which every creature emerges moment by 
moment from a wavy boundlessness.’133  It could be said that if the metaphor of divine 
entanglement in the world begins to arise in the connection between theology and science it 
is only because matter takes on a new meaning through the lens of quantum concepts. 
 
According to Bohm ‘[A] centrally relevant change in descriptive order required in quantum 
theory is the dropping any notion of analysing the world into relatively autonomous parts, 
separately existent but in interaction.’134  So whether moving upward or outward or down 
into smaller and smaller units, we do not come to fundamental units, or indivisible units, but 
we do come to a point where division has no meaning.  It may be that in some sense each 
unit contains a total structure enfolded within it.  As a metaphor for this enfolding process 
Bohm likens it to a hologram where each region of the hologram makes possible an image of 
the whole object, an object which could be more sharply defined as well as containing more 
points of view.135  The process in which the order in the hologram becomes manifest to the 
viewer in an image is called unfoldment or explication.  For him explicate and implicate 
orders complement each other at every level. This he suggests accords with Nicholas of Cusa 
for whom the explicate order signifies the manifest multiplicity of the universe.  The 
explicate will be constantly an expression of what is otherwise enfolded.136  Waves from 
each point unfold but at the same time waves from many points are enfolding to give rise to 
a new wave front and so each process includes both an enfolding and an unfolding.  It is only 
when we focus on one part of the process that we are led to talk of these as distinct, as 
dualisms. 
 
Turning aside from Cartesian dualism means that what we experience as independent 
movement through various levels of subtlety, will in a natural way ultimately move the body 
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to the level of the quantum vacuum and the sea of potential.  In some sense within the 
implicate order is an implication that a rudimentary mind-like quality is present even at the 
level of particle physics, and as we go to subtler levels, this mind-like quality becomes 
stronger and more developed.  The model thus evades dualistic relation or materialist 
reduction.  This subtler layer implies that the universe is flooded with animated awareness, 
matter comes to life, a life in all its fullness.  Thus for Bohm through enfoldment each 
relatively autonomous level of mind participates in the whole to one degree or another.  
Connectivity is unfolded inseparably from all that comes enfolded in each particular fold, 
each particle, each singularity.137 
 
In a universe of incompletion, quantum indeterminacy destabilises the entire apparatus of 
substantial matter and its metaphysics.  Whitehead articulates the challenge at the quantum 
level where ‘mere endurance’ which characterises the ‘undifferentiated sameness’ of 
substance, collapses into the vibratory streaming of energy.138  In the modern answer to the 
question ‘What is nature made of?’ Whitehead answers that it is couched in terms of ‘stuff, 
or matter or material - the particular name chosen is indifferent - which has the property of 
simple location in space and time…What I mean by matter or material, is anything which has 
this property of simple location’ thus matter is present in a simple sense that ‘does not 
require for its explanation any reference to other regions of space-time.’139  Yet numerous 
years later Whitehead changed his mind and wrote an entire alternative to materialism and 
matter, notions that in his view seemed fundamentally frozen into both dualisms and 
monisms of substance.  He called this the philosophy of organism, in which every creature or 
actual entity including most expressly all those traditionally called inorganic, an ‘event of 
interrelation.’  A live event, an actual occasion of experience; it ‘feels’, it ‘prehends’ - usually 
with no consciousness - the world from which it comes, the world of which it becomes.  
Every quantum of energy is thus metaphorically describable as a ‘throb of emotion’ or a 
‘subject of experience’, a ‘vibratory organism.’140  Such a subject is not describable as an 
enduring entity unfolding in time, having experiences and attributes, but an occasion of 
becoming in relation.  Far from simply located, every event is in its uniqueness here and now 
involved in one way or another prehended in every other.  The singular perspective in space-
time is a momentary decision - it does not establish any boundary of mere non-relation to 
anything. 
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Likewise, Keller believes that matters of fact, matters of concern, matters of care are shot 
through with one another, and God the symbol of that mattering, however over-abstracted, 
cannot be dislodged from matter.  Thus narratives of creation, incarnation, bodily 
resurrection ‘did not await science to conceptualise their own actions.’141  Quantum 
relationality turns the creation into such a mysterious relational field as to make an intimate 
relation to its source believable.  If that creative source is no longer conceivable as producing 
a world and directing it to its end, we could imagine it as unfolding in and through that 
world, as in its own flesh, and moreover as welcoming the indeterminate emergence of finite 
bodies with creativities all their own.  In a creation in which the boundary between inside 
and out is an imposed abstraction, whether for care or for convenience, the difference 
between creator and creation must remain non-separable.142  As Bohm says ‘one could say 
that through the human being the universe is making a mirror to observe itself.’143  The 
seeing of God is not the seeing of the universe, but since God is not an object of vision, the 
universe seeing itself in our eyes may signify just what in our verbal icons we have called the 
‘vision of God.’  Or as he suggests, ‘the universe could be regarded as continuous with the 
body of the human being.’  The universe in each creature is that creature.144 
 
The actual boundaries of bodies are never static, they are in states of constant flux.  This 
process of flux and exchange must come to mean something other than an absolute 
beginning or end.  Incarnation, divine multiplicity or real divinity is necessarily characterised 
by this becoming porous and interconnected in the world.  According to Laurel Schneider, 
bodies whether of humans or stars are always in a state of exchange.  They are porously 
open to each other.  Boundaries do exist but they do so temporally and spatially - they are 
always in a state of emerging or passing away.  Incarnate, divine being therefore resists 
singularity just as all bodies resist singularity.145  The more closely you look at any body, 
culture or language or indeed religion, boundaries blur.  Since human beings are related to 
every other creature through the energy that flows into and through them, boundaries 
between entities are therefore proximal, creative, and temporary.  In turning to the quantum 
concept of the wave, the meaning that I am only proximally distinct from the sun becomes 
clear.  I implicate the sun and the sun implicates me as a temporary and vital accumulation 
of its energy and light.  Unities Schneider argues, are therefore proximal because they are 
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temporary, and expand communally into unfinished totalities made up of ever-new 
connections thereby making possible and thus implicating yet new configurations and 
possibilities and becomings.146   
 
Luce Irigaray the author of much contemporary French feminist commentary, suggests that 
this 'openness permits exchange, ensures movement, prevents saturation in possession and 
consumption.’  As she remarks, each ‘I’ thus emerges as a nexus of exchanges, constituted by 
those exchanges rather than tolerating or enduring them.  This deeply interactive relational 
quality of existence undercuts the coherence of the isolatable self.147 
 
Bodies occur, they generate or express time and space, all the building blocks of matter 
constitute bodies as intervals of change.  And because intervals of time make space and 
describe matter, incarnation is a revelation of divinity-in-flux.  This is an ontology of ‘is’ of 
‘and’.  Bodies exceed the ‘is’ in every occurrence because of their implication, expression and 
movement into and out of place and moment.  Divine multiplicity in other words comes to 
body, to individuation, to being differently every time, in every instance of incarnation.  
Incarnation - divine becoming which is becoming flesh - is a material event of distinction that 
expresses time and space and in some sense ‘[makes] a difference.’148  Becomings stretch 
and shape an event and so express space and time in and through relation to other bodies’ 
gravitational attraction.  It is this mysterious effect that all bodies no matter how big or small 
exert on one another.  Divinity in the multiplicity of incarnation occurs with ‘the freedom to 
come and go; to fold into the deep; to unroll a surface of explicit presence; to strain out of 
the womb into a homeless starry night, to weave gravitational complexities that we call 
communities or worlds.  It is not a principle but an occurrence.’149 
 
Fluidity, porosity and interconnection all characteristics of divine multiplicity, however are 
only part of the story.  Divine multiplicity requires an attention to heterogeneity to otherness 
that is created in its unfolding articulation of change.  The positive differences that occur in 
the world are affirmed by this elemental difference.  Without attention to difference, to 
worlds of difference, bodies disappear, and any concept of divine multiplicity characterised 
by fluidity is liable to fall again into the trap of ignoring distinction in matter.  In such 
unknowing, bodies become abstracted into classifications, types and identities.  So only 
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through disappearance into types can bodies seem to appear.150  Schneider asserts however, 
that divine multiplicity is all about the differences that incarnation makes.151  Bodies thus 





Jean Baudrillard argues as a human body ages, the change of youthful body into aged body 
into earth is not an exchange of equivalence. 153  The body that was young cannot take the 
place of the body that is now old.  Everything is lost in bodies as they shift shape, especially 
the body-that-was.  New worlds open as youth is outgrown, but the new age does not 
replace the lost youth.  No thing can ever be fully exchanged for or cancel out another thing.  
Most subtle attempts to make the world meaningful in value terms, to endow it with 
meaning, come to grief on this insuperable obstacle.154  Actual bodies are not finally 
reducible either to each other or to the generalities that we assign to them in our own 
becoming-related stories.  Always exceeding the limits of language, incarnation is a 
becoming-different, a deferral of sameness.  No one can be exchanged for another, both 
because it is not another, but also because every-one, everything has altered already every 
other. 
 
Jacques Derrida observes that it is here that ethics finally fails.  How can we assign value to 
the utterly unique and inexchangeable? 
 
[What] status must be assigned to this exemplarity of re-mark?  How do we 
interpret the history of an example that allows the re-inscription of the structure of 
universal law upon the body of an irreplaceable singularity in order to render it thus 
remarkable?155 
 
When ethics is some measure of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ it falls apart in respect of bodies.  There 
where right and wrong have no basis of exchange, what is possible however is decision and 
responsibility, but not any system of ethics.  This is because of bodies.  The impossibility of 
exchanging one body for another, one moment for another or even one world for another 
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means each is invaluable, and consequently inaccessible to systems of whatever sort, which 
of course includes ethical systems.156  It is only when we forget the messiness of life which 
complexity brings in the passage of real, actual bodies, we can indulge in the kind of ethics 
that presumes systems of comparative value that can assign status and make exceptions in a 
life wholly implicated in the complicated world.  Emmanuel Levinas argues ethics as the 
vulnerable face of the other which confounds any justification for any universal or objective 
claim that in any way reduces the other to a category of person or thing.  To be other, to be 
distinct, itself inexchangeable, but the face must be real; it must be a body, and so 
gravitationally pull other bodies.157 
 
Decisions do have to be made, but none is pure, static and equally none is ethical.  Ontology 
and ethics come closer in a logic of multiplicity to stories which in their turn have seasons.  
They never conclude, and we never get the telling quite right - although sometimes we do 
for the time being.  We have our moments and our seasons, so the story changes, we are 
changed by the story and the listener in the meantime has also changed, indeed so too has 
the world.  Thus ethics becomes a ‘minefield’ a slippery concept in a complex multiverse. 
 
Leaving aside all that has been said so far about the body, its gross and subtle characteristics; 
its place and interrelationship with the cosmos at the most profound quantum level; the 
metaphor that is the potential for the particle and wave to be the foundation for human 
spirit, belief, faith and hope in an ever becoming, constantly dynamic universe.  The study 
now grounds the evidence presented on the meaning of the body to the implications of the 
processes of organ donation and transplantation for a wholistic interpretation of the body, 
from the viewpoint of informatics.  Chapter 3 details the statistics of donation and 
transplantation, the legal position, methods of consent and the myriad related complexities 
that act as a backdrop to the present ethical frameworks developed in support of their 
findings. 
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In contrast to the previous discussions, Chapter 3 sets out the current state within the 
medical specialism of organ donation and transplantation.  It acts as a contrast to the 
alternative perspective of the body already proposed, and gives grounds for the argument 
that the lack of organs for transplantation dominates over long-term care for those involved 
in the transplantation process - donors, patients and relatives.  In turn it underpins the case 
for a focus on patient narrative and caring as central to any future bioethical approach.  
 
Key issues involving a broad range of professionals from bioethicists and policy-makers on 
the one hand to clinicians, patients and donors on the other are discussed.  Included also are 
certain normative issues which are raised specifically to heighten awareness to the types of 
problem which those concerned encounter on a day-to-day basis.  The chapter begins with a 
general comment on the research area.  It then surveys a variety of textual material: some 
key statistics; types of donation; various modes of consent; legal requirements that govern 
the usage of human material; tissue banking; financial considerations and it concludes with 
transplant-tourism and organ trafficking.158  Together these have considerable influence on 
the framing of consent and the resulting ethical decisions.  In fact modes of consent and 
legal matters have a fundamental bearing on the various ethical models and tools as 
                                                          




protocols to aid the medical profession in determining their options in increasingly complex 
medical matters in general. 
 
The practice of donation and transplantation dates back before the Common Era - there are 
texts supporting cases in India and China where surgical procedures were performed.  
Although the evidence presented could well be apocryphal particularly in the case of the 
Chinese surgeon Pien Chi’ao, sources do quote and substantiate these dates.159  These 
procedures were of course, totally unregulated.  Regulation came into force in the United 
Kingdom (UK) through the Anatomy Act of 1832 that was passed in order to prevent the 
stealing of bodies for dissection.  The infamous William Burke and William Hare - otherwise 
known as ‘the body snatchers’ committed a series of sixteen murders over a period of some 
ten months in 1828 in Edinburgh; the bodies from which they sold to Dr Robert Knox for 
dissection at his anatomy lectures.160  In a move to prevent the recurrence of similar events, 
the Anatomy Act of 1832 was written into law and covered the disposal of bodies after death 
and the licensing of teachers in anatomy.161 
 
Details of early transplantation procedures in the UK can be found in the history of 
transplantation outlined in the timeline in the Appendices.  Whilst only progress in 
transplantation and organ donation are shown in the timeline for the UK, it should be noted 
that both the United States of America and the United Kingdom have been significant in the 
evolution of transplantation programmes and procedures.  It must also be remembered 
however that Dr Christiaan Barnard pioneered the first heart transplant in 1967 in South 
Africa and since the early 1990s solid organ transplants have been performed successfully 
worldwide. 
 
On closer examination of the timeline, evidence shows that overall regulation and indeed 
legislation appears to lag far behind biotechnical advances in the UK.  There is clear evidence 
of considerable chaos in the UK’s national health regulatory systems both historically and 
currently.  This exacerbates the position with respect to policy-making and hence impacts 
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upon the difficulties faced by those who have to take extremely sensitive decisions in the 
medical setting of organ donation and transplantation.  Interestingly in the USA, by contrast, 
updates to legislation and administration are considerably more regular, since litigation is at 
the forefront of their policy systems, especially those involving the full range of issues within 
the medical profession.  The ramifications of the differences in legal requirements have 
significant influence on distribution of transplantation resources globally since legal 
obligations differ considerably between jurisdictions - a point that is covered in the section 
on governing legal principles in this chapter.162 
 
The inclusion of a timeline historically positioning advances in transplantation gives a visual 
impression of the knowledge domain so that which follows can be put into a clearer 
context.163  The fuller picture however includes legal, academic, commercial and media 
material as they each highlight and contribute toward the ethical frameworks that presently 
inform decision-making in the UK.  Given accelerating advances in biotechnology at no time 




There is a global shortage of organs for transplantation.  Media attention in the UK 
continually seeks to raise awareness of this shortage by focusing on issues such as the 
increase in people paying for private procedures from organs obtained on the National 
Health Service (NHS) in order to ‘jump’ the NHS queue for transplantation; the inclusion of a 
mandated question in the UK driving licence application to register as a donor; the question 
of incentives for donors, and the explicit marketing of biotechnological advances. 
 
The critical problem for the medical profession is highlighted by the fact that in March 2017 
in the UK, statistics indicated that the ratio of people on waiting lists for organ 
transplantation to those who were registered as donors was 3:1.164  For every person who 
receives a vital organ three patients will die whilst waiting on the transplant list.  Whilst 
there has been a significant increase in donors over a number of years, the ratio in contrast 
has remained very similar.  The global shortage of organs raises various ethical issues, not 
the least of which has resulted in the practices of organ trafficking and transplant tourism. 
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Diverse initiatives have been legalised as a result of recommendations from ethical 
organisations in the UK including the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (Nuffield),  
the British Medical Association (BMA), the Organ Donation Taskforce (ODT) now the remit of 
local Care Commissioning Groups (CCGs) set up in 2013, and the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE).  Their specific remit has been to discuss and research modes of 
donation, donor incentives and the role of altruism in the issue of consent.165  They are 
equally tasked with ethical measures to aid in increasing organ supply in order to lessen the 
problems of global trafficking and tourism.  Such issues together with ethical concerns such 
as the legal position with respect to ownership of body parts will be considered in greater 




Organ donors may be ‘living’ or ‘brain dead’ additionally organs may be recovered from 
donors who are ‘cardiac dead’ often termed as cadaveric donors whose breathing and 
heartbeat has ceased.  Tissue may be recovered from donors up to 24 hours past the 
cessation of heartbeat, however in contrast to organs, most tissues with the exception of 
corneas, can be stored in tissue banks for up to five years.166  Thus tissue transplants are 
much more common than solid organ transplants.  Until relatively recently, organ donors 
were routinely relatives of the recipient.  As a result of medical advances in immunology, and 
providing tissue typing is consistent between the donor and the individual receiving the 
organ, it is now possible to donate to unrelated recipients. 
 
Some statistics of live and deceased donation 
 






Figure 1: Percentage of living and deceased donors in the UK 1st April 2016 to 31st March 2017 
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The decade between 2005 and 2015 saw major changes taking place in how organ donation 
and transplantation is delivered.  Those changes have continued; donors are older, more 
obese, and less likely to have suffered a trauma-related death, all of which have adverse 
effects on transplant outcomes. 
 
 
      Figure 2: Numbers of deceased and living donors in the UK, 1st April 2005 to 31st March 2017 
 
According to the 2017 statistics the number of deceased organ donors has increased from 
the previous year and overall deceased donation has risen since 2005 by some 50%.  There 
has been an overall increase in donation after brain death (DBD) as well as circulatory death 
(DCD), in fact the number of deceased donors rose to the highest number ever recorded in 
the UK.167  However, statistics show a small but steady decline in living donation over the 
period 2014-2017 which has clearly had an impact on overall donation rates, see Figure 2. 
The number of transplants in adults in 2016-2017 was 3169 for kidneys, 213 for pancreas 
islets, 966 for liver, 200 for heart only and 176 for lung only, see Figure 3.168  Kidney 
transplantation remains the most prevalent and easily the most successful of procedures 
according to NHSBT Transplant Activity Reports.   
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          Figure 3: The ratio of transplants by type of organ 1st April 2016 to 31st March 2017 
 
The total number of kidney transplants increased by 2% in 2016-2017, the total number of 
cardiothoracic transplants fell by 2%, liver transplants increased by 6% but pancreas 
transplants fell by 3%.169  Despite these figures the number of patients on the transplant 
waiting list has varied over the last ten years, but 457 patients died in this last period whilst 
waiting for a transplant, and the average waiting time for a kidney for example is around 880 
days.  It would appear that despite all measures to encourage donation and thereby increase 




Deceased donation is problematic.  Deceased donors are those who have been declared 
‘brain-dead’ and are neurologically tested as such, or have died following cardiac arrest.  In 
cases of brain death the donor has received trauma to that part of the brain that controls 
heartbeat and breathing - a circumstance that is frequently caused by serious accident.  Such 
a functional definition continues to raise concerns relating to what constitutes brain death 
and its consequent identification.  For many this issue remains unresolved.  According to 
Alistair Campbell: 
 
The main disagreement is between those who advocate whole brain death, which 
requires that both the higher (cortical) and lower (brainstem) parts of the brain are 
ceasing to function and those who advocate higher brain death (cessation of 
function of the cerebral hemispheres resulting in irreversible loss of consciousness, 
and the abilities to think, feel and relate to others.)171 
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By contrast, from a religious perspective, the Catholic Church advocates a requirement for 
moral certainty of death rather than its functional certainty: 
 
[T]he death of the person is a single event, consisting in the total disintegration of 
that unitary and integrated whole that is the personal self.  It results from the 
separation of the life-principle (or soul) from the corporal reality of the person.  The 
death of the person, understood in this primary sense, is an event which no scientific 
technique or empirical method can identify directly.  Yet human experience shows 
that once death occurs certain biological signs inevitably follow...the traditional 
cardio-respiratory signs...[or] the complete and irreversible cessation of all brain 
activity.172 
 
In agreement with the sentiment of Pope John Paul II, Robert Veatch claims that the 
definitions of brain death or indeed cardiac death ‘obscure the fact that we are searching for 
the meaning of death of the person as a whole’ rather than a specific level or locus.173  This 
raises a further point that those determining or defining the death of a patient should not be 
physicians with an interest in acquiring organs.  For example, William May believes it 
important that there is a separation between the question of defining death and the use of 
organs for transplant in order to protect the dignity of the dying person.174   
 
Evidence has shown that the problem of defining death is of concern.  It introduces ethical 
dilemmas that appear to be difficult to resolve.  Such ethical complexity is compounded in 
the matter of ventilation that aids in maintaining the viability of organs for transplant by 




Living donors donate renewable tissues such as an organ or part of an organ, in which the 
remaining organ can take on the physiological workload, as in the case of single kidney 
donation.  In partial donation such as liver lobe, pancreatic islets or small bowel cases it is 
reported that regeneration can and does take place.  Whilst the risk of death from living 
donation is fairly rare, living donors are quite often listed for kidney transplantation 
themselves at some later point for instance.175  Numbers of organs for transplantation are 
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increased by the practice of domino transplanting and paired and pooled donation.  
Procedures which are on the increase globally.176 
 
Initiatives to increase the number of organs for transplantation include, specific regenerative 
medicine using patients’ own cells in the form of healthy cells extracted from their failing 
organs or alternatively from stem cells which can be used in isografting.177  In 2016 an 
investigation into the growth of human organs in livestock, specifically pigs and sheep by the 
government’s animal research advisers was undertaken.  The procedure involves genetically 
removing an organ in the animal embryo then injecting human stem cells which it is hoped 
will replace the missing organ before putting the embryo in the womb of a female pig or 
sheep.  About 20 livestock were impregnated at universities in the United States in the year 
2015-2016 and a further 36 or so pregnancies are thought to have taken place in other 
countries.178 
 
Consent discussions and debates 
 
Before any surgical intervention of whatever kind, consent must be sought from those 
involved in the procedures - the medical professional who administers the forms and the 
patient, or by a relative in circumstances where this is inappropriate because of the patient’s 
mental capacity, age, or they have died without agreeing to donate.  Donors may be living or 
deceased as discussed.  In the case of living organ donation, consent is required from donors 
who are perfectly healthy but through choice have offered an organ or organs as a perceived 
act of charity to an individual who is in need and who otherwise might die.  The fact of 
agreeing to donate brings with it a diverse range of complex issues surrounding the framing 
of that consent.  It is therefore important to understand how these various modes of 
donation function, since highlighting the difficulties involved and the effectiveness and 
limitations of each of the methods enables a greater understanding of the ethical issues. 
 
Methods of consent to donation 
 
Consent is of crucial ethical concern in contemporary debates relating to the donation of 
human material.  The subject of donation has historically perplexed the many professional 
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organisations involved in how consent should be structured.  In this context Professor 
Margaret Brazier comments that ‘[C]onsent is such a simple word and is the more beguiling 
and elusive for that.’179  And David Price suggests that the ‘perceived’ or ‘actual failure’ to 
obtain proper consent has been central to many controversies in transplantation and 
research spheres.180  The most well-known example is the post-mortem and tissue retention 
scandals that occurred in the early part of the twenty-first century in the UK.181  Generating 
sufficient body parts for those in need and the rights of individuals or their families to control 
the use of such materials continues to be problematic as the NHSBT 2017 (National Health 
Service Blood and Transplant) Transplant Activity Report points out.  Despite an increase of 
50% in organ donation overall, although the number of living donors has fallen since 2014, 
there are almost seven thousand people in the UK in need of an organ transplant.182 
 
Different notions of consent prevail in official policies and widely varying laws and practices 
exist around the world.  Since the allocation of organs relies solely on a list-based system, 
appropriate mechanisms for consent are fundamental.  In the UK, the two key systems that 
have been developed and agreed by the various advisory and ethically based organisations 
are termed opting-in and opting-out:183 
 
¾ The scheme for opting-in is recognised as appropriate consent, permitting tissue and 
organs to be posthumously removed for transplantation, through the carrying of a 
donor card or by permission made explicit in the conditions laid out in a will. 
¾ The scheme for opting out is considerably more problematic.  Otherwise known as 
presumed consent, the scheme permits tissue and organs to be posthumously 
removed for transplantation unless an individual has previously raised an objection, 
in which case consent is withdrawn. 
 
Opting-in would appear to be relatively straightforward in theory, in practice however, the 
situation is somewhat different.  Many sources reveal that unless relatives are advised of the 
deceased’s intentions from their will prior to death, or indeed are aware that they carried a 
donor card, or otherwise have discussed donation, the deceased’s wishes may not be carried 
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through.  In this case the relatives are able to override consent for whatever reason.  With 
time being of essence in organ excision and thence transplantation, the likelihood is that 
relatives will not be in possession of important information to make their decision in order 
that timely surgical procedures can be performed.  This potential loophole in the system is in 
part responsible for the problems of organ scarcity.  The question of tightening up this 
anomaly therefore is a very live topic in frequent debates. 
 
According to NHSBT news in January 2016, the organisation responsible for the NHS Donor 
Register and for matching and allocating donor organs is investigating whether there are 
further steps it could take when approaching families to ensure more potential deceased 
donors’ wishes are honoured by their relatives - around five hundred families in the UK said 
no to organ donation during in 2016 and the Activity Report for 2017 showed a similar 
figure.184  The 2017 report includes statistics showing prime reasons for families not 
supporting donation that cover part of the 2016 initiative.185  Within that initiative a number 
of ideas were proposed to offset refusal including: providing families with a leaflet explaining 
that consent rests with the person who has died and not the family left behind; asking 
families to assess any risk to donation - such as an unforeseen disease resulting from donors 
having travelled overseas and fallen ill.  And finally, asking families to sign a document 
confirming their reasons for overriding a relative’s decision with the aim ultimately that the 
family will honour the relative’s original decision.  Objections raised to a number of these 
proposals involve contravention of the ruling of non-coercion.186  
 
As a further measure to increase organ supply, the BMA in their 2012 report pushed for the 
procedure of elective ventilation.187  Ventilation is the procedure by which organs are 
preserved in a suitable state for transplantation by mechanically keeping the patient ‘alive.’ 
This process has incurred concern from some physicians who question whether frustration 
over the static number of DBD donors has resulted in ‘an intervention that could jeopardise 
professional and public confidence in all forms of donation’ and arguing that such practices 
‘are at the very edge of acceptability.’188 
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In matters of consent, there is a distinction to be made between living and deceased donors.  
For living donors the systems and laws currently in place are intended to ensure protection 
of both autonomy and respect for bodily integrity.  Little dispute exists about removal of 
organs from living donors either for transplantation or research since it is the interests and 
wishes of the donor that are the prime determinant.  This too is reflected in global policies.  
Under these circumstances the rights of relatives and close friends are of no real relevance in 
the decision-making process, although exceptions may be made in respect of parental 
responsibility and for those with diminished capacity to make those decisions.  Where an 
individual interest is infringed however, this constitutes a ‘legal or moral harm’ and is subject 
to the law.  As Lori Andrews and Dorothy Nelkin state: 
 
A person’s control over what is done to his or her body, or its parts, is important to 
his or her psychological development.  It is a way of establishing personal identity 
and conveying value to others.189 
 
By contrast, the issue of what interests exist with respect to the dead, is contentious and the 
subject of diverse opinion.  This diversity shows itself in various attitudes towards 
conscription/presumed consent, mandated choice, directed donation and informed consent.  
It would appear that for deceased donation existing policies (such as obtaining consent from 
relatives, where none has been explicitly given by the deceased in a will for example) places 
a higher value on respecting the relatives’ autonomy rather than on maximising the recovery 
of organs.  John Harris for instance argues for a form of conscription understood as 
presumed consent since: 
 
The necessity of obtaining consent for cadaver transplants costs many hundreds of 
lives each year…Where there is no kidney donor card, for example, the necessity to 
find next-of-kin and find them in any condition to entertain the question of 
transplants from their nearest and dearest means that many potential donor organs 
are lost.190 
 
The system of opting-out is legal in some countries including Spain, Belgium and Italy, where 
it has reportedly been very successful.  However it has attracted criticism from many ethical 
bodies for its perceived lack of concern for the autonomy of the individual.191  Whilst Wales 
agreed to a soft form of presumed consent in 2013, presumed consent had been excluded 
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from legal sanction in the whole of the UK for numerous years.192  However, it has been 
suggested that the British government will be taking a vote imminently to write opting-out 
into law.193 
 
Those who advance presumed consent advocate certain additional advantages such as cost, 
efficiency, avoidance of delays and the relief from stress for healthcare staff who would 
otherwise have to request donation, and for families who currently have to make such 
decisions at an extremely difficult time.  Indeed Aaron Spital and James Taylor suggest 
‘...even if we are mistaken in our sceptical view of the concept of posthumous harm, this 
would not change our belief that routine removal of usable cadaveric organs is the way to 
go.’194  The views expressed by Harris and Spital and Taylor accord particularly with a 
utilitarian perspective that seems especially prevalent in transplantation medicine. 
 
On the other hand, Albert Jonsen maintains that ‘consent is ethically important because it 
manifests and protects the moral autonomy of persons...it is a barrier to exploitation and 
harm.  These purposes are no longer relevant to the cadaver, which has no autonomy and 
cannot be harmed.’195  The argument would follow therefore that the deceased has no 
interests at all in their organs after their demise and consequently cannot be harmed by 
whatever decisions are made concerning their removal.  In fact in any event there is a view 
that whatever interests do exist they are outweighed by the immediate interests of those 
requiring such materials for their welfare.  Sells states unequivocally that the shortage of 
organs will not be alleviated until opting out, otherwise known as presumed consent, is 
legalised and thereby numerous lives will be saved.196 
 
As a more prescriptive initiative, mandated choice is yet a further system for eliciting 
consent.  It is exemplified in the August 2011 driving licence agency’s scheme to mandate 
the previous optional question of donation on the licence application form, before approval 
for both new and renewal applications.  However this approach targets especially the 
nation’s youth who are the ideal donor category.  Naturally these are young people whose 
organs are ostensibly free from health issues associated with advanced age, but within this 
                                                          
192 The form of presumed consent is termed ‘soft presumed consent’ which still gives the opportunity for relatives 
to withdraw that consent at the time. 
193 The Daily Mirror Wednesday 12th July 2017: MPs to vote on organ donation opt-out system as hope grows for 
sick patients. 
194 Spital, A., & Taylor, J S., (2007) Routine recovery of cadaveric organs for transplantation: Consistent, fair and 
life-saving, Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology: 2 
195 Jonsen, A., (1998) Transplantation of fetal tissue: An ethicist’s viewpoint. Clinical Research: 36:3:215-219 




age group, the incidence of deaths from automobile, motorcycle, and bicycle accidents is 
high.  The license application form requires answers to three questions: 
 
¾ Yes I would like to register. 
¾ I do not wish to answer this question now. 
¾ I am already registered on the NHS Organ Donor Register.197 
 
Of importance is the omission of the option to refuse to donate, which as Nuffield points out 
is non-trivial, since it sends out an inappropriate message by the apparent neglect of 
autonomous choice.  
 
Directed donation is yet a further option for donors who consent only to organs being given 
to named relatives or friends or indeed to a specific race or gender.  It should be noted that 
ethnic minority groups are the least like to either donate or receive an organ for instance. 
This is a departure from the supposed requirement for anonymous, altruistic donation.  
Directed donation does raise certain ethical concerns over the communitarian ideals of 
solidarity - that an organ is given freely within the spirit of ‘we are all in this together.’198  It 
also calls into question the notion of property rights in terms of an individual’s autonomous 
choice to determine appropriate use of their donated bodily material according to their 
expressed instruction.199 
 
Finally there is the vital question of the framing of consent.  It is paramount that the consent 
given should result from a properly informed choice; that is the maximum intelligible 
information is offered for that choice to be made.  With advancing biotechnical options and 
the differing legal possibilities such as the use of certain organs of the body or all internal 
organs for donation or research or tissue banking, this has become increasingly problematic. 
Neil Manson and Onora O’Neill consider consent from an alternative perspective.200  In 
criticising standard methods which have traditionally focused on improving procedures, or 
making consent requirements more user-friendly, their approach involves finding ways of 
cutting through the obligations, legal rights and protections that are in general well 
understood and articulated.  Informed consent in a climate of advanced biotechnology they 
state ‘cannot and should not, aim to be fully specific, or fully explicit’ and the aim should be 
for a communicative transaction between doctor and patient or donor - the equivalent to 
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trust perhaps.  The emphasis is then shifted to the process of understanding the underlying 
communicative event rather than the consent itself.  In proposing this alternative move they 
support John Searle’s linguistic form - the Speech Act.201  The Speech Act illuminates the 
meaning and intention behind the interaction, so that both sides have the opportunity to 
negotiate the linguistic sense of the transaction.  Ultimately this opens up the potential for a 
clearer more perspicuous understanding.  The possibility of paternalism is lessened, and 
greater value and respect is given to the patient or donor for their part in the communicative 
act - a point that will be considered from various ethical positions throughout this study. 
 
The use of human material raises deep concerns about the relationship between bodies and 
personal identity and generates fundamental questions about who we are and what sort of 
society we wish to live in.202  Questions remain over wider ethical perspectives such as the 
potential for profit from human body parts and the increasing value and utility of human 
resources.  Evidence shows that deep divisions exist between those commentators adhering 
to mechanistic, utilitarian points of view and those whose attention focuses on valuing the 
body in non-materialist terms.  In this vein, Price acknowledges that valuing the body in such 
a mechanistic manner highlights the vulnerability of our bodies and underpins the need for 
donor and indeed community interest to be properly protected through the rule of law.203 
 
Legislation affecting organ donation and transplantation 
 
Many Acts and laws exist globally in respect of organ donation and transplantation each of 
which reflects the norms and values of their respective cultures.  The focus of this section 
will be to discuss the major legal requirements as they affect donation and transplantation 
throughout the UK.  Across most of the UK, there is a comprehensive framework governing 
the use of human material for research, transplantation and other medical purposes.  
Concerns that need to be addressed however, relate to the safety and quality of human 
material, potential limitations on use and commerciality, and the suitability of personnel and 
premises involved in the handling of bodily material.  In general legislation for the dead is 
more extensive than for the living.  The Human Tissue Act of 1961 made provision for the use 
of parts of bodies of the deceased for therapeutic purposes, medical education and research, 
and additionally for ‘respect to the circumstances in which post-mortem examinations may 
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be carried out; and to permit the cremation of bodies removed for anatomical 
examination.’204 
 
More specifically the Human Organ Transplants Act of 1989 underpinned the necessity for 
‘genetically related’ persons as donors in order to eradicate trading in human organs for 
transplantation.  Laws however employ sub-categories of materials, or distinctions for 
various ends.  The 1989 Act distinguished ‘organs’ from other human materials, whereas the 
2004 legislation now includes human material within its remit, but differentiates between 
organs and other human materials for licensing and other purposes.  Bronwyn Parry states 
that the 1961 Act was revised in 2004 in order to respond to concerns raised by events at the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary and the Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital (Alder Hey) where organs 
had been stored and used without proper consent.205  The report from a census published by 
the Chief Medical Officer for England in 2000 and the Isaacs Report published in 2003 
revealed that the practice of retaining, storing and using organs and tissue taken from adults 
and children without proper consent had become relatively commonplace in the period from 
1970 to 1995.206  Whilst there is continuing concern over organ and tissue retention, the UK 
Human Tissue Act 2004 for instance does not apply consent to the removal of tissue and 
retention from the living, such issues are typically governed by the general law.207 
 
The Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 on the other hand distinguishes between organs and 
other materials for the purposes of retention of material removed post-mortem.  The 
distinction between organs and tissues is intended to reflect the different emotional 
significance they allegedly have in this context.208  In comparison however, the USA’s 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 2006 only refers to allowing material from the deceased and 
describes ‘an anatomical gift’ as ‘a donation of all or part of a human body’ and defines a 
part of a human body as meaning an ‘organ, an eye or a tissue of a human being.’209 
The Human Tissue Act 2004 has been criticised for having too broad a remit and the 
adoption of a blanket approach to human material - in this regard, Parry states it was ‘wholly 
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unnuanced’ with a failure to reflect the ‘mischief’ that the legislation was designed to 
remedy as in the case of the retention of materials, for example.  She goes on to state that 
the first draft of the Bill was ‘underwritten by a presumption that individuals have an 
undifferentiated relationship to their extracted body parts.’210  In a joint paper with Gere on 
tissue banking and in particular in the case of the Alder Hey scandal, Parry and Gere highlight 
the ‘fracture in perceptions’ of what matters and what does not in terms of the use made of 
human materials: 
 
So it seems that, on the one hand, for many of the parents whose children’s organs 
had been retained at Alder Hey, tissue blocks and slides were unambiguously parts 
of the body, corporeal entities endowed with all the spiritual and emotional 
significance carried by the human remains of beloved family members.  For most 
members of the medical establishment, on the other hand, “blocks and slides 
constitute a medical record”, something to be filed with case notes and temperature 
charts.211 
 
On this very issue Cathy Gere and Bronwyn Parry assert that we should not ignore the 
connection between human materials and their ‘personal’ origin.  Whilst subsequent 
revisions continue to be written for the 2004 Act, the latest being in 2017, the basic tenor of 
the Act however remains the same, despite biotechnical progress having substantially re-
ordered the way in which body parts are treated medically in the twenty-first century. 
In addition to domestic and European law, there are relevant international conventions and 
guidelines that may influence UK policy on the donation and use of human bodily material: 
 
¾ The European Union Organ Directive 2010/45/EU concerns ‘standards of quality and 
safety of human organs intended for transplantation’ implemented into law in 2012. 
 
¾ The World Health Organization (WHO) first issued Guiding Principles on human 
organ transplantation in 1991. A revised and expanded version of these principles, 
embracing both organs and tissue, was endorsed in May 2010.  The guidelines cover 
issues such as the global shortage of human materials - particularly organs for 
transplantation; the growing phenomenon of 'transplant tourism' partly caused by 
that shortage; quality, safety and efficacy issues related to transplantation 
procedures; traceability and accountability of human materials crossing borders. 
 
                                                          
210 Parry, B., (2005) Genomics, Society and Policy: 1:1  





¾ The Declaration of Helsinki was originally agreed in 1964 but is regularly revised - the 
latest being a significant revision in 2013.  It covers research involved with humans 
and though it is not binding in English law it is considered a benchmark against which 
current UK projects are measured.  Its principles include: the need for consent for all 
competent participants in research; the rights of subjects to withdraw from 
research; human experimentation to be used as a last resort where other forms of 
research involving non-humans are not possible and finally, a need for the balance of 
risk to the subjects involved and the benefits accrued by the research.212 
 
¾ The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism was 
formulated in 2008.  At that time The Declaration stated that ‘organ trafficking and 
transplant tourism violate the principles of equity, justice and respect for human 
dignity and should be prohibited’.  It demanded action to prevent the purchase  
and sale of human organs, along with activities such as advertising, medical 
screening and transport mechanisms.  Regular policy documents continue to be 
written covering trafficking and related issues.213 
 
One of the major worries pointed out by both legal and advisory bodies is the matter of 
transplant tourism.  With the increasing flow of both organs and recipients across 
jurisdictions the potential for legal anomalies to occur increases exponentially in terms of 
quality of organs and procedures, quantity and permissible rulings - which includes money 
changing hands for surgery.  Whilst diverse legal sanctions are in place, concern has been 
expressed that there is an increase in illegal movement of both organs and patients.214   
I argue that far from merely highlighting that this global problem exists and in 
acknowledgement of the universal shortage of organs as already stated, it raises the 
question of some form of universal legal standardisation.  Or alternatively some form of 
agreement in order to address the shortage, allow for cross-border procedures and thereby 
potentially undermine the dangerous trafficking problems that continue to exist. 
 
Of significance for the United Kingdom, there are several further advisory bodies whose 
input has important influence on decisions taken by the various legal bodies, two of the most 
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active are the Nuffield Council on Bioethics and the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE).  Nuffield is an ethics advisory body whose remit is to cover issues across 
the range of medical science.  In the case of donation and transplantation it has produced 
two reports.  The 1995 report examines such issues as the urgent need to consider, clarify 
and where necessary, strengthen the ethical and legal framework within which the clinical 
and research uses of human tissue take place.  The uncertainty at the time risked impeding 
legitimate uses or even encouraging illegitimate uses of tissue; the patenting of surgical 
procedures and the ethical issues related directly to the core of respect for human beings, 
namely that they and their bodies should not be injured and that nothing should be done to 
them without their consent.215 
 
The remit for Nuffield’s research and subsequent 2011 report included: identification and 
definition of ethical questions raised by recent advances in biological and medical science; 
promotion of public understanding; limits on the promotion of donation including the role of 
payment and other forms of remuneration; the role of consent; and the role of the state as 
‘steward’ in matters of general health.  The working group also developed a framework 
based on altruism and the concept of payment as a tool to aid in future decision-making for 
organ donation.216 
 
NICE, provides guidance on clinical integrity and in the case of organ procurement end-of-life 
care to potential donors, to the sensitive issue of consent and to the appropriate way in 
which relatives are approached.217  NICE also works closely with the British Transplantation 
Society who also provide guidance to the medical profession from transplant co-ordinators 
to clinicians.218 
 
The British Medical Association (BMA) that acts especially in the role of trade union for the 
medical profession also has an ethical influence on organ donation, though less in the 
interest of the patient and more with respect to donation and transplantation in general.  
The organisation acts as a voice representing the views of the profession. 
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When it was set up in 2006 the Organ Donation Taskforce (ODT) was an influential 
governmental organisation established to look into various initiatives to increase organ 
donation rates, such as advertising campaigns, media coverage in terms of television, 
newspapers reports and articles, the input of regulatory bodies and methods of consent.219  
Subsequently a nudge unit was established to concentrate on the task of increasing donation 
rates including coverage of this issue across all public media.  The ODT was taken over by the 
NHS Commissioning Board in 2013 with a broader remit for patient care across all sections of 
medical treatment.  The Commissioning Group published its planning guidelines Everyone 
Counts in that same year to all clinical commissioning groups (CCGs), covering targets, 
financial matters and improvements in customer healthcare.220 
 
In order to implement the law in both the EU and the UK, regulatory bodies need to be in 
place.  To this end the Human Tissue Authority (HTA) was established by the Human Tissue 
Act 2004 to undertake the regulatory roles set out in the legislation.  However, this aspect of 
the UK regulatory landscape is in a state of flux, since the Department of Health 
announcement in July 2010 that the HTA would be abolished by 2015.221  The Department of 
Health stated that the regulatory framework itself would not change, but rather that ‘the 
functions of the HTA will be transferred to other organisations to achieve greater synergies 
where appropriate.’222  There is however uncertainty as to how these regulatory bodies will 
absorb the remit of the HTA or indeed given the rate of change within the NHS, whether the 
HTA will be abolished at all.223 
 
In fact the Organ Donation Taskforce recommended in their 2008 Report that one overriding 
body be established in the UK to advise the medical profession on ethical matters, especially 
in respect of ethical dilemmas and hence challenging decision-making.224  Despite these 
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...clear policy decisions need to be made with respect to the nature of the consent 
framework to be adopted and the infrastructural framework needed to be provided.  
At the present the role of relatives is not clearly articulated or illuminated as regards 
deceased donation in most explicit consent systems, creating a lack of clarity and a 




Price’s comment brings into sharp focus the continuing problems with appropriate consent 
frameworks.  Equally he highlights the ever-present difficulties with the position of the 
relatives who are caught in a network of discussions and decisions at a very sensitive time.  
Policy rests on outcomes from these issues, which are at the very forefront of both global 
and UK debate. 
 
It is a fitting time at this point to examine the key ethical sources which have led to the 
current position with respect to organ donation and transplantation, and to suggest that 
however important their input has been thus far, there may well be other equally significant 
knowledge domains to draw from to broaden the debate, and to offer an alternative 
perspective on what appears to be a somewhat intransigent position with respect to matters 
of consent and the consequent increase in organ supply.  Discussion of these sources now 
continues in Chapter 4.
                                                          




















The aim of this chapter is to put forward a critical analysis of those sources informing past as 
well as current bioethical debates on the subject of organ donation and transplantation and 
to deepen the discussions outlined in Chapter 3.  The intention is to highlight both the 
strengths and weaknesses of the significant ethical issues arising in order to add force to a 
proposed alternative approach to the main bioethical frameworks that currently operate in 
the UK. 
 
The giving and receiving of an organ are both complex and complicated events and since 
they involve major surgical intervention into the body, remain ethically challenging issues for 
those effecting and those who are affected by the processes.  Matters of consent; doctor-
patient relationships; the importance of gift-giving and altruism; payment and the apparent 
commodification of the body; ownership of the body and its parts; the fair distribution of 
resources and the value of the body in a biotechnologically-driven setting are representative 
of the nature of lengthy and detailed discussion in attempting to address those ethical 
sensitivities and complexities.  What follows in this chapter from the wealth of material that 





A ‘live’ topic for debate in the UK, the ethics of organ donation and transplantation has been 
placed high on the bioethical agenda since the late 1970s after the publication of Beauchamp 
and Childress’s notable bioethical text in Georgetown USA.226  For the last twenty years or so 
however attention to bioethical matters has increased exponentially as a consequence of the 
meteoric advancement in biotechnology.  Such technology has revolutionised the way in 
which the human body can be successfully manipulated in order both to improve and to 
extend the lifespan of those whose lives ordinarily would have been seriously curtailed by 
life-threatening disease.  There is no doubt that organ donation and transplantation is little 
short of miraculous in comparison with the medical possibilities of just fifty years ago as 
shown in the timeline in the Appendices.  Nevertheless ethical unease continues unabated as 
a result of medical advances in technology that offer more possibility for greater 
sophistication in surgical technique. 
 
The chapter begins with an evaluation of one of the most hotly debated ethical problems in 
transplantation medicine that relates to the difficulty of consent as it affects patients, donors 
and relatives alike.  Consent continues to be a thorny issue because of the enduring shortage 
of organs for transplantation globally and the varying regulations across different 




The concept of consent already discussed in Chapter 3 has been shown to be complex and 
contested.  As biotechnology progresses it will become ever more state-of-the-art requiring 
levels of understanding hitherto unimagined.  Whilst many methods obtain, most concern 
revolves around two specific areas of consent namely: presumed consent and informed 
consent.  Consent is multi-faceted, not only being subject to the decisions of the donor and 
the recipient and in certain circumstances to the relatives, but also subject to the law.  The 
difficulty lies in an increasing tension between the requirement to generate sufficient body 
parts for those in need and the rights of individuals or their families to control the use of 
such materials.  As Nuffield’s 2011 Report confirms227 and Price points out: 
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The need to satisfy the relevant demands for body parts cannot entirely justify a 
donation policy in itself, although it is recognised that a failure to satisfy those needs 
is not only a major moral deficiency, but will invariably lead to more and more 
extreme means of dealing with the deficit.228 
 
Indeed as Wales formally adopted presumed consent at the beginning of 2013 it is once 
more at the forefront of ever increasing argument and discussion.  Questions concerning the 
influence that Wales might exert over the potential position of the rest of the UK where it is 




Presumed consent refers to the routine acquisition of organs extracted from the bodies of 
deceased persons.  It is one of the main if not the most contentious ethical issue in the 
donation of an organ/s and is seen by many as wresting control from the person whose 
organs they are.  Furthermore presumed consent frequently places undue pressure on 
relatives who may be asked to make sensitive decisions concerning a loved-one who has just 
died.230 
 
In the UK, the terminology referring to the principal systems involving consent to donate, is 
known as either opting-in or opting-out, see Chapter 3.  Opting-in specifies that the donor 
has signed-up to the donor register, and opting-out is analogous with presumed consent.  
Opting-out assumes that unless explicit objections are raised organs will be routinely 
recovered from deceased persons.  Such terms are very basic expressions of a highly 
complex area and in the case of opting-out appear to be particularly confusing to some 
members of the general public.231  Alternative terminology, however, is hardly an 
improvement.  Beauchamp and Childress have suggested a typology based on express, tacit, 
implied and presumed consent, which at first sight may appear to offer more clarity.  Express 
consent means that the prospective donor has given explicit consent by signing-up to a 
register of donors and as such is quite straightforward.  However the difference between 
tacit as silent agreement where no uniform lack of objection constitutes consent and implied 
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or implicit - where consent to one medical procedure may be implied in consent to a host of 
further procedures within the same treatment programme, may be adding unnecessary 
levels of complexity and furthermore stretching trust levels rather far.  In fact trust levels in 
medical care in the UK are under severe strain and scrutiny.232  Additionally Beauchamp and 
Childress’s concept of presumed consent ‘reduces to either express or implied’ on the 
understanding that a person’s choice or values are known.  However, there are cases where 
neither the choices nor the values of the individual are known, and here the problem of 
obtaining consent from relatives remains.  Research findings reveal that relatives are very 
likely to refuse donation.233  An over-complicated system may in the end prove to be 
unhelpful and indeed Price points to the necessity of establishing just what type of presumed 
consent system should be put in place.  He asserts that tacit, implied or indeed imputed is a 
‘messy compromise’ to a straightforward, non-onerous, easy and reliable way of making 
individuals’ views known, particularly in terms of registering refusal.234  The question would 
seem to be that even if the terminology were changed in some way to offer ‘more clarity’ or 
indeed to ameliorate the difficulty that the word ‘presumed’ presents, the stark reality is 
that many regard any hint of presumed consent as compromising the autonomy of the 
individual.  It is the underlying ethos that attracts their disapproval thus perpetuating the 
problem of organ shortage and therefore exerting some influence on the manner in which 
any discussion or policy-making may play out. 
 
Some claim that at the heart of the debate lies the question of whether a ‘presumed’ 
consent is any type of real consent at all.  Janet Saunders for instance remarks that 
presumed consent is an affront to the moral principle that is the foundation of consent 
itself.235  And Hugh McLachan states: 
 
To say that it can be reasonably presumed that we consent to donate our organs if 
we do not specifically say that we do not consent is absurd.  It is a deceitful piece of 
sophistry.  There might be a good utilitarian case for having an opt-out rather than 
an opt-in system of organ donation.  However, this would mean that there is a case 
for using our organs even in the absence of our consent.  If consent matters in this 
area, then only the explicit consent of the people concerned can justify the using of 
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their organs after death.  If consent does not matter and the use of their organs can 
be justified without it, then consent does not matter….236 
 
In contrast, certain advocates of presumed consent maintain that the dead have no interests 
at all after their demise and therefore whatever interests that do exist, are outweighed by 
the undeniable and immediate interests of those requiring such materials to improve their 
health and quality of life.  Spital and Taylor argue that even if there is concern about 
posthumous harm ‘routine removal of usable cadaveric organs is the way to go.’237  In 
comparison, Harry Emson’s perception is of a process of natural recycling of human body 
parts into future generations through decay, decomposition and transference, and therefore 
the right control over the body should be vested in the state as representative of those who 
may benefit from organ donation.238  In agreement with Emson, Walter Glannon maintains 
that ‘the idea that the sick have a right to cadaveric organs is grounded partly in the belief 
that these organs are no longer of any use to the dead.  Hence viable and therefore useful 
body parts can be treated as state property.’239 
 
Countering the claim that presumed consent would compromise personal autonomy the 
BMA and the NHSBT reason that a culture in which donation is discussed more openly and 
perceived as the norm would benefit those who have a strong objection to donation since it 
would make clear their wishes before their death.  Any absence of a system such as 
presumed consent prevents discussion having taken place and thus reduces autonomous 
decision-making.  It also aggravates the situation where relatives are left with the burden of 
decision-making when they might be less able to think clearly and more likely to refuse.240  In 
fact we might question whether there is indeed a ‘right’ time and place for these discussions 
to take place together with the real risk that people might die unexpectedly before decisions 
about donation have been confirmed. 
 
As part of its commitment to implementing presumed consent, the BMA are also seeking to 
secure permission for ventilation.  Ventilation ensures that organs arrive in a healthier state 
for transfer to recipients and time is no longer of the essence in certain procedures such as 
heart transfer, thus recipients stand to benefit in the long term.  As a result of ventilation 
there is the likelihood of a more successful outcome and a much improved prognosis for 
                                                          
236 McLachlan, H., (2008) Presumed consent is no consent at all, www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/336/7636/111-
a#188146 
237 See Ch.3 p71 of this study. 
238 Emson, H E., (2003) It is immoral to require consent for cadaver organ donation, J Med Ethics: 29:3:125 
239 Glannon, W., (2003) Do the sick have a right to cadaveric organs, J Med Ethics: 29:3:153 




recipients together with positive implications for transplantation in general in the future.  
However, ethical questions remain over this procedure.  While the BMA argue that 
ventilation presents a further opportunity for relatives to say goodbye to their loved-ones, 
reports from relatives suggest that it is difficult for closure to be had whilst the body of their 
loved-one appears still to be alive when they leave which can add to their distress at the 
time.241  In whatever event, it is the responsibility of the medical teams involved to honour 
the wishes of the deceased and their relatives. 
 
Evidence shows that ethical challenges to any decision to implement presumed consent are 
varied.  Discussions reach far beyond the pragmatic and rational into the realms of personal 
preference, day-to-day issues and themes relating to selfhood.  Roger Goss has commented 
that presumed consent runs counter to the principle of protecting patients’ rights to fully 
informed agreement, and it ‘clashes with the prevailing practice to involve patients fully in 
treatment decisions.’242  Veatch and Pitt for instance believe that presumed consent is based 
on an erroneous assumption that people would donate if asked, claiming that the desire of 
many to acquire more organs might stifle the wishes of religious minorities for instance who 
find organ and tissue donation morally problematic.243 
 
Ann Sommerville, points to real life dilemmas that tend to include inconsistencies, opposing 
desires, ambiguities and ‘ragged-edges.’244  And O’Neill suggests the focus of bioethical 
discussion relating to autonomy: 
 
...is not on patient autonomy or individual autonomy of any distinctive sort.  What is 
rather grandly called ‘patient autonomy’ often amounts simply to a right to choose 
or refuse treatments on offer, and the corresponding obligations of practitioners not 
to proceed without patients’ consent.245 
 
Equally, Daniel Sperling comments that: ‘The act of organ donation should be regarded as 
enhancing the autonomy and self-expression of the donor and expanding - not abolishing - 
the self.’246  In contrast to Sperling’s thesis, certain philosophies would hold that an 
                                                          
241 BMA (2012) Building on Progress: Where next for organ donation policy in the UK, p27.  The Guardian: 
Doctor’s radical plan to tackle organ shortage, February 13th, 2012, www.the guardian.com/society/feb13, 
accessed 15/02/2012. 
242 Goss, R., (2000) Presumed consent further undermines medical ethics. British Medical Journal: 321:7267:1023 
243 Veatch, R M., & Pitt, J B., (1995) ‘The Myth of Presumed Consent: Ethical Problems in New Organ Procurement 
Strategies’, Transplant Proceedings: 27:2:1888-92 
244 Sommerville, A., (2003) Juggling law, ethics and intuition: practical answers to awkward questions in J Med 
Ethics: 29:281-286 
245 O’Neill, O., (2002) Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp37-38. 
246 Sperling, D., (2008) Me or mine? On property from personhood, symbolic existence and motivation to donate, 
in Organ Transplantation: Ethical, Legal and Psychosocial Aspects, edited by Weimar, W., Bos, M A., and 




individual possesses interests after death and death is just a different conceptualisation of 
the form in which persons exist.247  Sperling retorts however that even after death organ 
donation represents an expression of the recognition of a person’s ‘symbolic existence’ in 
non-material, second-order terms.248  In other words the donor maintains a link with the 
living person who holds all human interests belonging to the former person whose interest 
they are.  And Mark Wicclair further agrees that we should not see death as signifying the 
total ‘annihilation of all moral traces’ of the person who once was.249 
Would we accept a view that the human body in receipt of another’s organ has somehow 
been transformed into a hybridised form - a kind of synthesis of two people at the level of 
‘sharing’ an organ, and what would be the legal and ethical ramifications should we think of 
the body in this way?  It is not an issue that has been comprehensively debated in recent 
years, but nonetheless has received significant attention and whilst not the central remit of 
this study warrants further analysis.250  Indeed the anthropologist Lesley Sharp carried out 
some research that revealed that ‘encounters between donor kin and organ recipients 
generate shared understanding of unusual forms of embodied intimacy.’251  She maintains 
that this indicates ‘...a bio-sentimentality, for organ recipients are frequently understood as 
experiencing remarkable transformations by virtue of their harbouring within them the body 
fragments of organ donors.’252  As she argues this extraordinary outcome has the potential 
to transform the recipient’s sense of self ‘into a gestalt composed of the ego merged with 
another.’253 
 
Having legalised presumed consent, European countries such as Spain and Belgium report 
success.  Apart from Wales however, the remainder of the UK has continued to investigate 
the possibility of such a move.  In sanctioning presumed consent, Wales anticipated that a 
25% increase in donation rate would result post legalisation.254  This could be seen as 
encouraging for those waiting for an organ as a result.  However in 2016 a year after The 
Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013 became extant, statistics reveal that the figures for 
deceased as well as living donors are still very low compared with the overall population: 
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total deceased donors over the period 2015-2016 amounted to 64, and total living donors 
amounted to 30.  In the period 2016-2017 those figures for deceased donors dropped to 61, 
but increased to 36 for living donors.  The total difference shows no statistical significance 
between the two periods.255  Yet for 2016-2017 the number of patients on the active waiting 
list in Wales rose by some 43 patients over the previous period and overall transplants 
dropped to 187 from 214 the previous year.256  Despite this seeming lack of progress in 
Wales, The Guardian newspaper reported that in February 2018 in Britain the first vote to 
legalise the automatic usage of organs post mortem was passed.  A first hurdle that it has to 
be said shows little evidence and scant rationale - given Wales’ experience - for increasing 
the potential saving of lives to 200.257  Ministers in Scotland also have announced plans for 
moving to a ‘soft opt-out’ scheme in the future.258  It must be borne in mind however that 
writing presumed consent into law is merely one step towards overcoming the problems of 
gaining approval for organs to be donated or indeed transplanted.  Informed consent equally 
plays a major part for both donor and recipient alike. 
 
Informed consent and the doctor patient relationship 
 
In the matter of patient or recipient consent, Neil Messer considers the relationship between 
physician and patient to be paramount, since at the heart of healing is the caring undertaken 
by doctors and other health professionals towards the patient and those close to them.259  
Development of trust is crucial in what is an unequal relationship where patients ultimately 
depend on an expert to provide answers to their health problems at a time when they are 
least able to cope.  Such reliance has implications for patient autonomy, informed consent 
and ultimate decision-making. 
 
In particular cases such as organ transplantation, major difficulties with relating information 
to those who have little concept of the intricate, technical, nature of that which they are 
about to undergo becomes ever more concerning as biotechnology advances.  A cursory 
glance at the specialist articles in the Lancet is proof positive of the linguistic complexity 
involved and highlights the problems of a ‘private’ language that is accessible to a very 
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limited section of society.  This results in the skills and language used by the physicians far 
surpassing the understanding of most patients thus rendering their position increasingly 
vulnerable and undermining the vital dual control that this relationship demands.  As a result 
the possibility of medical paternalism increases as advances in and uses of ever more 
complex biotechnological language progresses that effectively compound the distancing of 
the patient from their own body and bodily identity. 
 
The loss of the traditional relationship between the family doctor and the patient may 
constitute part of the difficulty in establishing consent.  In former days, a level of trust was 
built up over numerous years with the family doctor who treated patients with full 
knowledge of their and their families’ medical history and circumstances.  According to Karen 
Lebacq, the doctor represented some stability in a world where the patient felt powerless 
and a certain loss of ‘normal’ status in the world.260  On this matter O’Neill advises: 
 
The traditional construction of doctor-patient relations as relations of trust, as quasi-
personal, as guided by professional concern for the patient's best interests makes 
sense to many patients because (if achievable) it would secure what they most 
need.  The point and the context of the older, trust-centred model of doctor-patient 
relationships are not at all obscure….Contemporary relations between professionals 
and patients are constrained, formalised and regulated in many ways, and may 
erode patients’ reasons for trusting.261 
 
Presently, therefore, not seeing the same doctor and the dual constraints of time and 
finance together with more complex health problems conspire against such traditional ways 
of treatment.  Patients are often necessarily seen by a team of professionals in both medical 
and other capacities on a one-to-one basis over a protracted length of time, and this can add 
to their feelings of instability and disempowerment and furthermore can lead to a slower 
rate of recovery.262  Nowhere is the problem of lack of good and consistent communication 
more amply demonstrated than when things go wrong.  The Alder Hey case is a prime 
example of the trauma that can ensue when good communication breaks down and trust is 
abused in such professional/patient relationships.263 
 
In the UK two key issues have emerged illustrating the need for greater trust between 
patients and their clinicians.  A patients’ association report in 2012 gave details of a survey of 
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a considerable sample of patients showing a significant drop in satisfaction, trust and 
involvement in care.264  And the Francis Report into the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust debacle, 
made recommendations to shift the emphasis from a focus on business issues to once more 
placing the patient at the forefront of healthcare.265  Revival of the values of truthfulness, 
trust and care - considered lost as a result of prioritising business issues over patients - are 
perceived to be distinctly more important in achieving greater successful end results both for 
the patient, not to speak of the reputation of healthcare authorities. 
 
Patient choice moreover is seen as imperative in establishing informed consent, and there 
have been several proposals considering how patient autonomy may be safeguarded.  For 
example Beauchamp and Childress claim that a structured approach with a checklist of 
elements to be gone through and approved will alleviate the problem of breakdown in 
communication.266  Manson and O’Neill argue that some form of negotiation between 
physician and patient as shared communication could be considered legally or morally 
sufficient.267  Whatever position is adopted, the standing of patients has to be made clear in 
order to provide the binding contract covering that which they are about to undergo without 
leaving them in a state of feeling disconnected or helpless. 
 
Of clear importance is the concept of informed consent as a standard way of avoiding 
breaches of significant obligations.  It is ethically important in medical practice where 
interventions would otherwise contravene underlying responsibilities.  Rights exist which 
cover considerably more comprehensive aspects for patients than merely protection of their 
autonomy.  As Manson and O’Neill point out: both in medical practice and research, 
informed consent practices presuppose the very significant ethical, legal and professional 
obligations not to invade others’ bodily integrity, not to constrain their liberty of action, not 
to deceive them or to violate their privacy or indeed any rights that correspond to these 
duties.268 
 
We cannot have medical or research intervention unless we permit limited action 
that would otherwise constitute a breach of bodily integrity, personal liberty or 
privacy; informed consent is a way of granting permission for such action.  It is not, 
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and certainly not primarily, a way of exercising individual autonomy, however 
conceived.269 
 
Equally for the living donor informed consent is closely interrelated with pragmatic concerns 
of relating sufficiently understandable material that clarifies the risks of surgery and the 
likely health and everyday practical implications of undertaking such a serious procedure.270  
After all, the living donor who was formerly extremely healthy will effectively become a 
patient with all that entails.  In fact Price remarks that some critics maintain that living 
donation is an illegal practice that contravenes the moral and ethical prescription of non-
maleficence.271 
 
In a healthcare system that paradoxically is supremely advanced and well equipped to 
undertake sophisticated transplant procedures people continue to die on a daily basis 
through the acute shortage of organs, the reasons for this shortage are manifold.  The reality 
is that people’s health has significantly improved over the last fifty years leading to an ever-
aging population whose organs on their death are unlikely to be fit for transplantation.  And 
fatal accident rates have dropped overall in the last few years with the introduction of 
stringent seat belt and drinking laws, although exceptions remain in the case of young, new 
drivers’ serious accident rates.272  Whilst overall donor refusal rates continue to remain 
persistently high and in contrast numbers on the donor register have considerably improved, 
the needs of those on the transplant list are far from being met.273 
 
There is little doubt that the concept of donating an organ is ethically problematic.  For the 
donors it requires some extremely serious thought concerning how we perceive our bodies 
and how we wish others to perceive us.  It is no trivial exercise involving considerable 
rational as well as emotional input for the individual donor and some very careful and 
powerfully persuasive arguments from those who wish to encourage people to donate in the 
first place.  For instance are we altruistically inclined to donate an organ as a gift of such 
magnitude?  Are we truly capable of such extreme generosity?  
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Gift giving and its interrelationship with altruism 
 
The notion of the gift is seen as vital by organisations in the donor-organ relationship.274  The 
word ‘donor’ equally reinforces the concept of an act of charitable gift-giving.  Catherine 
Waldby and Robert Mitchell criticise the gift metaphor as demanding altruism, ceding of 
control for donors, obscuring the potential value of tissues and rendering the body an ‘open 
source of free biological material for commercial use.’275  Equally, Nancy Scheper-Hughes has 
alluded to the ‘tyranny of the gift’ alleging that even living related donation is more 
accurately described as ‘poaching’ than a voluntary act of giving.276  On the other hand Grant 
Gillett believes that the notion of the ‘gift of oneself’ parallels the highest ideals of most 
moralities, both secular and religious and equally in ethical terms and public image.277  And 
as Graeme Laurie states ‘The notion of the gift has a strong normative appeal....  It is in our 
nature generally to offer a helping hand to others in need.’278 
 
Somewhat unconvincing however, is the idea that the gift of an organ has certain 
equivalence to the gift of life.279  More accurate may be the idea of the gift of an improved 
level of health, or the gift of an extension to life, although these too come with certain 
limitations.  Whereas the gift of life idea may be the perspective of organ recipients or their 
relatives since the reality for them is that precious lives are indeed being saved, the very 
notion needs to be balanced against what kind of life this turns out to be.  It is not a life 
restored to its former self.  For many recipients organ transplantation only buys time and 
requires adjustment to a lifestyle of dependency on drugs and other attendant health 
problems which can arise, or indeed the likelihood of further transplantation at some later 
date.280  In fact Laura Siminoff and Kata Chillag allege that the donor is often the ‘gift object’ 
as opposed to the gift giver, and further that the concept is ‘used’ by healthcare 
professionals as a form of social control diverting attention from other ethical issues such as 
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the quality of life after transplant and the possibility of the need for further 
transplantation.281 
 
Paradoxically, however, the UK organ donation system is based solely on altruism and the 
gift relationship.  In this matter, the BMA consider that the gift element of donation can be 
important to those families who consent to donation and to those who receive organs.  In 
refuting an assertion that if an individual either personally or via relatives pro-actively 
volunteers an organ it is no longer a gift, they give quite a convoluted argument: 
 
Under an opt-out system individuals go through exactly the same thought process as 
they do in deciding to opt-in.  Given the option to donate or not, a decision is made 
to act to help others, by not opting out of donation, this is no less of a gift than an 
organ donated under an opt-in system…Under an opt-out system there is no way of 
knowing which of those who have not opted-out would have taken positive steps to 
donate under an opt-in system. Some people will see the loss of this positive action 
to donate as a cause for concern.  Whilst it may be seen as preferable for individuals 
- or their families - to take action to give organs, we need to acknowledge that under 
the current system organs are being lost that could have saved lives when that 
would not have been the wish of potential donors….282 
 
Unpicking this rather contradictory and naïve line of argument interestingly throws up the 
difficulty of establishing altruistic donation - yet altruism is a concept the BMA vehemently 
uphold.  Serious misgivings would ensue in any event where decisions to opt-in were 
equivalent to those of opting-out, as they claim.  The intellectual process might be similar, 
but the emotional impact would be different by orders of magnitude.   
 
There is no doubt that to verify that an organ has been given totally without any ulterior 
motive is particularly problematic.  This is of real concern in cases of living altruistic 
donation, since people rarely come forward unprompted to offer an organ, in fact in the UK 
only 80 so-called live altruistic donors made such an offer in 2016/2017.283  The burning issue 
remains to prove in cases of organ donation that any perceived charitable act is indeed 
altruistic.   
 
The notion of altruism in organ donation 
 
Biological altruism for instance explains how unselfish behaviour might have evolved.  
However it implies nothing about the motives or intentions of the agent.  Christine Clavien 
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and Michel Chapuisat claim that altruism is a deep and complex phenomenon, confusing 
because the term covers variable concepts and processes across disciplines and is thereby 
context dependant.284  And Judith Lichtenberg maintains that despite evolutionary theories 
the commonly held view that people never intentionally act to benefit others except to 
obtain some good for themselves still possesses ‘a powerful lure’ over our thinking.285 
 
Situations do arise when we appear to act unselfishly, because other reasons for our 
behaviour often come into play: the prospect of a future favour in return, the boost to our 
ego and standing in the community, or simply the good feeling that comes from appearing to 
act unselfishly.  Whether or not the donor is truly offering an organ altruistically is 
questionable since statistics demonstrate that live donation is directed in favour of a relative 
or friend in many cases, leaving open to question whether altruism is indeed relevant or 
even a necessary criterion at all.  The important point about the notion of gift is that it is 
mandated to ensure that no money is exchanged.  Douglas Martin and Eric Meslin consider 
that the lack of potential reciprocity generates dissonance in relation to organs and 
constrains levels of donation in so far as it may not be reasonable to expect a person to 
make a gift of such magnitude in an entirely detached and impersonal context.286 
 
The concepts of altruism and the sanctioning of a so-called acceptable form of payment were 
considered by Nuffield in their 2011 Report.287  In response to continuing organ scarcity and 
low donation rates, Nuffield chose to focus on altruistic gift-giving relative to fair and 
acceptable incentivisation schemes such as payment for peripheral expenses, clearly in the 
hope that this might increase the pool of donors, see Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: The Altruism Ladder proposed by Nuffield288 
 
What constitutes ‘fair recompense’ to the donor who in many cases may be the only person 
concerned not to receive any form of remuneration?  The question lies in contrast to the 
salary paid to health care staff involved, or the direct benefit the recipient derives as a 
considerable health benefit from the donated material.  Such questions arise especially 
where the intermediaries concerned in the process - for example the medical teams and the 
pharmaceutical companies who operate on a commercial basis - gain sizeable financial 
reward.289 
 
As a supporting exercise for part of their 2011 study, Nuffield conducted a small ad hoc 
survey to test out attitudes to the acceptability of diverse kinds of incentive and further to 
give some credibility to the tool they developed.   
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The responses however were somewhat indifferent.290  Furthermore, however well-intended 
and creative their ladder concept is, it does send out a rather mixed message which appears 
contrary to the much held ethical principle of the necessity for a benevolent act of gift giving, 
of giving for giving’s sake. 
 
Further questions arise concerning the reliability of a tool that is essentially reductionist that 
will aid in assessment of such a multi-dimensional problem.  What results are expected in 
relation to the goal of increasing donor rates?  What happens if a particular case does not fall 
neatly into any one of the criteria?  In light of the responses received in Nuffield’s ad hoc 
survey, how would the ladder be adapted to meet the needs of those who would be in 
receipt of ‘associated benefits in kind’, or some acceptable financial benefit for having 
donated?  These matters would need to be thoroughly examined together with issues 
relating to those who refuse to donate, and subsequently need a transplant, in order that 
precedents are not set so that those who do refuse are in no way disadvantaged by those 
who donate, such as funeral expenses or precedence on waiting lists for a donor organ. 
 
Donating any organ is a personal decision dependent upon a very complex set of 
circumstances which might occur at any time during an individual’s lifetime: for living donors 
it means undergoing risky surgery and being suitable to do so together with the attendant 
health issues post-operatively.  For the deceased or their relatives - openness to the idea of 
being buried with a loss of bodily integrity, and for those with certain religious inclinations its 
acceptability.  All are certain to be amongst the most searching issues both relatives and 
prospective donors will have to face.  Any talk of incentive may be far from their immediate 
priorities when making such decisions. 
 
Would any form of payment incentive or otherwise be considered appropriate in the context 
of organ donation?  Is the insistence on altruism and gift giving justifiable when people are 
dying through lack of a much-needed resource?  Would financial incentive lessen acts of 
trafficking and alleviate a global problem?  Are the difficulties merely practical or are deeper 
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concerns such as how we view and value the body part of the problem?  Some form of 
payment is nonetheless a consideration, however its acceptability is another matter. 
 
The payment debate and the issue of commodification 
 
Payment per se for either selling or acquiring organs is illegal in the UK.  The move towards 
any kind of payment is not without difficulty for as Cynthia Cohen points out: 
 
[The] reason we are reluctant to exchange money for human kidneys is that this 
would deny something distinctly valuable about human beings - their dignity and 
human worth....Our body has special value because it is the medium through which 
we express ourselves.  Thus, our special value as human beings extends to our 
bodies.291   
 
Moreover, Mark Cherry argues that the more the conceptual distance between persons and 
their body parts is increased, the more body parts become like other objects in the world to 
be possessed, given away or sold.292  This would seem to suggest that any concept of trading 
could be linked to some notion of the closeness of various body parts to identity and ‘self.’  
Indeed Immanuel Kant in Lectures on Ethics viewed it inconceivable to imagine a life not 
mediated by the body.293  And Campbell states that dismantling the body in order to earn 
money raises some serious issues about personal integrity, since the body is being treated as 
a permanent and alienable commodity.294 
 
According to Janet Radcliffe-Richards, the problem is not the idea of payment itself, but in 
how the case is argued.295  Payment is something we do for goods and services on a regular 
basis - it is not anathema in the ordinary sense of the word.  The underlying justification 
needs to be one of balancing the benefits and risks of sanctioning any form of payment.  
Some doctors argue that payment for organs or transplantation leads to a slippery slope 
position which privileges the wealthy.  Whilst this is admittedly a general point that is often 
made against those who can afford to ‘go privately’, it nevertheless has some validity in this 
context.  We might question why organ donation and transplantation should be considered 
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any differently.  What is it that peculiarises this sphere of medicine and therefore incurs this 
type of comment? 
 
On the one hand there are those who argue that payment for organs could drive up the rates 
of donation, lessen the problem of trafficking and transplant tourism and more importantly 
offer the hope of improving the lives of those who are desperately in need of an 
organ/organs.296  On the other, it is felt that payment for organs could lead to a situation 
where market forces dictate price differentials between organ types.  In the opinion of 
Childress the various arguments associated with payment are not convincing enough to 
prove that the act of selling an organ is intrinsically immoral.297  Whereas Gillon believes that 
while in individual cases selling an organ such as a kidney may be entirely justified, 
nonetheless the likely dangers of financial exploitation and post-operative harm to 
predominately poor individuals involved in the transactions would probably result in an 
excess of harm over benefit.298  Yet again there are those who would vehemently disagree 
with each and every one of the foregoing points.299 
 
The issue of payment remains controversial since there is a delicate balance to be struck 
between benefits and harms if some form of remuneration were to be agreed.  Continued 
problems in overcoming scarcity encourages more and more extreme levels of dealing with 
the issue as Price has pointed out.  There are those who may be likely to benefit financially 
from selling an organ, for instance people in the poorest nations who donate organs for their 
own day-to-day survival.  There is however a real danger that they are likely to be exploited 
and are not in a position to access the follow-up care required after major surgical 
intervention.  Indeed as Price points out, transplant tourism and the likelihood of trafficking, 
potentially increases the more this situation continues.300 
 
It has been suggested that some global legal framework might be a solution.301  However this 
is very unlikely when in many countries payment for organs is considered both unacceptable 
and illegal and gaining agreement would prove particularly problematic where payment for 
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medical care is routine.  Unfortunately the outcome of this impasse results in persistent 
scarcity of organs and limited hope to those waiting on any transplant list. 
 
Since many forms of payment or incentivisation continue to incur considerable criticism and 
relentless debate and discussion, the question of ownership has been considered as a policy 
which in Price’s terms will ‘cut through the increasing noise’ provided by legal and ethical 
principles which inevitably operate in a ‘fuzzy’ way.302  Why should I not demand some form 
of recompense for giving away something that ostensibly is mine?  The question is however 
do we ‘own’ our bodies in the same way as we might own for instance a house or a car that 
we would inevitably sell in return for some pecuniary exchange?  Or is ownership of the body 




Veatch et al contend that defenders of donation hold that organs from the deceased are not 
for the taking, whilst advocates of incentives are unconvinced of any notion of property 
rights.303  The question here is whose body is it?  As a lawyer, Price favours the clearer cut 
approach of ownership which involves a type of legalisation of property rights in order to 
bring control back to the donor, which he maintains is the only way to ensure faithfulness of 
the gift.  Whilst the donor may have no expectation of the return of bodily material, there is 
an expectation that it will be used in accordance with the ‘terms’ of the gift. 
 
With ownership, however comes risk as Price suggests: 
 
...[of] course [ownership]might lead to perceptions of finance and market driven 
forces, with illegal money changing hands and the facilitation of exclusive control 
and unfettered use and powers over such materials including use for ethically 
unacceptable purposes.  This might not only result in perceptions of inequity, but 
could potentially jeopardise the trust of those who are being asked to freely donate 
to third parties who are then able to exploit such materials including commercially 
without constraints.  It is therefore necessary to translate the fairly ubiquitous and 
popular concept of the gift into legal concepts which more faithfully and 
appropriately reflect the wishes of the donor.304 
 
Nonetheless there is considerable difficulty with words such as ‘gift’ in this context.  The 
concept of property rights however is of a different moral status to the rights accorded to 
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humankind.  The notion of property or ownership in this context not only highlights the 
question of how humans are to be valued, but also the currently illegal market potential for 
body parts.  In positioning his argument Price points to the reality of the possibility for 
misuse of bodily materials for the purposes of financial gain and the numerous cases 
reported globally of trafficking and transplant tourism on the one hand; 305 whilst on the 
other in the UK reports continue of organs freely donated on the NHS for transplant to 
private patients.306 
 
Margaret Radin in discussing policy reform, considers that to treat personal property as 
marketable property is to redefine and change the character of any act of giving.  It affects 
our understanding of ourselves and our bodies.307  Andrews and Nelkin concur with Radin, 
claiming that the body not only serves certain functions for science, but also for society.308   
A person’s control over what is done to his or her body, or its parts, is important to their 
psychological development and wellbeing.  It is a means to establish identity and equally 
conveys values to others.  Moreover, beyond the individual, social conceptions of the body 
establish community identification.309 
 
According to Price however, failure to establish ownership creates a problem for society in 
general since the lack of bodily materials has the potential to ‘invariably fuel more and more 
extreme means of dealing with the deficit...’ and as a consequence will inevitably lead to a 
requirement for further ethical and policy decision-making.310  Whether or not ownership is 
to be established by a set of rights-based regulations is appropriate, there is undoubtedly a 
need for a comprehensive legal and ethical approach that is perceived to be fair and 
transparent for those involved in the donation process.  Fairness extends to the distribution 
of resources which given the dual constraints of finance and shortage of organs presents 
real-life issues for those decision-makers responsible for determining who shall receive an 
organ.  The dilemma of relating who will remain on the transplant list or who is unsuitable 
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for transplantation at all and will face the inevitability of the end of their life, remain daily 
occurrences in the lives of most clinicians in this specialist field of medicine. 
 
Fair distribution of resources 
 
Fair distribution of resources within transplantation medicine is predicated on sufficient 
bodily materials to ‘go round’ which is problematic.  Indeed many discussions in this study 
have been focussed on measures looking to alleviate this worldwide issue.  As a result of the 
shortage of bodily materials, medical professionals have some extremely difficult decisions 
to take in rationalising who will receive an organ or organs and who will remain on the 
transplant list or not.  Should fairness extend merely to the distribution of organs for 
transplant to those deemed ‘suitable’ resulting from the application of a supposedly 
independent measure of quality of life post-surgery?  Should those who have abused their 
health be entitled to the same opportunities for transplantation as those who have looked 
after themselves?  What if I just want to live longer irrespective of age, gender or ethnicity?  
These are very real considerations in the decision-making process. 
 
Due respect to the way in which the body is treated is an important consideration in issues of 
ethical fairness and transparency - not merely on a physiological level, as in adhering to the 
principles of non-maleficence and beneficence, but rather in taking into account the needs of 
the individual who may be feeling out-of-step with the world for long periods of time.  
O’Neill believes that in the domain of bioethics justice cuts across other ethical principles 
including those of autonomy and beneficence, and consequently appears to operate quite 
differently.  Justice in this case is more relevant to medical policies and systems rather than 
to clinical decisions or doctor-patient relationships.  In the context of distributive justice, 
justice serves as a reminder that fairness is not merely a matter of conforming to the law or a 
particular ethical code of practice.  Rather it involves answers that demand a critical 
appraisal of the needs of the individual above and beyond those of a medical nature - what it 
is to respect and have care and concern for others at a time when they are at their most 
vulnerable.311 
 
For healthcare and organ donation and transplantation in particular, issues of fair 
distribution of resources is probably the single most complex of difficulties to overcome 
                                                          




ethically - particularly since financial considerations are uppermost in the majority of 
healthcare establishments.  Despite the volume of psycho-social questions for both the 
donor and the recipient prior to surgical intervention, in the UK allocation of organs boils 
down to gaining the maximum benefit for the maximum number - a principle considered 
ethically problematic since it prioritises the choices of the many over those of the individual.  
John Rawls argues that, ‘…it fails to take seriously the distinction between persons.  The 
principle of rational choice for one man is taken as the principle of social choice as well.’312  
The dilemma in the case of transplantation occurs when selection of recipients rests on a 
choice between instances where one might offer the most benefit while another might be 
the most fair. 
 
Moral conflict arises when the basis of who might have increased life expectancy and a 
better prognosis for recovery becomes a norm for decision-making.  The question is: is 
allocation on this premise equitable?  For organ transplantation the idea of assessing an 
individual on the future outcome of quality-of-life and its longevity seems particularly 
difficult to countenance in light of an uncertain future for any of us.  Quality Adjusted Life 
Years (QALYs) often work against the older patient or indeed the young infant, since they are 
considered less likely to accrue the most benefit in terms of survival.  Harris maintains that 
basing decisions on age is ethically problematic: ‘the point is a simple but powerful one:  
however short or long my life will be, so long as I want to go on living it then I suffer a 
terrible injustice when that life is prematurely cut short.’313 
 
And yet quality of life language implies that not all lives are equally good or equally deserving 
of protection, thus it is essentially discriminatory according to Richard McCormick.  Every life 
being of equal value reveals a legitimate concern for instance that medical treatment is not 
denied or withheld in a way that violates the rights of individuals.  However, perhaps that is 
not the concern.  Every person may be of equal value, but not every life is of equal value.  
The terminology is of vital importance here in making ethical decisions.  McCormick makes a 
valid point: 
 
If ‘life’ means the continuation of vital processes in a persistent vegetative state; if 
‘value’ means a good to the individual concerned; if ‘equal’ means ‘identical’ or ‘the 
same’ especially of treatment, then I believe it is simply false to say that ‘every life is 
of equal value.’314 
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Unjust discrimination is avoided if decision-making centres on the benefit to the patient, 
even if that benefit is described largely in terms of quality-of-life criteria, such criteria 
however would mean far more than the QALY measurement could ever account for. 
Issues of justice arise in at least two distinct contexts in donation.  On the one hand, 
concerns arise that those who are most likely to donate organs may be the least likely to 
benefit from access to the services of which the donation is part.  On a global scale it can 
lead to inhabitants of lower income countries becoming the main source of organ donors for 
those who live in wealthier nations.  On this point, Jacquineau Azétsop and Stuart Rennie 
make a powerful comment that the challenge facing bioethics in resource poor settings is 
not to mislead people with unrealistic promises of autonomy that very few people can 
indeed achieve, but to ‘articulate moral principles and societal values that are oriented 
around the promotion of equitable access to care and which broaden the goals of medicine 
and public health.’315 
 
Should organs go to alcoholics or diabetics or obese persons for example?  Should lifestyle 
choices dictate the opportunity for transplantation in circumstances where the potential for 
needing an organ is increased?  Would some degree of lower priority be accorded to those 
who do not look after their health?  Should those requiring further transplant be given less 
priority on the grounds of ‘no-one should get seconds until the others have had firsts’ 
particularly since second time recipients have been shown to fare less well.  Should those 
who agree to donate be afforded the opportunity to go to the top of the transplant list if 
need be?  Such questions are symptomatic of the range and magnitude of the problem of 
fairness and the necessity for a level of deliberation that extends far beyond the notion of 
the body as a mere physical entity. 
 
Fairness of distribution furthermore calls into question the practice of socially directed organ 
donation, which could be considered a different form of discrimination.  As Price points out 
those committed to the principle of justice would insist that the pattern of allocation is 
morally critical.  For example would a directed donation be restricted to going first to 
children, or would a request that an organ go to a person of a particular race or gender, be 
acceptable? 316  Often the offer of an organ is just down to serendipity, being in the right 
place at the right time.  Regional factors globally do come into play, with the net result that 
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there is an exponential increase in transplant tourism within and across jurisdictions.  This is 
a difficult matter since globally different jurisdictions have non-comparable laws and the 
standard and sometimes cost of healthcare is variable. 
 
Perhaps the answer to this seemingly intractable dilemma is to choose a method of random 
selection as Paul Ramsay proposes: 
 
When the ultimate of life is the value at stake, and when not all lives can be saved, it 
can be reasonably argued that we should stand aside as far as possible from the 
choice of who shall live and who shall die. The equal right of every human being to 
live and not relative personal or social worth should be the ruling principle.  Thus 
random selection is preferable not simply because life is a value incommensurate 
with all others, and so not negotiable by bartering one person’s worth against 
another’s.  It is sustained also because we have no way of knowing how really and 
truly to estimate a person’s societal worth or his worth to others or to himself in 
unfocused social situations in the ordinary lives of humankind in their 
communities.317 
 
There is no doubt that justice as fairness in the matter of organ distribution and transfer is 
no inconsequential principle, the concept brings to light manifold issues that reach into the 
core of some very real personal and wider social concerns.  The Lancet comments that there 
are many frameworks within which organ transplantation can operate but at the heart of any 
system must be trust.318  Dying patients need to trust their families that their wishes to 
donate will be honoured, and moreover that doctors will provide the best end of life care 
possible.  According to the Lancet, patients waiting for transplants must be able to trust in an 
ethical and fair organ supply based on clinical need and treated by doctors who will provide 
the highest standards of clinical care.319  In short no matter how problematic the issue of 
fairness of distribution of organs turns out to be, valuing the person lying in the bed in front 
of the medical professional who is in dire need of whatever medical support is appropriate, 
is absolutely paramount. 
 
The value of the body from a medical perspective 
 
What makes human life valuable, and what makes it more valuable than other forms of life?  
As Jonathan Glover points out we should not regard a preference for human life as a mere 
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prejudice in favour of our own species.320  Any notion of speciesism might be considered 
objectionable partly because of its moral arbitrariness - we would need to give an adequate 
account of what in effect differentiates humankind from other creatures or forms of life.321  
But what if anything makes human life more than mere prejudice in favour of ourselves and 
our own kind?  What is the basis of the belief and what indeed justifies it?  These questions 
may seem excessively abstract and too difficult and controversial to be of help in solving 
everyday practical problems faced by health care professionals.  Yet many of the day-to-day 
decisions taken in medical practice presuppose answers to these questions. 
 
In the organ donation and transplantation environment the shortage of kidneys, hearts, 
lungs and livers render them valuable resources for both the patient and the doctor.  Such 
scarcity influences consent methods, the distribution of resources and the notions of 
altruism and gift giving in particular and the very idea of how we wish the body to be seen.   
Sells in arguing presumed consent, believes that until opting-out legislation has been 
introduced the lack of organs available for those in dire need and who are dying is a ‘tragic 
waste of life.’322  In fact in their 2008 Report the Organ Donation Taskforce recommended 
that: 
 
All parts of the NHS must embrace organ donation as a usual, not unusual event.  
Local policies, constructed around national guidelines, should be put in place.  
Discussions about donation should be part of all end-of-life care when 
appropriate.323 
 
The whole notion of donation being considered the ‘norm’ highlights the problems of using 
the body as a means to an end rather than an end in itself, argued by the Enlightenment 
philosopher Kant as a moral imperative in the sense of practical law.  It is moreover of 
continuing importance not only in matters of consent, but also for transplant medicine 
generally.   
 
In this Kant states: 
 
…[that man], and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not 
merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions, 
whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed 
at the same time as an end….Persons, therefore, are not merely subjective ends 
                                                          
320 Glover, J., (2006) The Sanctity of Life in, Bioethics: An Anthology, 2nd edition, Kuhse, H., & Singer, P (eds.), 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Oxford, p271. 
321 Glover, J., (2006) p271 
322 Sells, R A., (1990) Transplant Proceedings: 22:931-932 




whose existence as an object of our actions has a value for us; they are objective 
ends – that is, things whose existence is in itself an end…324 
 
While the need of the clinician is to rid the body of disease by transplantation for instance, 
such a mechanistic approach is typical of those who see the body in a reductionist and 
somewhat simplistic manner.  There are obvious consequences for concentrating on the 
body as a quasi-mechanical object capable of being ‘repaired’ rather like a car in order to 
extend life since it leaves behind the very nature of what constitutes humankind itself.  Leder 
holds that the physician need not attend to the patient’s intentionality when conceived as a 
physiological machine.  Diagnosis and treatment seek to address ‘the observed lesion, the 
quantified measurement far more than a person living in pain.’  The patient’s own 
experience and subjective voice thereby become inessential to the medical encounter: 
 
Modern medicine allows the hidden parts of the human form which cause disease 
and pain to be revealed by ignoring the lived body, and by revealing mechanisms 
and structures in the dead body.  Real-time diagnosis with amazing scanning devices 
can deal with issues once thought to be miraculous, but still the patient is inert, an 
object of study, and what is subsequently uncovered will need to be revealed ‘like 
the map of some alien territory.  The patient must be introduced to their own body 
as though to a stranger.’  In accord with such a medicine of distance, bioethics tends 
to offer only de-personalised norms and principles, far removed from the patient’s 
own narrative and cleansed of all individuality.325 
 
Campbell argues that we need to avoid simplistic accounts of the value of the body and its 
parts, in contrast to valuing humankind as people realising their good by having their wants 
satisfied.  Is it morally impoverishing to think about the body devoid of a full account of the 
nature of our embodied selves?  Whilst there is no moral imperative to treat the body as a 
sacred object, appreciation of the beauty and complexity of the world we inhabit depends 
totally on bodily existence and the way in which we perceive and value ourselves as human 
persons.326  John Breck believes that to set sanctity of life against quality of life issues is a 
form of bio-idolatry since God-given life is ultimately fulfilled beyond the limits of biological 
existence.327  Theologians such as Gilbert Meilaender have argued that life has a value to be 
preserved precisely because it makes other achievements possible.328  For John Locke the 
17th century philosopher and physician valuing is a conscious process and to value something 
is both to know what we value and to be conscious of our attitude towards it.329  So what do 
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we mean by valuable?  The list is endless, but what matters is not the content of an account, 
but that individuals have the capacity to give such an account in the first instance.  If we 
allow that the value of life for each individual consists simply in those reasons, whatever they 
happen to be and however varied, if they want to go on living, then the nature of those 
reasons is irrelevant.  As Harris says, all we need to know is that particular individuals have 
their own reasons - that they value their own lives and therefore such valuing should in some 




Analysis of textual and research data has thrown up a series of questions relating to the 
ethical, pragmatic and technological debates concerning donation and transplantation.  As a 
general point it is apparent from a focused attention on the multitude of discussions and 
debates that there are areas where ethical policy and opinion have been conflated with 
decisions which are merely of pragmatic concern.  The notion of payment is an obvious 
example where outcomes have been influenced by policy that rules it out completely, 
whereas payment for any good or service is an accepted part of our everyday existence.  The 
problem lies not in the concept itself, or in any agreement over whether payment is 
appropriate, but in how the discussion is played out in terms of fully examining the benefits 
and disadvantages before reaching any conclusions.  Disentangling the moral from the 
historically or politically nuanced is critical if discussions and recommendations are to move 
forward with reliability and with confidence that all sides have been fully examined and 
debated in the interests of those who are likely to benefit from the decisions made. 
 
More specifically however, whilst reflecting on the revolutionary nature of transplantation 
procedures, there remains the possibility that we might need to revise our perceptions of 
human existence both now and in the future.  Is the future of consent to donate effectively 
going to be taken out of our hands?  Who owns the body?  What do we mean by the body?  
Is payment or incentive of whatever kind merely of pragmatic concern or are deeper 
questions such as how we view and value the body part of the problem?  Can we be sure 
that the best possible opportunity for securing an organ is open to us when we are in dire 
need?  And if not, crucially, what other avenues of healing are possible should I want to go 
on living?  How are we to become more amenable to the idea potentially of a hybridised 
                                                          




body?  These questions reach far beyond the mechanistic into the complex and thus 
multifaceted nature of bodily existence. 
 
Arguably a more empathic and creative approach to bioethics focussed on the patient is 
paramount in order to keep pace with but more importantly offset some of the ethical 
presuppositions and questions which biotechnological advances have thus far presented.  
Any deconstruction of current ethical frameworks must deal with an account of the 
hermeneutics of the complexity of the body in the specialised setting of transplantation 
medicine.  Complexity in this domain needs to be treated as a thick concept embracing not 
only the pragmatic and technological, critical for both ethical policy and decision-making, but 
more importantly for notions of selfhood as affected by ill-health.331  The notion of the 
wholistic nature of the body in both health and illness has wide-ranging implications for the 
development of any bioethical model - a view that will be taken up in the next chapter. 
 
                                                          














Principlism and Alternative Bioethical Models 
 
I am not a mechanism, an assembly of various sections. 
And it is not because the mechanism is working wrongly that I am ill. 
I am ill because of wounds to the soul, to the deep emotional self 
and the wounds to the soul take a long, long time, only time can help 
and patience, and a certain difficult repentance 
long, difficult repentance, realisation of life’s mistake, 
and freeing oneself from the endless repetition of this mistake 
which mankind at large has chosen to sanctify.332 





This chapter will consider a variety of ethical models, both current and historical, in order to 
give weight to my contention that most models or frameworks fail to live up to their original 
intention which is to offer guidance to such medical decision-making in order to provide 
benefit and a restoration of an improved level of health to the patient.  Clinicians face 
considerable difficulties and dilemmas on a daily basis, not the least of which is who will 
receive an organ.  The chapter therefore begins with some comment on how modern 
                                                          




medicine developed, since it has had an influence on bioethical developments in general and 
ethical frameworks in particular.  Subsequently the current, dominant ethical model 
‘Principlism’ developed by Beauchamp and Childress will be critically reviewed.  Finally some 
ethical alternatives to Principlism as suggested by bioethicists in the field will be discussed 
and the contribution of an ethics of care will be proposed as a potential ethical approach 
since it chimes with the arguments proposed throughout this study.  A critical summary will 
subsequently point the way forward for the chapters that follow. 
 
The rise of modern medicine 
 
Modern medicine arose through the unification of two phenomena: the medical clinic and 
pathological anatomy.  They were systematically brought together in a way that created a 
new approach towards the human body and its diseases.  In contrast to pre-modern 
medicine patients were classified through an investigation based primarily not on what they 
told the doctor but rather on signs detected through inspection of their bodies - through 
touching, looking and listening.  The philosopher Michel Foucault comments that this is most 
obviously represented in the enormous corpus of catalogues of different diseases assembled 
by physicians such as Thomas Sydenham who classified taxonomies of disease according to 
similarities and differences in the symptoms and clinical signs of the patient.333  To this 
systematic, empirical approach to the diseases of living patients was linked a classification of 
disease from records of the dissection of deceased bodies.  Thus in contrast to the 
‘traditional’ way patients were treated, with the doctor being a ‘friend’, the body came to be 
viewed as a functional space that can be opened up for inspection by an impersonal expert.  
As Foucault asserts: 
 
To establish these signs (of disease)…is to project upon the living body a whole 
network of anatomo-pathological mappings: to draw the dotted outline of the 
future autopsy.  The problem then is to bring to the surface that which is layered in 
depth; semiology will no longer be a reading, but the set of techniques that make it 
possible to constitute a projective pathological anatomy.334 
 
Marie François Xavier Bichat considered the founder of modern medicine, and other 
eighteenth century physicians shared the conviction together with Foucault, that the linking 
of clinical observation to post-mortem dissection was critical.  Diseases were then found in 
the form of morbid changes in the tissues that were thought to have given rise to signs and 
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sounds on the surface of the diseased body when the patient was still alive.  Those systems 
according to Foucault however, left no room for the patients or doctors as human beings; 
they were reduced to little more than ‘disturbances’ in the representational system of 
diseases.335 
 
Two historical theories exemplify the profound change that took place in the history of 
Western medicine.  According to Svenaeus, the first - the progressive view, looked upon 
medical history as a series of discoveries by different individuals who challenged the theories 
of pre-modern medicine.336  Whilst only placing their trust in the evidence of ‘sound 
empirical knowledge’, a massive body of thought was collated, which succeeded in toppling 
the old system that had been previously supported by a religious and conservative ideology.  
The other - Foucault’s epistemic view, maintained that historical changes do not come about 
through the isolated inventions or discoveries by individuals that then accumulate in a 
progressive way, but rather depend on epistemological shifts in discourse, thus making 
possible new inventions and theories about individuals.337 
 
Human beings did not come to occupy the centre of knowledge and the focus of the medical 
gaze until the modern clinic came into existence and the shift from the classical to the 
modern age had taken place.  In the modern clinic the patient is not just a surface upon 
which diseases are read and classified, she is viewed as an autonomous subject.  Jewson 
considered the ‘medical cosmology of bedside medicine’ to be essentially patient-centred.338  
The patient as an individual person and their symptoms and the account of their illness ‘were 
the raw materials from which the pathological entities of medical theory were 
constructed.’339 
 
Foucault however maintains that patients and doctors and their ways of coming together in 
the modern setting are merely effects of medical discourse not of praxis in the Aristotelian 
sense.340  Since technology has taken over some of the routine work of the doctor, patients 
run the risk of being reduced to an object - a body, a case in patient records and further 
taxonomic evidence, in which the person consequently disappears altogether.  The meeting 
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of whatever kind, between the doctor and the patient that in the history of medicine formed 
the basis of the medical encounter, is replaced by a new image: the scientist examining his 
object.  This can prove problematic since the object - the patient - never ceases to be at the 
same time a person, and this potentially gives rise to problems of conflict and trust.  
Notwithstanding the fact that modern medical science and technology will continue to 
change the nature of the medical meeting, medical practice will at the same time remain a 
meeting at its heart between persons.  And crucially a meeting that reflects at an ethical level 
all that is implied by the very nature of this encounter.  The nature of that ethical encounter 
is the substantive point however. 
 
Principlism - the dominant bioethical model 
 
The model, known as Principlism, developed by Beauchamp and Childress is founded on 
traditional philosophical propositions espoused by Plato and Hippocrates, in a time frame 
that saw medicine as an unregulated and undeveloped practice where the patient frequently 
diagnosed their own malady and consulted with the doctor merely for curative relief.341  And 
a visit to the doctor was clearly deemed unimportant.  In the sixteenth century, visiting the 
doctor was an expensive matter, only open to the gentry; the remainder of the population 
relied on remedies of one sort or another and ‘cures’ for their maladies were handed down 
through generations.  It was not until after the Second World War and the establishment of 
the National Health Service in the UK that medical services became freely available to all and 
bioethical matters became significant.342 
 
Beauchamp and Childress’s framework of the four principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence and justice which has proven its popularity through longevity by reason of their 
claim to its simplicity in ethical decision-making, has come under considerable scrutiny.  The 
assertion that their model is based on universal morality applicable in any situation including 
medicine has been questioned for its lack of applicability in technically advanced and 
complex settings such as that of transplantation medicine.343  Further a number of medical 
professionals suggest the problem of morality and any supporting bioethical frameworks 
based on either utilitarian or deontological principles lies in their inability to focus on the 
individual in ‘provid[ing] an adequate account of day-to-day decision-making in medicine,’ 
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and thus ‘to provide any substantial guidance for medical practice.’344  There is little doubt 
and research has indicated, that solving dilemmas in such advanced bioethical circumstances 
remains persistently problematic and reservations thus remain over the four principles 
approach as too basic and narrow in questions of both practical and ethical importance. 
 




Autonomy strongly depends on the free decisions of individuals, free from any form of 
coercion and entered into by free and informed agreement.  It has long been argued that 
autonomy or respect for persons has tended to be the leading principle of biomedical ethics 
or research ethics respectively.345  As evidenced in the literature review many criticisms have 
been levelled at autonomy-based bioethics over the past thirty years or so from a number of 
different angles: sociological, gender-based and multicultural amongst others.  Herring 
believes what is really being claimed here is a right of ‘bodily integrity’ that is a right not to 
have something done to your body without your consent.346 
 
The difficulty of autonomy as a principle arises especially in resource poor settings when as 
Azétsop and Rennie state:   
 
…[People] can barely afford the cost of care or satisfy the nutritional requirements 
for a good recovery, the ethics of medical encounter should be understood 
differently and expressed in different terms than patient choice….It would be more 
helpful to develop new sets of values that guide medical practice and promote 
patient participation in the healing relationship. 347 
 
The call for patient participation is not a new phenomenon.  Patient movements were 
formed after the Second World War when people began demanding influence over the 
institution of medicine and levelled accusations against doctors for paternalistic behaviour. 
Until this point the physician had acted as a good father, according to Shorter.348 
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Once again patient power is to the fore in matters of care and concern, and evidence shows 
that these fundamental criteria appear to be lacking within the medical profession in the UK.  
In a study carried out in 2012 by the Patients’ Association 80% of the circa 8000 respondents 
said they wanted to be more involved in their care, whilst around 39% rated their GP’s 
communication skills at 5 out of 10 or less.349  Additionally, proof from a response to the 
Care Quality Commission’s Report of 2014 by the Nuffield Trust, confirmed that tensions still 
exist between financial performance and quality of care in which Nuffield suggests that such 
issues were in part responsible for the problems in the Mid-Staffordshire care scandal.350  
Such problems Nuffield consider to have been exacerbated by the freezing of funding in real 
terms within the NHS.  Initiatives to cut funding while there is an ever-increasing demand for 
greater efficiencies in dealing with patients will inevitably influence decision-making when 
very expensive surgical procedures are being taken into consideration. 
 
Where a patient resides, often referred to as the postcode lottery, and specialisation 
globally, dictate opportunities for transplant procedures.  Equally those hospitals that 
specialise in certain types of transplant are likely to get better funding and easier access to 
organs than those hospitals not performing or minimally offering such treatment.  Thus 
autonomy rubs up against justice in a powerful way.  In this politically and financially driven 
climate how does a clinician decide between hip replacement surgery and an extremely 
expensive heart transplant for instance and what bearing will this have upon patient 
autonomy?  Statistics for the UK given in Chapter 3 prove unequivocally how few heart 
transplants are undertaken.  Clinical decisions in this circumstance demand an alternative 
mode of thinking.  Focusing on a solution that reflects entirely on the needs of the patient 
who might otherwise die, might be more appropriate.  For instance the use of ventricular 
assisted devices (VAD) are used as ‘bridges to transplant’, implanted only temporarily in 
order to sustain patients as they heal or await matching allographs.  The implant of a VAD 
offers hope and a modicum of quality of life; or as ‘destination therapy’, understood from 
the start as a permanent implant, generally for those who have too many medical 
complications for them to qualify for transplant.351 
 
The principle of autonomy renders problematic the contrast between how the world is 
perceived by those who are healthy and those who are in pain and discomfort and their 
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respective views of that world.  A sick individual is essentially dis-located from the world as 
they previously knew or experienced it so that their choices are limited and influenced by 
this change to their state on every level.  Beauchamp and Childress however consider that 
personhood is too ‘imprecise and vague' a concept to be of value in developing any 
framework based on morality.352  But Gardiner points out our emotions influence how and 
what we see and are necessary to register and record facts with ‘resonance and depth.’353  
Perception and affect however, are closely intertwined in informing our choices.  
Consequently emotions are not to be accepted simply as ‘instinctive unmanageable 
reactions’ but as sensitivities that inform our judgements.354 
 
Some ethicists have argued for the notion of relational autonomy since the idea of absolute 
autonomy promotes the concept of an isolated person deciding what is in their best 
interests whereas in fact we have lives based on interdependent relationships.  Thus rather 
than the question being ‘what is best for me?’ it morphs into: given the responsibility I have 
for those in relationships with me, and the responsibilities they owe me, ‘what is the most 
appropriate course of action?’  Thus relational autonomy involves the values of love, loyalty, 
friendship and care.  Listening to the patient’s choices in light of their relationships and the 
feelings of worry, concern for others and obligations they have, becomes paramount.355  Just 
what these worries and concerns are, however, has to be established by the individual 




Beneficence is the principle that medical professionals must do ‘good’ for their patients.  
They must cure any disease or injury where possible and avoid infliction of pain or harm.  
The principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are commonly stated in mainstream 
moral philosophy as kinds of obligation.  Beneficence frequently connotes acts of mercy, 
kindness and charity.  Beauchamp favours David Hume who makes motives of benevolence 
all-important in moral life, arguing that natural benevolence accounts in great part for the 
origin of morality.  Thus acts of love, generosity and goodwill toward others are part of our 
human nature.356  John Stuart Mill on the other hand argues that a single standard of 
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beneficence allows us to decide objectively between what is right and what is wrong.357  
Thus the principle of utility or the ‘greatest happiness for the greatest number’ for Mill is 
contained in the principle of beneficence since actions are right in proportion to their 
promotion of happiness for all beings and wrong if they promote the reverse.  For Kant the 
motive behind beneficent actions is duty.358  However, Stanley Rudman has argued that 
neither of the two main types of ethical theory, utilitarianism and deontological Kantianism 
is adequate to resolve the problems encountered in applied ethics.359  And without careful 
attention to individual context and detail, Rudman believes basic principles are insufficient.  
Once the practitioner embarks on a specific case, it is the context and the details that begin 
to matter more.  Consequently contextual description is not just a matter of filling in the 
descriptive details of a case history.360  Earl Winkler and Jerrold Coombs have argued that an 
applied ethics model ‘puts the cart before the horse’, because it proceeds deductively and 
tries to fit the case to the principles instead of starting with the situation.361  They claim that 
the Principlism model is overambitious about the role of ethical justification.  In fact context 
is often more sceptical: ‘justification is essentially continuous with the case-driven inductive 
process of seeming the most reasonable solution to the problem.’362 
 
In a healthcare setting the professional’s view of both harm to and benefit for a patient can 
differ sharply from that of the patient and yet the professional’s understanding of benefits 
often depends on the patient’s view of what constitutes a benefit to them or indeed a 
worthwhile risk.  Since different patients have different views about what constitutes a harm 
or a benefit it is therefore difficult to defend principles that are considered objectively 
independent of the patient’s judgement.363  Transplantation medicine is particularly testing 
in the matter of beneficence and non-maleficence.  The fact remains that either someone 
has to die to donate an organ or a perfectly healthy individual becomes a patient with all the 
potential problems caused in carrying out an act of considerable benevolence.  This includes 
the risk of complex surgery and anaesthesia as a prerequisite, as previously discussed.364  An 
act of benevolence would accord entirely with the view of beneficence argued by Singer, 
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who advocates that those who are in a position to do so ought to make extreme sacrifice in 
the act of helping those in need.365 
 
Both the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence may well apply under normal 
circumstances, since in general we are naturally predisposed to help others.  The overriding 
issues in the case of transplantation medicine lie in using the body as an object that may well 
cause harm to one healthy donor for the sake paradoxically of saving the life of another very 
sick person whose life expectancy might in any case be curtailed.  Can this be considered 
justifiable when for instance the live donor incurs such significant risk both to their short or 




At its core the principle of non-maleficence asserts that one person should not cause harm 
to others.  For medical professionals there is a well-established principle: Primum non 
nocere, ‘above all do no harm’ which forms the foundation for part of the Hippocratic Oath.  
What does harm mean however?  There is a wide-ranging understanding of harms to 
humanity as creatures of meaning who fundamentally can be harmed if the basic goods of 
life and relationship are in any way hampered.  It is a complex principle that demonstrates 
how possible it is to have a definition of harm that goes well beyond pain.  John Herring 
argues that the importance of non-maleficence in a medical setting ‘urges against harming 
one patient to help another.’367 
 
Harm can be variously defined particularly in cases where certain patients’ views are out of 
step with generally accepted societal norms - the practice of euthanasia is a pertinent 
example.  In this case disagreements arise over what ‘harm’ connotes.  At its most 
rudimentary, the principle captures the notion that doctors should never use their medical 
training for immoral purposes.  Emily Jackson argues that it is this principle that proscribes 
medical participation in euthanasia.368  However, the view of life as a loan from God, may 
not support the traditional prohibition of suicide and euthanasia.  As Hume reasoned in the 
eighteenth century, if artificially ending life trespasses on God’s position as the giver and 
owner of life, the same could be said about artificially prolonging someone’s life by giving 
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life-saving medical treatment.369  Should a doctor agree to a request for euthanasia, it could 
be concluded that the patient has not been harmed, but rather that the doctor has acted to 
avoid the greater harm of a protracted and distressing death.  Arguments for various kinds of 
utilitarian approach suggest that allowing assisted suicide and euthanasia would result in 
more benefit and less harm than continuing to prohibit it.  What is more Peter Singer 
maintains that in decision-making, the preferences of all concerned should be satisfied.370 
Whilst there are guidelines from a variety of sources such as NICE and the BMA, what counts 
as a harm is determined also by the individual, thus echoing in some sense the principle of 
autonomy.371  If a person has consented to organ donation for instance and the doctor 
provides the necessary procedure, the non-maleficence principle is not infringed.  In this 
case, it is informed consent under the criterion of autonomy that becomes crucial, as it gives 
important assurance to both parties that medical intervention is approved no matter what 
that intervention might portend.372 
 
The principle of non-maleficence if taken too literally is nonsensical.  Most medical 
treatments of whatever sort involve the causing of some harm even if it is just an injection.  
Whilst non-maleficence raises some very thorny questions and thereby has to strike a 
delicate balance between moral, societal and individual acceptability, when seen as a whole 
however, the principle maintains that medical intervention should not cause harm, and as 




Justice is often interpreted legally to mean that we should treat like cases alike.  This 
depends on being able to tell when medical cases are either ‘like’ or ‘unlike’.  So when 
allocating lungs for transplant for example, are we acting justly by making smokers a lower 
priority than non-smokers (unlike) or should the only relevant decision be based on clinical 
need, in which case the two instances are like?  It is seldom possible to give every patient 
immediate access to the best medical treatment so the rationing of scarce resources must be 
fair and transparent. 
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In medical cases Ivan Illich argues that the meting out of justice lies entirely in the hands of 
the physicians.373  Courts of law, when not strictly enforcing legal adherence in matters 
medical, are powerless in comparison with the physician.  In commenting on the authority of 
the doctor, Illich suggests that only doctors know what constitutes sickness, who is sick, what 
should be done to the sick and to those who are considered to be at special risk.  For him the 
doctor is the ultimate arbiter and the breakdown between medicine and morality has been 
defended on the grounds that medical categories rest on scientific foundations exempt from 
moral evaluation.  
 
The fair distribution of organs is problematic for a variety of reasons, as discussed in  
Chapter 4.  Whilst Illich’s presuppositions may well be considered rather harsh and extreme, 
justice in this area of medicine rests on several factors including the results of tests such as 
risk assessment and quality of life criteria, which might arguably sit more comfortably in a 
business milieu.374  In confirmation of Illich’s view, Manson and O’Neill believe, that the 
principle of justice sits rather uncomfortably within the Principlist framework.  They maintain 
that it needs expansion into acknowledgement of sociocultural factors that have direct 
influence on the welfare and happiness of those patients who are involved in the 
transplantation process.375  I believe that an ethical response should include an appreciation 
of the quality of the patient’s needs in life, together with what value really means in this 
context for them.  We would have to question Illich’s assumptions that the doctor is the sole 
arbiter, since the value of any patient’s life I believe unequivocally should take into account 
individual patient input. 
 
Does universal morality exist? 
 
The four principle framework was originally established as a basic ethic which Beauchamp 
and Childress defend as a set of moral principles to function as ‘general norms of the 
common morality that are a suitable starting point for biomedical ethics.’376  Lively comment 
over their claim to universality has been articulated, critics such as Søren Holm believe that 
the culture in which the Principlist model was developed is too specific to be considered  
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universal.377  Tom Walker sees Principlism as problematic: firstly more than four principles 
are needed to capture morality in general; secondly if Principlism is taken to be an attempt 
to capture universalisable moral norms, such an account rules out much of what we take to 
be morally significant.378  In fact Walker goes on to argue that those who advocate 
Principlism ‘owe us an explanation of why morality is so narrowly constrained’, and suggests 
that a move toward a culture-specific version which would contain more than four principles 
might provide a more acceptable solution.379 
 
Gillon and Ruth Macklin support the Principlist framework as it stands.  Gillon agrees that the 
four principles are a very good way of dealing with problems of healthcare as they ‘permit a 
thorough and systematic analysis of real bioethical problems.’380  And Macklin goes so far as 
to state: 
 
No wonder that so many practising health professions clutch with relief at the four 
principles which provide a familiar moral language and seem to encompass 
everything.  Part of the attraction must be the implication that a mere four factors 
need to be considered but for this to be the case, a certain elasticity of definition is 
required.  In fact on analysis it seems that the four principles eventually come to 
include all the values, guidelines, codes and legislation that one can imagine.381 
 
Joan McCarthy considers the four principles to provide a method of supporting ethical 
decisions that have a ‘strong justificatory force.’ 382  That is the force of the imperative to ‘tell 
the truth’ derives from grounding in universally accepted norms, not from a subjective 
viewpoint or the intuition of the health professional.  She believes furthermore that the 
processes of moral deliberation are akin to scientific processes since they involve ‘the setting 
up of hypotheses that are tested and modified or rejected on the basis of reasoning and 
experience.’383  Thus in situations involving doubt and uncertainty, the deliberative process 
which comes into play appeals to reasoning strategies and goals that are also considered 
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objective, not intuitive.  In suggesting however that the Principlist approach would be 
considerably strengthened by narrative ethics which has its roots in literature and  
philosophy, McCarthy continues by saying that: ‘The strength of narrative ethics…is that it 
provides a method and vocabulary for interpreting and respecting the unique and personal 
stories of individuals.  On this view, any decision about medical treatment or health care 
must be considered in the light of the person’s individual story or stories.’384  Much as I 
would concur, McCarthy’s proposition would appear to run counter to Beauchamp and 
Childress’s fundamental premise that issues of a subjective nature are inappropriate in 
development of a bioethical model because they are too diverse and hence unstable to be 
credited with moral status.385  However I agree with her premise. 
 
Whilst Beauchamp and Childress declare their principles to have some universal appeal in 
functioning as ‘general guidelines for the formulation of the more specific rules’,386 it is not 
entirely clear how their model might be ‘adapted’ in such specific cases as dilemmas 
resulting from issues within transplantation medicine.  Issues that might well sit outside the 
four principles framework, for example those of a sensitive, personal nature, involving some 
kind of recompense for donating an organ.  Nor is it obvious how some universal morality 
would operate under such special circumstances given the diversity of either religious or 
socio-cultural norms and values that are held by different nations.  For instance, the 
Japanese religion Shinto believes the body to be impure after death and interfering with a 
corpse is said to bring bad luck; Jehovah’s Witnesses do not encourage organ donation and 
religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism leave it up to individual conscience, although some 
believe the act to be both charitable and compassionate.387 
 
According to Mike Burley, in the case of Hindu beliefs and culture views exist that may 
determine the choice for donation, for example the act of selfless giving - daan is virtuous, 
including aspects of generosity, charity and sharing with others.388  And Flood argues, the 
importance for Hindu soteriology is freedom from the cycle of rebirth exercised through 
karmic accumulation, through for instance acts of selflessness.  Karmic benefit is accrued 
through both leading a ‘good’ life and preparing the way for a ‘good’ death.’ 389 
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Acts of compassion and charity are perceived as adding to the store of karma built up 
through the lifetime of the individual in order to ensure a ‘smooth’ and unencumbered 
passage into the next life.  Thus organ donation is sanctioned, considered as a charitable act 
so long as the body is treated with respect.   
 
Certain Hindu traditions also consider donation from a wholistic perspective where bodily 
integrity post mortem is paramount and the passage of the soul after death becomes critical.  
Strict adherence to the rituals for the deceased is prescriptive.  The body must be treated 
according to ceremonial rites of passage, to aid transmigration.  Prayers are offered and 
further rituals are enacted, but at no time is the body either to be embalmed or organs to be 
removed.  In this manner bodily integrity is maintained.390  In such a case ritual practices may 
act against any form of donation.  For many Buddhists the final moment of consciousness is 
the most important of all.  Family members are not supposed to touch the corpse for three 
to eight hours after breathing ceases.  Thus preparation for the performance of religious 
ceremonies after death takes place is deferred for some period.  Buddhists believe that the 
spirit of a person will linger on for some time and can be affected by what has happened to 
the corpse.  It is important that the body is treated gently and with respect so that the spirit 
can continue its journey calmly and in a state of grace.391 
 
Cultural norms and mores are of obvious importance when the question of deceased 
donation is mooted.  Whilst claims are made by NHSBT in their organ donation pamphlets 
that it is up to the individual to make the decision to donate, this is far too generalist.392  
Given such cultural diversity within Hindu and Buddhist values and traditions, it could be 
insensitive to broach the subject to those whose religious beliefs would override any idea of 
donating an organ at the time or even approaching the time of death.  Furthermore this 
renders problematic any notion of legalising presumed consent. 
 
In halting any concept of universalism, Heyward argues that the need for ethics arises 
whenever, on the basis of our values, we are pulled between conflicting obligations or moral 
claims.  For her ethics originates in the complex relationship of needs, values, obligations and 
visions.393  This realisation pushes us to think ethically, not on the basis of who we are in and 
of ourselves, but rather of who we are together in the world, our work, our colleagues and 
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our relationships, which involves becoming radically aware of our selves in relation.  The 
affirmation of ourselves together allows us to envision guidelines for morality in a 
confidence that our differences need not break our body.  ‘We are one body with many 
members.  We are not alike in our cultures, credos, experiences, desires - we need to respect 
our differences.’394  The issue appears to be one of the difference between an ethic which 
sits above what might be called the common morality and the everyday dilemmas 
encountered by doctors that effect and are affected by what is considered good for the 
patient and their own desires and concerns. 
 
It also seems to be the case that a pre-occupation with normative codes of conduct in 
general hampers research.  Sharp maintains that biomedicine on all levels is hemmed in by 
the ‘strident set of four principles.’  Interestingly in her anthropological research she notes 
with some surprise the 
 
…[Ubiquitous] application of the four bioethical principles to science based research 
not only in the United States but also in Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand 
and Australia…In other words, bioethics (at least in the guise of the model originally 
espoused by Beauchamp and Childress) is now pervasive, referencing codified and 
thus standardized or established categories that dictate moral conduct in the 
laboratory and beyond.395 
 
In her account Sharp reveals that in fact many research scientists proved to be well versed in 
the framework reporting that the Principlist approach underpins and puts shape to the 
rigorous requirements of grant applications within private foundations together with online 
training and certification programmes in universities in the USA.396  We might question 
whether Beauchamp and Childress’s model is being used under these circumstances as a 
protocol to achieve some end that sits completely outside of the domain of its original 
ethical intentions. 
 
An overview of alternative bioethical approaches 
 
Doubts remain over the Principlist model in its entirety whether they are over its 
universalisability, its internal consistency and cohesiveness, or even the breadth of bioethical 
concerns it encompasses.  As arguments have demonstrated, importance on the manner in 
which the body is perceived influences bioethically what is needed to support medical and 
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research procedures.  Chapter 2 outlining alternative views of the body, shows the standard 
model of western medicine as wanting.  Thus ignoring embodied being and its particularity, 
means that ethical frameworks developed on utilitarian or even deontological lines leave 
aside the individual and their perceptions of what is of benefit to them.  
 
After much criticism from other bioethicists of the Principlist framework, Beauchamp and 
Childress minimally added certain character traits from Virtue Ethics to their original four 
criteria.  Whilst proposing that Virtue Ethics has value in specific circumstances such as 
caring in hospitals or truthfulness in research, they draw a distinction between ethical 
guidelines that govern overall practice, and professional roles in biomedical fields that are 
‘usually tied to institutional expectations and standards of professional practice.’397  
Unfortunately, bioethical alternatives or the inclusion of some of their criteria, appear 
equally as problematic as the Principlist framework, since they are incompatible with the 
basic premises in Beauchamp and Childress’s model, and incompatible with each other. 
 
Daniel Callahan favours a communitarian framework that entails focussing on the social 
meaning, implications and context of any given ethical issue as a way of thinking about 
ethical problems, rather than providing any rigid criteria for dealing with them.398  
Communitarianism assumes that humans are socially inclined beings whose lives are lived 
out within ‘deeply penetrating social, political and cultural institutions.’399  Callahan’s 
approach rests on analytical skills and personal virtues.  It emphasises that living in a decent 
community and society is key to a good life.  When we consider an issue such as whether a 
person should be allowed to sell their kidneys, the communitarian approach would be to ask 
whether kidney selling is compatible with a decent society.  Critics of this approach might 
point out that a decent society is one that respects individuals’ rights rather than a society’s 
willingness to interfere with those rights for the greater good.  Utilitarian approaches have in 
general been criticised for promoting the interests of the community above the interests of 
those individuals on the margins of society who may be its most vulnerable members.   
 
Paul Gardiner advocates a virtue ethics approach.  Virtue ethics emphasises that it is 
attitudes motivating action in assessing the morally right thing to do rather than the 
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consequences of those actions that matter.400  Thus character is the determining factor 
within any dominant ethos.  The four cardinal virtues advocated by Socrates and Aristotle: 
prudence, temperance, justice and fortitude or courage are well known.  Virtues, essentially 
good habits, direct human nature toward good actions.  However, those who favour a virtue 
approach disagree over the extent to which consequences can be used to assess the 
appropriateness of an act.  In a healthcare context qualities of compassion, honesty, fairness 
and diligence are those we demand and have come to expect.401  Beauchamp and Childress 
have added five focal virtues to their four principles: compassion, discernment, 
trustworthiness, integrity and conscientiousness.402  They claim that these additions provide 
‘a moral compass of character for health professionals’ as they are ‘important in part for the 
development and expression of caring.’403  Two questions arise however.  Firstly how do 
these additions fit in with their model, where the original four principles already either sit 
uncomfortably with each other or are considered superfluous?  Secondly Beauchamp and 
Childress argue that those additions would be intrinsic to the practice of any doctor who 
astutely follows their basic four principles in any case.  It seems that such adjuncts could be 
seen as a mere sop to the comments from their critics. 
 
Notwithstanding, a basic concern of the virtue approach rests in deciding exactly which 
virtues are critical.  In such a diverse society agreement over what a virtuous person is will 
remain contentious.  Although virtue ethics might provide an expectation that medical 
professionals act appropriately, as a framework for practical guidance in such ethical 
dilemmas as the fairness of healthcare rationing for instance, is problematic.  Basing 
decisions on virtues will prove an issue fundamentally because a broader perspective is 
required when complex decisions arise - for example whether to offer a heart transplant to 
an elderly person when many other less expensive procedures could be performed in its 
stead.  Fairness is an ambiguous concept, as I discussed in Chapter 4 since it sits beyond the 
remit of the individual medical professional who has limited control over what counts as a 
virtuous/valuable life and moreover limited control over the allocation of financial resources.  
In particular over any decision to undertake extremely expensive transplant procedures in a 
regional area whose finances are already stretched even in provision of less intricate surgical 
interventions. 
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Somewhat akin to Callahan, but focused rather on the individual within a community, Arthur 
Frank suggests a multi-vocal ethic.  When the body’s vulnerability and pain are kept in the 
foreground as an important part of what it is to be human, he believes a multi-vocal ethic 
which is in no way suggestive of universalism, would underpin ‘a new social ethic.’404  The 
challenge is to state this ethic in terms that remain multi-vocal; it implies the need to 
recognise multiple voices and to afford each its ‘full legitimacy in reaching a consensus that 
is not only workable in achieving compliance of all parties, but is also moral in the sense of 
respecting the values of all those whose compliance is required.’405  What would be helpful 
in clinical ethics is not a replacement of existing positions, but a shift towards a multi-vocality 
that balances out the views of all involved, by making each aware of the other.  Frank argues 
that in a multi-vocal medical environment, it is vital that non-medical voices should be heard 
too.  Given the limitations of informed consent as discussed in Chapter 3, whilst a plurality of 
voices may be difficult to manage because of resource constraints within the NHS across the 
board, gathering those voices is nonetheless possible through support groups for instance.  
That healing requires an approach that includes the opportunity for the patient to have 
greater input into their treatment is an issue discussed throughout this study.  And whilst 
multi-vocality may be once more a partial solution it goes some way towards a more fluid, 
wholistic and caring approach to healing that affords an efficacious and improved long-term 




The concepts in care ethics appear to echo more closely the wholistic and relational 
interpretation of the body and its needs emphasised by this study.406  Care ethics is one of a 
cluster of normative ethical theories that were developed by feminists in the second half of 
the twentieth century.  It was Carol Gilligan the psychologist, in her seminal work In a 
Different Voice written in 1982, who established a way forward for an ethics of care.  In 
concluding that the way people talk about their lives is significant, that the language they use 
and the connections they make is revelatory, Gilligan believes the world they see and in 
which they act is disclosed.407  From her perspective identity formation and moral 
development in women’s adolescence and adulthood are key to understanding an ethics of 
care.  She maintains that a responsibility to discern and alleviate suffering which takes place 
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through an understanding of the psychological reasoning within mother and child 
relationships, ultimately leads to an emphasis on everyone’s need for care.408  
 
According to Gilligan, women impose a distinctive construction on moral problems, seeing 
moral dilemmas in terms of conflicting responsibilities.  The sequence of women’s moral 
judgement proceeds from an initial concern with survival to a focus on goodness and finally 
to a reflective understanding of the resolution of conflict in human relationships.  The 
concepts of responsibility and care in women’s constructions of the moral domain, the close 
tie in women’s thinking between conceptions of self and of morality, are key to Gilligan’s 
assumptions.  In their portrayal of relationships, she considers that women replace the bias 
of men toward separation with a representation of the interdependence of self and other, 
both in love and work.409  By changing the emphasis from individual achievement to 
relationships of care, there is an ensuing shift towards the progress of relationality.  Life 
transitions seem to involve women in a distinctive way.  For instance when the distinction 
between helping and pleasing frees the activity of taking care from the wish for approval by 
others, the ethic of responsibility results in the growth of personal integrity and strength - 
post-menopausal women have in the past been referred to as crones for their wisdom and 
considerable experience of nurturing for example.  By contrast, Gilligan argues that the 
moral imperative for men appears to be restricted to respecting the rights of others, 
including protection from interference to the rights to life and self-fulfilment, which pivots 
on turning attention away from the logic of care to the consequence of choice.410  For 
women the integration of rights and responsibilities takes place through a psychological logic 
of relationships.  Gilligan holds that men come to see the limitations of a conception of 
justice blinded to the differences in human life whilst women come to see the violence 
inherent in inequality. 
 
Gilligan puts forward a gender specific argument such that the moral imperative for women 
lies in the responsibility to care which she maintains paradoxically is relational.411  Her views 
whilst being praised when first published, have received notable criticism for their 
narrowness of perspective.  For instance, Lawrence Kohlberg412 and Jürgen Habermas413 
maintain that Gilligan’s research on the ethics of care is not about moral theory at all.  In 
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supporting Principlist ethics they argue that her theory is about evaluations of virtue and 
character in personal relationships, about the good life - but not about moral theory.  They 
maintain, by contrast that moral theory concerns justice and the shape it should take in 
society.  Principlist bioethics from their perspective is unequivocally about justice because it 
involves the application of universal principles to broad social issues, such as equal access to 
health care and professional training, the allocation of scarce medical resources and policies 
on controversial medical issues such as abortion and euthanasia.  In contrast, Christine 
Gudorf endorses a position that morality concerns the question of what may be considered 
truly human.  True humanity is not defined solely by moral principles such as justice, or even 
patient autonomy but by all the ways in which we care for the other, ourselves and our 
world.414 
 
For Maria Puig de la Bellacasa controversy surrounding the origins of caring’s ethical 
subjectivity in the mother and child relation has resulted in discussions being expanded and 
challenged from a range of perspectives that reach well beyond activities traditionally 
identified as women’s work.415  The ethics of care has moved on.  Concepts of care have 
been put to the test and explored critically through psychology (Nel Noddings), political 
theory (Joan Tronto), justice (Daniel Engster), anthropologies of health work and sciences 
(Anne Marie Mol, Ingunn Moser and Jeannette Pols) besides many more that cut across 
every facet of existence.416  These engagements with care make specific contributions to 
care’s breadth and meaning, revealing how caring implicates different relationalities, issues 
and practices in diverse settings.  De la Bellacasa however sees care, caring and carer as 
contested words.417  Most of us need care, feel care, are cared for or encounter care, in one 
way or another.  Care is omnipresent even through the effects of its absence.  Care passes 
within, across and throughout things.  But its lack unravels.  To care can feel good, but it can 
also feel awful.  It can do good but it can also oppress in the sense that it can convey 
control.418  In a controlling environment, care can be ambivalent in significance as well as 
ontology.419  
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In contrast, care includes everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our world 
so that we can live in it as well as possible according Tronto.  That world includes our bodies, 
our selves and our environment, ‘all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-
sustaining web.’420  An integrated act of care considers affective and ethical outlooks 
involved in concern, worry and taking responsibility for other’s wellbeing, such ‘as caring 
about’ and ‘taking care of’ that need to be supported by material practices such as care-
giving and care-receiving.421  In contrast to Gilligan, de la Bellacasa argues that such a 
distinction does not separate these modes of agency, but allows us to emphasise the notion 
that a politics of care engages much more than a moral stance.  ‘It involves affective, ethical, 
hands-on agencies of practical and material consequence, as well as an accent on care as a 
vital interconnection with the web of life.’422  It also suggests interdependency as the 
ontological state in which humans and countless other beings unavoidably live. 
 
Tensions exist within the diverse range of care’s broader remit.  Care can be a burden, a joy 
or simply boring.  Besides committing to the work of love, care can turn into moral pressure 
for workers.  These tensions expose that vital maintenance is not sufficient for a relation to 
involve care, but without maintenance work, affectivity remains closer to moral intention, to 
a disposition ‘to care about’ without putting in the work to ‘care for.’423  This similarly applies 
to ethical and political questions raised by care, such as condemnation about its absence, or 
about controlling policies that regulate what is considered legitimate care.   
 
Mol discusses the notion of care in medical practices: ‘[a]rticulating good care …is an 
intervention’ rather than a factual evaluation or judgement of practice.424  Care is never 
neutral: it can be carried out in contexts within and for settings that we might find 
objectionable.  Calls for caring though are everywhere.  People are summoned to care for 
everything but foremost for ‘ourselves’, our lifestyle, our bodies, our physical and mental 
fitness or that of our families, reducing care to its most ‘parochial caricature.’425  Nurses are 
constantly criticised for not caring enough, or not caring anymore, or for having lost some 
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natural capacity to care, while pay and conditions worsen in the NHS year on year and time 
and space to carry out their tasks is at a premium.426 
 
The ethics of care approach, inevitably has received its fair share of criticism in other 
ways.427  It has been argued by feminists that its glorification of caring and dependency is 
likely to be harmful to women since the role of women as carers and dependants according 
to Wolf et al, has led to their oppression and subordination.428  Some concern centres on the 
notion of care itself as being too vague.  Peter Allmark rightly points out that not all caring 
relationships could be considered good; they may involve manipulation and domination.429  I 
would see the promotion of the values of care as being context dependent and therefore as 
remaining fluid, rather than static in any relationship, be that medical or otherwise.  Care in 
an intensive unit is manifestly different from that required in stitching a wound in the 
emergency department, although it must be said that the skills are equally critical and the 
doctors will be ‘doing their best’ for the patient according to beneficent principles.430  The 
issue is whether care, that turns out to be manipulative, is really care at all.  Surely 
manipulation is more concerned with issues of power, control and authority rather than with 
care.  Caring is about being present to both ourselves and importantly to the other, an acute 




Midgley points out that during the twentieth century: ‘the quarantining of morality from 
topics that obviously relate to it’ has led to a position where morality is seen as ‘something 
vague, irrational, privatized, inarticulate and subjective - in fact as something beautiful but 
trivial.’432  She claims that ethics has been shut off from the rest of ‘the intellectual scene’ 
and ‘shares company with a number of other topics’ which ‘are awkward items including 
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consciousness, emotion, creativity and free will’, resulting from the transformation 
historically of patient-centred medicine to a science-based practice.433 
 
Ethics, as has been frequently remarked, is certainly not an exact science.  The need for 
bioethics to be dynamic is pressing, reflecting the fast-moving pace of biotechnology.  To 
keep pace any bioethical framework has to be capable of revision to reflect current trends 
including advanced surgical and biotechnical developments.  Research from this study has 
shown that piecemeal suggestions put forward have resulted in very little movement 
towards the creation of an ethical response that addresses the enormity of biotechnological 
advancement and its influence on complicated medical procedures.  Indeed Beauchamp and 
Childress’s book which proposes the four principles approach, despite being in its 7th edition 
has fundamentally not changed for some forty years, and this lack of development has wide-
ranging implications for policy-making in particular and more importantly for 
recommendations to changes in the law both now and in the future as biotechnology 
increases in everyday use within patients’ households.434 
 
According to Sharp, the Principlist framework seems to underpin an ethic far more suited to 
particular research practitioners who are required to satisfy the relevant authorities that a 
certain protocol has been followed before proceeding with medical research and the 
resulting medical input.435  A ‘simplified’ ethic that fulfils a ‘tick-in-the-box’ exercise appears 
to be both attractive and meets the legal requirement.  In an era of increasing litigation the 
fact that the accepted protocol has been followed is absolutely imperative to avoid any 
problems should ‘things go awry.’  Essential to any exploration involved in creating an ethical 
approach that focuses to a greater degree on such affective factors as those proposed in 
Chapter 2, the patient is absolutely central to any medical involvement or intervention as 
this is vital for their own healing; a healing marked also by the re-establishment of their 
innate power and connection to all that exists.  
 
Acknowledgement of the importance of affective and sociocultural factors is surely critical.  
Questions remain as to why the body is considered as anything other than an object in the 
context of transplantation, useful in supplying parts to those in dire need in order to save 
their lives.436  What is it that distinguishes humanity from other forms of life?  What value do 
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we extend to the human being and how will that value be transformed in an age where 
hybridisation becomes an increasing possibility?  Have we reached a point therefore in such 
fast-pace technical advancement where we need to rethink what constitutes human being?  
I believe we might have.  Chapter 8 argues this very possibility. 
 
Too frequently in a medical encounter the patient remains effectively a silent witness to 
their own dis-ease.  Exacerbated by both medical language and highly sophisticated medical 
procedures, patient alienation is problematic.  Leder in ‘The Absent Body’ asks ‘why, if 
human experience is rooted in the bodily, is the body so often absent from experience?’ 437  
As he suggests, the healthy body is primarily directed towards intimately connecting within 
the world as a normal and taken-for-granted position in direct contrast to the body 
experiencing illness: 
 
In the case of health, the body is alien by virtue of its disappearance, as attention is 
primarily directed toward the world.  With the onset of illness this gives way to dys-
appearance.  The body is no longer alien-as-forgotten, but precisely as remembered, 
a sharp and searing presence threatening the self.  One is a mode of silence, the 
other a manner of speech, yet they are complementary and correlative 
phenomena.438 
 
In engaging with the world day-to-day the body literally disappears because we routinely 
take the body for granted, rather than think about it we merely get on with life.  In illness 
paradoxically the body is vociferous in engaging with itself in pain.  The body reasserts itself, 
makes its presence felt.439  And yet that very same body becomes dislocated from the world 
through its dysfunction - through not being in a position to act or engage in that world as it 
formerly could.  Thus the body once more becomes invisible.  The key for the patient is to be 
encouraged to hold on to the person they are, to not lose sight of embodied presence and to 
embrace illness, to make sense of it.   
 
It has been shown that Principlism acts as a meta-ethic, detached from the needs of complex 
and dynamic decision-making.  Granted the framework may well cover a set of generalised 
principles which would hold up well within a system of litigation and even within the ethical 
underpinning of research proposal submission.  But the question remains whether such a set 
of guidelines meets the needs beyond for instance the modern Hippocratic Oath in its 
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manifold forms, which many doctors choose to take in order to practise medicine.440  It may 
be that the Hippocratic Oath will be considered mandatory in the future, as responsibility for 
patient care is devolved to the individual patient and accountability for treatment is 
rendered unclear when monitoring health through medical technology installed in the home 
becomes routine.441 
 
I believe that the notion of care despite its shortcomings, along with a focus on multi-vocality 
and narrative as integral to care offers greater flexibility, inclusivity, and a more rounded and 
effective ethical approach.  Such an alternative to Principlism that bases morality on the 
individual when life-changing decisions concerning the welfare of the patient’s body are in 
the balance is critical.  The discussions in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will now turn to the articulation 
of the proposed approach.
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‘Narrative medicine’ borrows its terminology from literature and fiction.  As Eakin remarks 
‘Fiction’s critical and irreplaceable consequences are to force readers to recognize the 
storied shape of reality, to understand in the most basic way that we create meaning by 
weaving the fragments of life into a plot….’442  The stories we tell merge with those we hear 
– in fiction, fairy tales, family legends and sacred texts.  Story is the generic term 
encompassing all manner of genres within its remit, as foundations for cultivating the self. 
 
Narrative by contrast according to Charon captures the ‘singular, irreplicable, or 
incommensurable, …the pleasure of the new, the never seen.’443  In other words the unique 
elements that collectively make up the story – a perspective that has especial significance for 
patient genres in the context of medical encounters.  As she maintains, without narrative, 
the patient cannot grasp what the event of illness means to her and in her terms.  And 
                                                          
442 Eakin, P J., (1999) How Our Lives Become Stories, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 




‘without telling or writing about the care of a patient in a complex narrative, the caregiver 
might not see the patient’s illness in its full, textured, emotionally powerful, consequential 
narrative form.’444  It may be that such narrative vision is ‘required in order to offer 
compassionate and effective care to the sick.’445 
 
For Frank a narrative type is the most general storyline that can be recognised underlying the 
plot and tensions of particular stories.446  He identifies three types of illness narrative: 
restitution – restoration of health; chaos – imagining that life will never get better, and quest 
– seeing illness as transitory.  Frank believes that identification of types of story underlies the 
course for the most appropriate methods of treatment.447  For instance he describes the 
telling of restitution illness stories as a way out of ‘narrative wreckage.’  Using the metaphor 
of shipwreck Frank sees illness as ‘a sense of being shipwrecked by the storm of disease.  
Storytelling thus becomes the repair work on the wreck.’448 
 
Care therefore requires paying close attention to the needs of the other and their story.  The 
story becomes an alternative ethical form.  Adam Zachary Newton in Narrative Ethics 
suggests that ‘a narrative is ethics in the sense of the mediating and authorial role each takes 
up towards another’s story….  Storytelling lays claims upon all its participants, those 
circumscribed within the narrative as well as those…witnesses and ethical co-creators from 
without – its readers.’449 
 
The rationale for choosing narrative as an appropriate alternative to the traditional 
bioethical framework of Principlism is the focus of the discussion in this chapter.  Prompted 
by the reality that organ donation and transplantation is distinguished by the involvement of 
a third person in surgical procedures and outcomes, a positive healing prognosis rests on 
continued care throughout the process of pre- and post-surgery.  The narrative input of both 
the donor and the recipient - beyond the medical history - is fundamental to garner support 
in times when either physically or emotionally their anxieties may be relieved appropriately 
by the medical professionals involved.  Their experiences are unique in the intervention they 
are about to undergo, as I discussed in Chapter 3.  For the recipient the average waiting time 
in 2016-2017 for a kidney for example is about two years in which time their condition may 
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worsen to a point where transplantation is no longer an option and the prognosis is dire.450  
Under this circumstance, it may have been possible, given an understanding of the 
experience of the illness to the patient through narrative, for certain life-goals to be fulfilled 
supported by appropriate medical assistance before they die.  Gawande argues that offering 
a better quality of life in its end stages engenders a sense of trust in an otherwise hopeless 
situation.451  Story puts both the patient (as both donor and recipient) and the doctor 
mutually at the forefront of inclusive decision-making about treatment options even when 
the patient may be closer to dying.   
 
Story uncovers the everyday personal struggles of people who are trying to make moral 
sense of their own suffering.  The body also acts non-vocally through gesture: smiles, nods of 
the head, bodily tics and touch for example, all of which provide significant clues to the story 
the patient has to tell.  Beyond symptoms, gestures add a further dimension to diagnosis in 
myriad ways providing subtle clues to both the mental, spiritual and physical state of the 
patient.  Illness is an unfolding and enfolding process and it is critical for the doctor to assess 
the patient from diverse viewpoints rather as a 3D hologram, as Bohm suggested, in order to 
gather sufficient vital data to maximise healing.452  The practical implications for the medical 
profession of listening and interpreting patient narrative however are not insubstantial.  
Although patient input in the form of their developing story might prove to be significant in 
overall healing processes, and thus offer a better prognosis and fewer visits to the doctor, 
constraints on doctors’ time will doubtlessly prove prohibitive.  However, as Charon suggests 
a suitable method of gathering a diverse variety of data is key to informed decision-
making.453 
 
The discussion in this chapter centres on story beyond the patient’s medical history, and 
though medical history is vital in assessing treatment protocols, I consider that the patient’s 
own story has significant relevance for their future wellbeing and healing.  Clarification of the 
difference between pain and suffering and the subject of the fear of dying is an important 
starting point since these issues form the foundation for many a story within a medical 
context.  The conflation of pain and suffering is all too frequent in everyday language use, 
but they are profoundly different.  Pain, however agonising, is structural, suffering is deeply 
embedded in the subtle energy system, which over time manifests as pain.  Suffering as a 
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result is problematic for medical professionals to treat allopathically.  Narrative offers a 
gateway into patient suffering and thereby a prompt to begin the process of healing often 
before any treatment takes place.   
 




Such is the nature of healthcare being dispensed in a routinised manner that medical 
professionals regularly conflate both pain and suffering.  The reality is that doctors treat pain 
because it is visible, frequently signalled by the patient, able to be monitored and hence 
treatable, while the subtle problems of suffering which accompany trauma in many cases are 
underestimated and frequently ignored. 
 
Pain is organic and can be treated at the physical level no matter how intense the pain 
appears to be.  It is a bodily sensation.  Medicine has not conquered pain however, though it 
has developed the means to control pain during much of critical illness.  Prolonged pain is 
the body’s response to illness at the gross (physical) level of the body.  It is the first thing 
many people associate with illness and what they fear most.  Pain frequently eludes precise 
definition.  We have plenty of words to describe it however: sharp, throbbing, piercing, 
burning, even dull.  But these words go little way towards describing the experience of pain.  
Pain is a vague concept.  Unable to express pain, we come to believe that there is nothing to 
say.  Silenced, we become isolated in pain and that isolation increases it.  When we feel 
ourselves being overtaken by something we do not understand or cannot control, the human 
response is to create a mythology of what threatens us.  Frank suggests that we turn pain 
into ‘it’ some kind of enemy to be fought.454  We hear talk of people ‘fighting cancer’ for 
instance.  We think pain is victimising us, either because we have done something to deserve 
it or for some other malevolent reason.  We curse it and often pray for relief from it.  But 
pain is not alien - it is from the self.  Pain is the body signalling that something is wrong.  It is 
the body talking to itself.  Dealing with pain is not war with something outside the body, it is 
the body coming back to itself.  In pain the natural rhythm of life is lost and that loss leads to 
further losses of plans and expectations of a life that makes sense as a fitting together of 
past and future.  Order breaks down and incoherence takes its place.  Pain is thus one of the 
first experiences an ill person has of being cast out.  To regain a sense of coherence, in which 
                                                          




pain may have to remain a part, the ill person has to find the means to recover the self she 
has become separated from. 
 
Under the impact of mind/body dualism in Western medicine, medical professionals have 
been particularly oriented toward physical bodies and their pain.  Thus organic issues are the 
prime focus of the physician.  The patient’s illness is consequently transformed into a disease 
- a recognisable entry into the medical classification system as argued in Chapter 4.455  
Nelson believes that the doctor’s concerns therefore become the symptoms, the disease 
aetiology and history, the pathophysiology and the possible treatment intervention.456  
Historically, we have come to think of physicians as ‘high priests’ of the body and clergy as 
‘high priests’ of the soul.  And whilst this sounds like a very neat division of labour it persists 





Many ill people when they are patients harbour an intuition that their physicians know 
aspects of their suffering as no one else can.  Amongst the words of others that shape an ill 
person, the physician’s words have particular significance, especially if those words are 
spoken to the person who happens to be a patient, not about the patient who contains the 
disease.  Anatole Broyard an American literary critic in relationship with his physician had 
‘…[A] wistful desire for our relationship to be beautiful in some way that I can’t quite 
identify….Just as he orders blood tests and bone scans of my body, I’d like my doctor to scan 
me, to grope for my spirit as well as my prostate….I would also like to think of him as going 
through my character, as he goes through my flesh, for each man is ill in his own way.’457  
And whilst Broyard did not want his doctor to stop being the technical expert, he did want 
his illness to be understood as his rather than some identifiable disease state.458  As Frank 
rather curtly suggests, for many patients’ experience of illness is completely different, most 
end up better advised to find a physician they can use for the medical problem and go 
elsewhere to talk about healing.459 
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In the distortion of relationships that medical practice perpetuates, both patients and 
physicians suffer.  Lori Alvord understands this suffering as the result of medicine forgetting 
that ‘everything in life is connected.’460  She like Chinese meridian philosophy, emphasises 
balance in her surgical work with an awareness of the ‘harmony of the entire being’ of the 
patient and the extension of this harmony to the relationships in the operating theatre.  She 
says: 
 
…[I]llness can be caused by an imbalance or lack of harmony in any area of a 
patient’s life.  I began to realise that everything a patient encounters has an impact 
on her.  If illness could be caused by a lack of harmony, could not the same be true 
for wellness and the ability to heal?  It made sense that if the healing environment 
was more ‘harmonious’ a patient might return to wellness faster.461 
 
Doubtless a great many physicians do see the living subject beyond the text of medical 
language.  But the pressure is strong in the direction of abstraction.  While this admittedly 
serves some practical purposes, such language and style can abstract both the physician and 
the patient as persons.  The case history as a consequence moves in the direction of 
anonymity and authority and the patient becomes less a person with a story, and more a 
person interpreting her own body and her illness.  She becomes more the possessor of a 
body-object with an organically classifiable disease and prognosis.  As Nelson suggests, 
medical practitioners believe in the objectivity of the case history resulting in adherence to 
the objectivity of medicine itself.462  Consequently it becomes difficult to deal with the 
patient as a suffering human being, for suffering is simply not organic.  It is that very 
personal distress we experience when there is a threat to our intactness as persons.  
Suffering is our interpretation of what is happening.  If suffering is seen by the physician as 
merely subjective, not real and hence not within medicine’s domain or is identified 
exclusively as bodily pain, that which is real to the patient becomes trivialised, diminished 
and depersonalised with the result that suffering is compounded. 
 
It is impossible to treat sickness as something that happens solely to my body without 
damage to me.  It is commonly believed that the greater the pain, the more suffering is 
caused.  But that is not necessarily the case.  It all depends on the meanings associated with 
the pain, the interpretations given those physical sensations.  According to Nelson, patients 
can often tolerate writhing pain when they know its source and know it is correctable and 
temporary.  On the other hand patients report considerable suffering from less pain when its 
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source and meaning is mysterious to them.463  That is when pain is not validated by other 
significant persons.  It is at this point that the patient’s body in its most intense presence 
becomes disembodied and alien. 
 
The interpretation of the patient’s disease may be at least as important as medical 
interventions in dealing with suffering and the quality of life.  For medical professionals there 
are two ways of understanding the same reality.  One focuses on localising and isolating the 
offending pain, the other attempts to grasp patients in their totality and understand the 
meanings of their sufferings and illnesses to them.  These positions are not antithetical both 
are needed.  Audrey Lorde after having had a mastectomy writes: 
 
At times, I miss my right breast, the actuality of it, its presence with a great and 
poignant sense of loss…I have come to realise that that well of feeling was within 
me.  I alone own my feelings.  I can never lose that feeling because I own it, because 
it comes out of myself…I would never have chosen this path, but I am very glad to be 
who I am, here.464 
 
To be fully present with persons as they move from suffering into fully experiencing what 
that suffering means as they go with it, as they experience reintegration, should be central to 
the medical enterprise of caring.  If suffering is pain that isolates itself in consciousness, 
absorbing the rest of consciousness, then the true difference is not between suffering and 
pain.  The difference is between suffering which has its cry attended to, and suffering that is 
left in its own uselessness. 
 
The telling of personal stories can be a form of resistance to suffering.  In story the flow of 
experience is reflected upon and redirected.  Stories of suffering have two aspects: one 
expresses the threat of disintegration that becomes the teller’s encompassing reality; the 
other requires that the old intactness be stripped away to prepare for something new.  As 
Frank points out in The Wounded Storyteller, to suffer a person must not only perceive a 
threat but must resist that threat.  The perception of threat is already a weak form of 
resistance, since the lived flow of experience is disrupted.465  People in the era of 
postmodern medicine466 live simultaneously with both the threat of disintegration and the 
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promise of reintegration, thus the body stands at the threshold of being unmade but 
unmaking can be turned into a generative process, that is it stands to be remade.467  For 
example chemotherapy easily reduces body strength to weakness, the body is literally 
unmade as people try to hold onto the promise that the treatment will cure them while at 
the same time their body is deteriorating, their intactness and integrity as a body-self is 
disintegrating.  Yet people in chemotherapy also believe they are being cared for.  Or they 
believe they ought to believe this, or they have given up believing but still confront others 
who insist that their treatment is care.  The self thus is unmade in contrast to the mind’s 
message of care and the body’s message of pain.  More importantly such confusion unravels 
trust.  Living with this paradoxical situation is what Frank terms as embodied paranoia.  
Embodied paranoia is not knowing what to fear most and then feeling guilty about this very 
uncertainty.  Disease and treatment happen to a body/self that is already substantially 
unmade by a combination of embodied paranoia and scepticism.  Suffering places the 
embodied self in a perpetual condition of ‘multiple threatened intactness.’468   
 
Suffering becomes useless precisely because any person’s suffering is irreducible, being 
nothing more than what it is, suffering can have no meaning that is beyond the person who 
is experiencing it.  Irreducible sufferings can never be compared therefore, but here the 
argument has an opportunity to turn on itself.  Beyond comparison the existential universal 
of suffering requires that different forms be spoken of and thus each suffering is part of a 
larger whole; each suffering person is called to the whole as a witness to other sufferings.  
Levinas insists that we listen to a further call: the opening to the inter-human.469  The other 
who suffers now speaks but cannot hear their own speech, because to be able to hear 
yourself is already to have found some meaning in helpless suffering.  But this speech that 
cannot hear itself remains a call for help.  The voiceless are given voice.  And thus from a 
position of resistance that the disease forces upon the body a voice is found in order to make 
suffering useful, the storyteller gains a power, a power to tell and even to heal.  Listening 
and telling are phases of healing and so the healer and the storyteller become one.  The 
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Dealing with death 
 
Rainer Rilke wrote poignantly about ‘death familiar and ours’ in the ninth of his Duino 
Elegies:470 
…because being here is much, and because all 
that’s here seems to need us, the ephemeral, that 
strangely concerns us. We: the most ephemeral. Once, 
for each thing, only once. Once, and no more. And we too, 
once. Never again. But this 
once, to have been, though only once, 
to have been an earthly thing – seems irrevocable. 
And so we keep pushing on, and trying to achieve it, 
trying to contain it in our simple hands, 
in the overflowing gaze and the speechless heart. 
Trying to become it. Whom to give it to? We would 
hold on to it for ever....Ah, what, alas, do we 
take into that other dimension? Not the gazing which we 
slowly learned here, and nothing that happened. Nothing. 
Suffering then. Above all, then, the difficulty, 
the long experience of love, then – what is 
wholly unsayable. But later, 
among the stars, what use is it: it is better unsayable… 
Namelessly, I have been truly yours, from the first. 
You were always right, and your most sacred inspiration 
is that familiar Death…. 471 
 
According to Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall, perhaps the most difficult aspect of modern 
culture is our fear and hence inability to deal with death.472  Michael Kearney, a doctor in 
Ireland reported that most of the physical pain we feel in the course of dying really arises 
from our fear in the face of a process we don’t understand, and those who overcome that 
fear experience less pain and need fewer drugs in support.473  For some believers in the 
concept of re-birth, death is a constant companion of life, a constant, further state of 
present existence.  Death is not an ending, but rather a state of on-going existence - a 
further level of my being.474  Death, in terms that a quantum theorist would propose infers 
that my present living form is a state of excited energy, where death is that deeper state of 
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still energy that I carry within me and into which I will one day be reabsorbed.475  Physicists 
tell us that all energy is conserved and therefore the amount of energy in the universe never 
changes, thus the energy that I now am, that which is concretised in my present living body, 
will exist forever.  And so the processes of living and dying simply mean that this borrowed 
energy that I am will one day take on some other form.  My deep being, that deeper sea of 
potentiality on which my present life is but an ever-evolving wave, has no beginning and no 
ending.   
 
We are part of a long history of constant creation and destruction of matter and 
consciousness arising out of the quantum vacuum, traversing space and time for a brief 
while, and then returning to the vacuum.476  We are the brief forms that infinite potentiality 
takes before it borrows us back to create other forms.  Life and death are all part of a cyclic 
process of continuous flows of energy so long as universes are born and die.  The seasonal 
and yearly cycles of nature replay the same drama, as indeed do the individual molecules in 
our bodies as they come and go through the more persistent pattern of energy that is us.  
According to Laszlo death is simply a necessary and natural part of the constant 
transformation of the energy that is life that we see in the changing seasons and in the 
whole of nature itself.477  A view that is significant for medical treatment of the body 
generally and for organ donation and transplantation particularly since Western medical 
approaches concentrate much effort in preventing death at all costs,478 sometimes to the 
detriment of the patient as Gawande rightly points out. 
 
Gawande argues that scientific advances have turned the process of dying into medical 
experiences, matters to be managed by healthcare professionals. 479  The pattern of bodily 
decline has changed for many chronic illnesses.  Instead of just delaying the moment of 
decline, treatments can stretch the descent out.  Drugs, fluids, surgery, intensive care units 
and so on get people through.  People enter the hospital looking terrible, and some of what 
can be done makes them look worse.  But just when it looks like they have breathed their 
last, they rally.  The trajectory that medical progress has made possible for many people 
results in increasingly large numbers getting to live out a full life span and die of old age.  But 
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in truth no single disease leads to the end, the culprit is just the accumulated crumbling of 
the bodily systems while medicine carries out its ‘maintenance measures and patch jobs.’480 
 
Nevertheless the progress of medicine and public health has been a great blessing, people 
get to live longer, healthier and more productive lives than ever before.  The advances of 
modern medicine have given two revolutions: a biological transformation of the course of 
our lives and a cultural transformation of how we think about that course.  However the 
institutionalisation of medicine has given rise to a depersonalised understanding of living and 
dying.  Medical professionals concentrate on repair of health not sustenance of the soul.   
The battle of being mortal is the battle to maintain the integrity of life - to avoid becoming so 
diminished or dissipated or subjugated that who you are becomes disconnected from who 
you were or who you want to be.  In general medicine the goal is to extend life.  Doctors 
sometimes sacrifice the quality of existence by performing surgery, providing chemotherapy 
or even intensive care treatment, for the chance of gaining time later.  But people with 
serious illness have priorities besides simply prolonging their lives.481 
 
When there is no way of knowing how long lives will extend, and when we imagine ourselves 
to have much more time than we do, the impulse is to fight.  The simple view is that 
medicine exists to fight death and disease.  Death is the enemy.  But the enemy has superior 
forces.  Eventually it wins.  No one really has control over the ending of life.  Physics, biology 
and unforeseeable events ultimately have their way, but the point is that we are not helpless 
either.  Courage is the strength to recognise both realities.  Death as Beverley Clack points 
out is important since it leads to discussions of where meaning might be found.  Western 
cultures however ignore death in a variety of ways and in doing so effectively succeed in 
‘promoting the trivial over the profound.’482  Death is objectified and placed in a category 
that makes it more manageable.  It is viewed as an accident.  If we adopt certain lifestyles, 
changes in diet, exercise regimes and so on, it can be avoided.  Such ideas are predicated 
upon the belief that it need not occur at all.  There is room to act, to shape stories, though 
admittedly as time goes on it is within narrower and narrower confines.  ‘The most crucial 
failure in how doctors treat the sick and the aged is the failure to recognise that they have 
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priorities beyond merely being safe and living longer; that the chance to shape individuals’ 
story is essential to sustaining meaning in life.’483 
 
Susan Block, a palliative care specialist, believes that a large part of the task is helping people 
negotiate overwhelming anxiety - anxiety about death and anxiety about suffering.484  
Arriving at an acceptance of mortality and ‘a clear understanding of the limits and 
possibilities of medicine is a process, not an epiphany.’485  There is no single way to take 
people with terminal illness through the process, but there are some rules according to 
Block.  You sit down.  You make time.  You’re not discussing whether they want treatment X 
versus treatment Y.  You’re trying to learn what’s most important to them - a process that 
requires as much listening as talking.486   
 
Directly or tacitly, most illness stories borrow their authority from death, and they do so 
honestly.  Walter Benjamin believes that there is no story for which the question ‘how does 
it continue?’ would not be legitimate.487  Thus a story of dying is situated beyond the death 
of the author.  That story continues in other stories forming ‘the web which all stories 
together form in the end.’488  Each story weaves threads that are original in that person’s 
experience.  Yet everything that is said carries the resonance of previous stories, because 
every expression of despair and act of courage has been told before.  A radical hope when 
death is more or less a proximate prospect is to become part of that web of stories, because 
the web is paradoxically the possibility of other people’s hope. 
 
The importance of narrative in thinking through the body  
 
According to Schneider, enchanted stories, stories of power, scriptural stories, and medical 
stories do not simply ‘transport truth or existential reality - they also create and uncreate 
it.’489  She argues that stories, words and images change with experience but the ‘way to 
learn stories is to listen.’490  The threads of connection between words, images, stories, 
experience and meaning are tangled and dense.  This means that whatever human beings 
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strive to call truth is inaccessible to human life except ‘fleshed in folds of language, culture 
and interpretation.’491  The co-constitution of truth with time, place and culture does not 
discredit the truth as such, instead it makes the vitality of stories less easy to dismiss when 
pursuing that truth.  We might question indeed whether science tells stories in the guise of 
hypotheses in order to test and undo them so as to make coherent their findings and to 
guide their investigations.  We need the storyteller’s genius for getting over the barriers of 
social or political doctrine to examine what images and beliefs are actually founded upon.  
For example the storyteller can sometimes more directly, effectively expose the lies and 
fabrications on which dominant institutions, cultures, classes, races and genders rely for 
their power.  We are painfully aware of the many ways that certainty in the hands of the 
righteous powerful has historically meant hard times for the outsider or even the oppressed. 
 
Through stories that indicate change, relationality and interconnection, the matter of our 
existence may be re-ordered - in our daily lives, in our values and priorities in community.  
Being dynamic through multiple experiences in life, stories themselves are becomings.  Since 
life is fluid, stories that relate to ebb, flow, space and time are creative, purposeful and goal-
oriented.  They have the potential to build and deconstruct the world.  Time collapses and 
reconfigures in the context of the stories we tell.  Time is spatial in stories because ‘stories 
form geometries and meaning in space, in the orientation toward that which takes place in 
the story, in the story’s telling and in the story of the story’s telling.’492  Stories must be told 
appropriately, however.  Honest, authentic stories have such power that once told they are 
never under the complete control of the storyteller.  This is because in part storytellers also 
become the story.  Having the capacity to change the world, stories express the dynamic 
flow of creation in all its forms.  Thus the universal significance of stories is not some truth 
for all times and places, the significance lies in their potential to prompt questions and offer 
examples that inform lives lived far from the story’s particular time and place.  What is real?  
Who are we?  What does this illness mean to me?  Arguably these questions are evident just 
under the surface of contemporary debates about health, reproduction, euthanasia and 
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Narrative as a healing process  
 
Roy Schafer suggests that ‘self-stories’ are a way out of the narrative describing the 
wreckage that illness brings.494  The self-story is not told for the sake of description but 
rather the self is in the process of a different kind of becoming, of being formed in what is 
told.  In telling these self-stories to others we might, for most purposes, be said to be 
performing straightforward narrative actions.  In saying that we also tell them to ourselves, 
however, we are enclosing one story within another.  This is the story that there is a self to 
tell something to, ‘a someone else serving as an audience who is oneself or one’s self….On 
this view the self is a telling.’495  The act of telling is a reaffirmation.  Relationships with 
others are reaffirmed, and the self too is reaffirmed.  Serious illness requires both.  The ill 
person needs to reaffirm that her story is worth listening to by others.  But more importantly 
she must also reaffirm that she is still there, as an audience for herself, ‘in order to keep me 
available for myself’ as Lorde states.496  Illness is a crisis of self in the specific sense of 
uncertainty that I am still available to myself - I am still there.  The repair begins by taking 
stock of what survives the wreckage.  The old map may now be less than useful but it has not 
been relegated.  Disease happens in a life that already has a story, and this story goes on, 
changed by illness but also affecting how the illness story is formed.   
 
Reflections following a kidney transplant 
 
Peter and I lie in the ward, 
In neighbouring beds, 
Joint beneficiaries. 
Released from the tyranny 
Of constant changes four times a day, 
Mobile once more. 
 
So must the wind feel free to blow 
Where it pleases. 
No need to plan thirty-two items 
To be taken when going away, 
No need to plan the times to change 
Pleasure indeed. 
 
Peter and I lie in the ward, 
Successful transplantees. 
Joint beneficiaries 
Of some poor wretch who met his death,  
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A donor, anonymous to us, 
His sole memorial spare parts. 
 
Peter has the left, I the right, 
Living kidneys. 
I live again, but feel the pain 
That pleasure comes from someone’s death. 
Though one may say for conscience sake 
Turn back the clock? It can’t be done. 
I feel the pain. 
 
Unknown donor, I cry for you, 
And yours who mourn with me. 
I know I must a burden bear, 
A question which I cannot solve. 
Am I deserving of your gift? 
I feel the load. 
R. J Wild after receiving a kidney in November 1988 
 
The stories that ill people tell come out of their bodies.  The body sets in motion the need for 
new stories when illness disrupts the old stories.  Thus the body whether diseased or 
recovered is simultaneously cause, topic, and instrument of whatever new stories are told.  
These embodied stories have two sides, one personal and one social.  The personal side to 
the narrative of illness is to give voice to the body, so that the changed body can become 
once again familiar to those stories.  As Martin Buber says ‘the body does not use speech, 
yet begets it.’497  The ill body is certainly not mute - it speaks eloquently in diverse ways in 
pain and symptoms - but it itself is inarticulate.  We must speak for the body, and such 
speech is quickly frustrated since speech presents itself as being about the body rather than 
of it.  That the teller’s diseased body shapes the illness story should be self-evident.  We 
speak through our body, the mind is not separate but diffused throughout it.  The obvious 
social aspect of stories is that they are told to someone, whether that someone is 
immediately present or not.  The less evident aspect is that people do not make up stories by 
themselves.  From many sources, family, friends, popular culture and so on, storytellers have 
learned the formal structures of narrative, conventional metaphors, imagery and standards 
of what is and is not appropriate to tell in specific environments or circumstances.  Thus, the 
shape of telling is moulded by circumstances and expectations that ‘the story teller has been 
internalising ever since he [sic] was encouraged to tell the doctor what hurts and then had to 
figure out what counted as the story the doctor wanted to hear.’498  Ill people need to tell 
their stories in order to construct new maps and new perceptions of their relationships to 
the world.  
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The modern experience of illness started when popular experience was overtaken by 
technical expertise, including complex organisations of treatment.  People no longer go to 
bed and die, cared for by extended family members and neighbours.  They go to paid 
professionals who reinterpret their pains as symptoms using a specialised language that is 
unfamiliar and overwhelming.  As patients they accumulate entries on medical charts and 
notes which in most instances they are not allowed to read: the charts and notes thus 
become the official story of their illness.  The story that reigns supreme above all others in 
modern medicine is the medical narrative.  The story told by the physician becomes the one 
against which all others are ultimately judged true or false, useful or not.  The American 
sociologist Talcott Parsons suggested that a core social expectation of being sick is 
surrendering oneself to the care of a physician.499  The ill person not only agrees to follow 
physician regimens, she also agrees tacitly to tell her story in medical terms.  ‘How are you?’ 
now requires that personal feeling be contextualised within a second-hand medical report.  
Thus the physician becomes the spokesperson for the disease, and the ill person’s story 
comes to depend heavily on repetition of what the physician has said.  But other stories 
proliferate.  Ill people tell friends and family versions of what the doctor said, or rather they 
are encouraged to, and these others reply by the telling of other experiences that seem to be 
similar - both those they have had themselves or alternatively have heard from others.  
Illness becomes a circulation of stories.   
 
The experience of illness begins when ill people recognise that more is involved in their 
experiences than the medical story can tell.  The loss of a life’s plan, of a disconnection and 
destination are not medical symptoms.  Yet the scope of medical training does not include 
helping patients learn to think differently about their post-illness worlds and construct new 
and different relationships to those worlds.  Illness elicits more than fitting the body into 
traditional community expectations or surrendering the body to professional medicine.  
Illness is an experience, a reflection on the body self, and the destination that life’s map 
leads to.  Illness like the narrative that gives meaning to it is not static, it develops and thus is 
a becoming.  These days the sick role carries the expectation that ill people get well, cease to 
be patients and return to their normal obligations.  But as Frank argues people feel a need to 
find their voice.500  They have an alternative construction of self with wide ranging 
implications of health, of what it means to be healthy and what treatment should be 
delivered when they become sick.  Medicine today claims the body of its patients as its 
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territory, at least for the duration of their treatment.  When admitted to hospital for instance 
or even visiting a doctor, the admittance forms in many instances ask for ‘the patient’s 
name’ and so we stop being people and start being patients.  Our identity as people and the 
world we once knew are both relinquished, thus we become their patients and end up 
sometimes living in their hospital. 
 
Increasing numbers of people with varying degrees of articulation and action have begun to 
be suspicious of medicine’s reduction of suffering to its general unifying view.  They question 
their place in medical narratives.  Pressures on clinical practice, including the cost of 
physician’s time and ever-greater use of technology, can often mean less time for patients to 
speak, and so frequently they speak elsewhere, to the media is an obvious example.  New 
evidence resides not in the content of what patients say about medicine but rather recent 
stories begin in how often medicine and physicians do not enter their stories.501  This 
movement involves a profound assumption of personal responsibility.  Where Parson’s sick 
role articulated the requirement that ill person’s delegate responsibility for their health to 
physicians, illness responsibility is reduced to patient compliance.  The role of the ill person 
as patient is responsible consequently merely for getting well.502  Nowadays there is 
increasing evidence that the ill person takes responsibility for what illness means in her life.   
Physicians in their turn are responsible more to professional codes for legal reasons than to 
individual patients - ethical codes such as those proposed by Beauchamp and Childress for 
instance.503  According to universalist principles, the greatest responsibility to all patients is 
achieved when the professional places adherence to the profession before the particular 
demands of the individual patient.  Such professionalism is responsible less to individual 
people than to ‘truth’, understood on a number of levels: the factual truth of medical 
science, the beneficent truth of institutional management in the hospital and ultimately the 
political truth of administering people’s welfare.  All of which require the acceptance of the 
patient’s narrative to be surrendered to the medical enterprise. 
 
Morality and illness stories 
 
Stories of people trying to sort out who they are figure prominently in defining the ethic of 
our times, affording each a right to speak their own truth, in their own words.  This voice is 
embodied in a specific person but it is equally social, taking its influence from the times in 
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which we live.  Frank believes that telling stories of illness is the attempt instigated by the 
body’s disease to give voice to an experience that medicine cannot describe.504  Storytellers 
try to reclaim their own experience of suffering and as they seek to turn that suffering into 
testimony, the storyteller engages in moral action.  Morality is thus usefully sought in the 
everyday personal struggles of people who are trying to make sense of their own suffering 
and who are witness to sufferings that go beyond their own.  Alan Wolfe asserts any 
professional discipline that observes and attends the ill must accept responsibility for its 
observations as acts of witness that commit the clinician as a person.  Thus responsibility 
begins and ends with the body.  Both storyteller and witness begin with a body and both 
should commit to that body.505 
 
Being responsive to stories of illness and suffering, and equally thinking with them entails 
telling certain stories over and over in order to hear different nuances of potential meaning 
as the story develops and is told.  It ultimately requires a highly personal grounding of 
experience: it involves living with the stories and having them shape perceptions of various 
experiences over time.  One of our most difficult duties as human beings is to listen to the 
voices of those who suffer for the voices of the ill are easy to ignore because they are often 
faltering, contradictory and confused.  However these voices signify conditions of 
embodiment that most of us would rather forget as they recall our own vulnerability.  
Listening is demanding, but it is also a fundamental moral act; in listening to the other we 
are listening for ourselves as well.  The moment of witness in the story crystallises a 
mutuality of need when each is for the other. 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre clearly recognises the importance of witness in his influential description 
of storytelling: 
 
…man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-
telling animal.  He …becomes through his history a teller of stories that aspire to 
truth.  But the key question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only 
answer the question, ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ’Of what 
stories do I find myself a part?’  We enter human society, that is, with one or more 
imputed characters – roles into which we have been drafted – and we have to learn 
what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how 
our responses to them are apt to be construed.506 
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Physicians find themselves faced constantly with decisions about ‘What am I to do’ and each 
needs either to tell their own story or reflect on their own story in order to answer 
MacIntyre’s complementary question: ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’  
Most physicians have a problem that MacIntyre would not immediately recognise.  Although 
physicians do find themselves in a role or roles into which they have been drafted, according 
to Frank many feel limited by the demands of the ethical standards imposed on them.  He 
maintains that many have to tell stories to get themselves out of at least one of the stories of 
which they are a part.507  Getting out of an old story requires telling a new one, but often 
there isn’t a new story to tell.  There isn’t an adequate story that is culturally made.  By 
virtue of one or more personal or professional qualities doctors can feel marginalised either 
to medicine or to society as a whole.  Certain marginalities might include ethnicity, gender 
and sexual orientation.  These marginalities prompt the questioning of received values and in 
such cases where health professionals receive their values from.  A new story, a new 
possibility of being a physician has to be created.508  It is necessary because the conditions of 
medical practice have changed and because physicians need to bring a heightened self-
awareness to their work.  Whilst listening to the stories of patients is both inclusive and 
valuable, understanding the body language of the storyteller creates a deeper insight into 
the suffering that their individual story engenders. 
 




Entering the space of another requires listening in another guise, for stories are also told by 
the gestures that accompany them.  The body acts, it is an agent of action, and behaviour is 
the only channel that we can observe directly.  Although we might be able to surmise much 
about a patient’s inner life from some kind of resonance with their feelings and sensations, 
such inferences cannot take the place of the patient also accessing and verbally 
communicating their own sensations and feelings to the doctor through the story of their 
experience.  However, the doctor can often infer a patient’s inner states from reading her 
body language, the unspoken language of her actions, inactions or tension patterns.  As the 
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trauma therapist Peter Levine reveals, each of these patterns is charged with meaning and 
offers further clues to the patient’s mental, emotional and physical state at the time.509   
 
Paralinguistic clues - gestures - are key indicators of what might be going on for the patient 
not just in their illness state but in their life generally, adding weight to their narrative.  For 
example interpretation of the clenched fist in non-verbal communication can be seen either 
as threatening or as the setting of clear boundaries and quelling fear.  The wringing of hands 
may indicate extreme tension.  Facial expressions such as smiling or clenching the teeth and 
bodily posture are also indicative of physical and affective states.  Levine advises that bodily 
reactions are not metaphors; they are literally postures that inform our emotional 
experience.  Tightness in the neck, shoulders and chest and knots in the gut or throat are 
central to states of fear.  Helplessness is signalled by a literal collapsing of the chest and 
shoulders.  Diverse postural attitudes represent action potentials.  If they are given 
permission to complete their meaningful course of action then as Levine confirms, ‘all is 
well’.510  If not they live on in the body and compound patient trauma and suffering. 
 
According to Erin Manning, a political philosopher and movement specialist, gesture draws 
our attention to the challenges within expression, leading us to ‘the realm of the unsayability 
of words as completed thoughts.’511  A gesture acts as a force that renders touchable 
language’s instability, ‘challenging language to become an infra-language of interrelation, 
where the felt is said even as the said is felt.’512  Gesture reinforces the fact that 
communication is not linear, that language cannot be pinned down, and words that reach 
another cannot be completely taken in.  Gesture as such has literally nothing to say.  It is only 
relationally that gesture creates the possibility for exchange.  However gesture can be used 
to communicate something to another - that which I don’t feel I can adequately voice.  
Gestures thereby continuously slip outside the lines of organised linguistic structure, 
enunciating a vocabulary that can exceed everyday language. 
 
Our relationship with others is dependent upon a mutual exchange of sensory data, both 
external and internal.  We gaze, touch and speak, and through a resonance of our sensations 
come to know ourselves and each other.  The overall sense when this process is 
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synchronised is one of ‘belonging and goodness.’513  Without access to the feeling sense, 
through bodily sensations, our lives would be one-dimensional.  Both our physical life and 
feeling life, from our most primal cravings to the loftiest artistic creations depend upon 
embodiment.  When embodied we linger in the present moment.  When we are fully present 
we experience more pleasure, wonder and wisdom.  Embodiment is thus about gaining 
through awareness the capacity to feel the ambient physical sensations of aliveness and 
unrestrained energy as they flow through our bodies.  The author and poet D H Lawrence 
reflected on such a living, knowing body: 
 
My belief is in the blood and flesh as being wiser than the intellect. 
The body-unconscious is where life bubbles up in us.  It is how we know  
that we are alive, alive to the depths of our souls and in touch  




We see, hear, touch, smell and taste the divine, who is embodied between and among us insofar as we 
are moving more fully into, toward, mutually empowering relationships in which all creatures are 




Touching someone’s arm can often indicate mutual understanding of how breathtaking a 
beautiful sunset is, or proffer a sympathetic response to someone who has lost a loved-one.  
The most profound moments are frequently silent but words emerge out of silence.  
According to Gill Westland, we can observe the way that silences are broken perhaps 
elegantly, roughly or a bursting forth.516  Wilhelm Reich is of the view that experience ‘not 
only functions before and beyond word language; more than that, it has its own specific 
forms of expression which cannot be put into words at all.’517  And furthermore, ‘what is 
described as the spirituality of great music, then, is an appropriate description of the simple 
fact that seriousness of feeling is identical with contact with the living beyond the confine of 
words.’518  Similarly Maura Sills in writing about relationality, maintains that when silence 
embodies qualities of stillness, warmth and empathic resonance, ‘implicate information is 
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subliminally conveyed and known silently with clear comprehension.’519  Within this 
relationality a patient might truly hold their suffering in balance and open to an experience 
of their human beingness that is beyond words. 
 
Touch is foundational since it is the first sense to develop.  Indeed the skin is a vast 
communication system connecting us with the rest of the nervous system and the external 
environment.  As the skin delineates what is both inside and outside of the body, it creates 
not only a physical bridge but also a psychological one.  The skin provides literal and 
metaphorical containment; keeping in what should be kept inside and keeping out what we 
choose to keep out.520  The skin learns through experiencing touch to process sensory 
information, however this awareness doesn’t necessarily lead to an understanding of its 
influence.  Thomas Dumm reminds us that rejecting touch is possible and sometimes 
necessary to survive hurt.  Yet if such protection becomes entire, it results in negation of life 
itself.  The unavoidable ambiguity of touch conveys both a vital form of relation and a threat 
of violence and invasion.521   
 
Whilst touch can be challenging for some people, the place of touch should not be 
underestimated in the care and healing of illness and the promotion of wellbeing.  Touch 
empowers those touching and those being touched.  It confirms their presence, their 
immediacy.  It restores, it informs, it reassures and embodies the interrelationship between 
the caring actions of the doctor and the vulnerability of the patient kindling that necessary 
level of trust that promotes mutual healing.522  Thus understanding caring through paying 
attention to what it means to touch and to be touched deepens an awareness of the 
embodied character of perception, affect and thinking.  De la Bellacasa explains ‘to think 
with touch has a potential to inspire a sense of connectedness that can further problematize 
abstractions and disengagements of (epistemological) distances, the bifurcations between 
subjects and objects, knowledge and the world, affects and facts…’523 
 
Touch through our sensing skin protects us while opening us toward becoming vulnerable to 
another.  To touch is always an attempt to touch the incorporeality of a body, to touch what 
is not yet.  Touch connects bodies.  It has an ethical quality because to touch another implies 
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responsibility on behalf of the one doing the touching.  Equally I cannot touch you without 
being receptive.  ‘For touch must always indicate its source and its source can never be 
identified by an individual, touch is a singular-plural.’524  What is interesting about touch 
reminds us that the body is the medium through which touch can be negotiated.  The body is 
the receiver of the gesture that informs me that paradoxically my body is not one.525  ‘Sign of 
itself and being itself of the sign: such is the double formula of the body in all states, in all its 
possibilities.’526 
 
The wound of illness lives within the body, trying to resist the shutting down of meaning and 
sense.  It is this resistance, ‘this urge to touch another, wound against wound, that 
potentially creates a community of resistance....’527  Within this relation new bodies are 
created and shared - bodies of thought and bodies of knowledge.  For the doctor the sense 
of that difference has the potential to create a body of knowledge, a growing experience of 
what it means to receive the gift of touch.  Touch therefore is informative.  It is through an 
other’s touch that my body becomes my body, for my body cannot be otherwise than 
singular and plural - a multiple becoming.  It is through the touch of the doctor for instance 
that a response is elicited, a response that is not necessarily felt or acknowledged by words 
but through a return of the knowledge gained through the touching initiated by the doctor. 
 
Thus an embodiment of touch is a touch that can never take place unilaterally.  Touch 
belongs first to another.  It comes from another, addressing itself to another.  Without 
touch, the body remains unarticulated, unaffected.  With touch I enter into communication 
with you, ‘I do not become you’ but the space between you and me is created.528  What I 
touch is that untouchability, the unknown and the infinite distance that separates me from 
you.  Touch creates time and space, reminding us through every gesture that time and space 
articulate this very creation rather than pre-existing it.  Touching is an event, it is a 
directional gesture toward a body that has not yet become, not a body in stasis, but a body 
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Hospitals trade in endless pieces of specialised information.  At best, this information comes 
together into a coherent medical narrative of the illness that turns out to be a technical 
account of the disease, its possible cause and expected progression.  Technical accounts 
however concern the interaction of non-sentient objects thereby lending little meaning to 
illness and suffering and inhibiting the kind of story telling that can make the experience 
meaningful.  The fundamental problem with stories of recovery and success lies in the 
considerable weight of institutional authority and expectation that results in crowding out 
other forms of storytelling.  Whilst such stories are not without veracity, they can exemplify 
the sad but profound truth that communicability of patient experience is frequently lacking.  
Walter Benjamin writes of medical institutions: ‘Almost nothing that happens benefits 
storytelling; almost everything benefits information.’529  NHSBT for example advertise for 
organ recipients and donors to send in their stories for inclusion on their organ donation 
website.  Those stories receiving approval will be written up by a journalist in a manner that 
‘tend[s] to lead directly to people becoming donors or registering to donate.’530  In other 
words the stories are sanitised to provide a positive advertising mechanism for overcoming 
organ shortage.  One such story recounts the experience of a kidney donor who was 
reported as ‘gently jogging in three weeks, back in work on light duties after four weeks and 
pretty well recovered after six weeks.’  And who declared ‘It was a life-affirming experience.  
If I had a third kidney, I would happily do it again.’  It would have been interesting to discover 
what he meant by life affirming and how his recovery played out long term.531  Equally ‘Real 
Life Stories’ available on the NHS website provides stories of ‘People who have benefitted 
from receiving a transplant.’532  The reality of living with a ‘new’ organ in the body 
substantially alters the circumstances of recipients and donors whose stories would be 
valuable.  
 
There seems to an institutional climate of fear around sufficiency of solid organ donations, 
yet figures substantiate that the ratio over ten years or so has barely changed.533  This would 
lead to the conclusion that some deeper issue is at stake that requires teasing out through a 
different mode of narrative and recording method.  Underpinning my point, a recent book 
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What’s in a Story?  Lessons from Reflections in General Practice containing more than one 
hundred stories written by dozens of authors might have been a step in the right direction.  
A comprehensive set of general practitioner reflections has the potential to provoke thought 
in a wider medical readership.  Sadly not.  It turns out to be accounts of errors, missed 
diagnoses, and contradictions, a learning manual for general practitioners.  A missed 
opportunity; by fitting into a template for ‘what I have learnt’ rather than breaking out of it, 
much of the power of storytelling is lost.  An encouragement to think more critically about 
these stories and what they might mean for the narrator, patient and medical practice/ethics 
might instead have unleashed the potency of medical storytelling.534 
 
Whilst case histories and narrative accounts of successful transplants are no doubt helpful 
for the medical professionals, they do little to represent what illness and a subsequent 
transplant means for the patient beyond their physical symptoms.  Neither do they account 
for the longer-term experiences of the donor or their relatives, nor the relatives of the organ 
recipient.  There is considerable disruption to all in those circumstances, rendering care and 
support networks that build trust essential when those involved are feeling at their most 
vulnerable.  It is pertinent that whatever financial and resourcing levels pertain at the time, 
positive healing outcomes for all concerned are maintained, predominantly for the patient, 
but equally for the donor and the relatives who have to cope with the aftermath of complex 
procedures which will affect their everyday lives well into the future.535  In the long-term this 
has financial consequences, it saves money, but more importantly insures improvement in 
health and wellbeing and potentially leads to fewer visits to medical agencies.  All too 
frequently the ill person and those around her are subsequently left to deal with the 
consequences of what has not been recognised.  If the ill person dies, those who survive 
must deal with all that was not said, the unfinished business of a life closed out in a setting 
where dying is a problem of management not a continuity of experience.  And those ill 
persons who recover must recover not only from the disease but also from being a patient.  
According to Frank ‘This recovery will proceed far more smoothly if the person within the 
patient has been recognised throughout the period of illness by those involved in the process 
of their healing.’536 
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Becoming a storyteller, the narrator has her own ethic - a telos for life to aspire to.  The 
crucial test of the story may well be the sort of person it shapes.  Stories have the capacity to 
engender hope in the possible hopelessness of illness.  Hope begins with having sufficient 
confidence that an individual’s life will have a future story.  Most hope consequently requires 
a belief in the capacity to affect how the story unfolds.  Beyond those minimum conditions, 
hope means imagining that life can be at least worthwhile and at best valuable.  Those who 
are ill might imagine living a life that is relatively speaking, ‘good’.  That life is not as the 
person wanted it to be.  Instead, ‘good’ for those who are ill means life lived in conditions 
the person did not choose and could not avoid, but has discovered value in life lived in those 
conditions.  Perhaps what is needed is what Frank calls ‘intransitive hope’ - a hope that has 
no specified object or objective.537  It is an openness and a flexibility that allows hope for 
healing even in the face of a grim clinical prognosis.  Healing itself is not a fixed outcome it 
denotes a range of possible conditions all of them different from a medical cure.   
 
Charon argues that narrative ethics is not an independent method that promises to replace 
all existing efforts in the field of medical ethics.  As long as clinical ethics remains grounded 
in universally applicable principles and adjudicatory rules to health care conflicts, so long as 
limited liability remains the guiding principle governing its vision of the practice of medicine, 
clinical ethics limits itself to ‘imagining variations.  It continues to play the broken record.’538  
The value of narrative contributions lies in their ability to enhance medical caregivers’ 
recognition of the complexity of treatment decisions.  As such, narrative plays a crucial role 
by leading physicians to recognise the moral dimension in every medical encounter since it 
helps to ground difficult medical decisions in the concreteness and specificity of each 
patient’s life.  Barry Hoffmaster suggests that the moral imperative of narrative ethics is not 
clinical adjudication but personal becoming, of evolving and growing in spite of the illness.  It 
is an ethics of commitment to shaping oneself as a human being.  Individual stories are the 
medium of this shaping, and the shaping itself is the story of each life.539 
 
Patients need words to speak the truth about illness, words in which they try to fit a world 
that seems worth believing in.  Although experiences are very much individual, such 
experiences are understood in relation however.  In this vein, Chapter 7 will take up the 
significance of multiplicity in complexity, of otherness and of relationality establishing the 
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notion that the body is much more than individual containment, but rather a wave of 














The Body as Multiple, Relational and Other 
 
Mutuality involves wrestling more fully to embody friendship.  It involves learning to stand and walk 
together and to recognise and honour the differences we bring to our common ground.  It requires 
risking through fear, not without it to be friends.  It means working together on our frustrations, hurt, 
anger, confusion and conflicts.  It is a process of getting unstuck, of coming into our power together.  It 
is the way of liberation, of calling forth the best in one another and, in so doing of empowering one 






If bioethical stances are to progress with any degree of confidence, a more fluid 
interpretation of what is ‘good’ for individuals and for those who are ill in particular is vital.  I 
have proposed that viewing the body differently will contribute effectively towards 
accomplishing the aim of grounding the seemingly intractable complexities of technical 
advancement especially within transplantation medicine, in order to render with greater 
clarity, the effect on patients, donors, family and medical professionals.  Establishing a 
                                                          




rationale for narrative through the processes of multi-vocality, that is by gaining views from 
both expert and non-expert, from protagonist and sceptic, I believe will offer greater insight 
into development of any approach within an ethic of care.   
 
People tell stories not just to work out their own changing identities, but also to guide others 
who will follow them.  In so doing their act of narration does not provide a definitive map for 
others but rather is an act of witness to their own experience of reconstruction, whether it 
be of their lives or their story.  Story telling is for another just as much as it is for the self.  For 
the storyteller offers themselves as guide to the others’ self-formation.  Frank believes that 
‘The moral genius of storytelling is that each, teller and listener, enters the space for the 
other.  Telling stories attempts to change one’s own life by affecting the lives of others.’541  Ill 
people still surrender their bodies to medicine, but increasingly try to hold onto their own 
stories.  Refusing narrative surrender however becomes an exercise of responsibility.  A 
sense of responsibility to the common-sense world that in turn represents one way of living 
for the other.   
 
This chapter considers otherness from the early beginnings of what it means to be other 
through subject formation, awareness of the body self in relation, the concept of multiplicity, 
the importance of dialogue, and the meaning of otherness in medicine seen through the 
gaze of care and compassion considered central to the concept of healing.   
 
The formation of self 
 
A body in the world is much more than individual containment.  It is a complex assembly of 
feeling that is active between different settings that constitute the whole.  It is individuation 
before it is self.542  Connected environments are active and always in concert with the 
becomings they engender.  Becoming self is one of the ways in which the fluid wave of 
beingness expresses itself, but never toward a totalisation of self - always toward continued 
individuation.  The self not being contained, is a fold, a wave of immanent expressibility and 
power: 
 
To think individuation it is necessary to consider being as not a substance, matter or 
form, but as a tensile oversaturated system beyond the level of unity.543 
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Gilbert Simondon’s premise is simple: individuation whether subject or object according to 
traditional categories, comes to be.544  Thus the span of becoming is broader than the 
concept of a being.  All individuation is more than an individual.  The individual is always 
moving into its own and beyond.  And so every actual occasion carries within itself the more-
than of its taking form.  ‘Force is everywhere active, on time-lines that intersect with the 
occasion at hand, and on transversal lines that extend beyond it or circle through it.’545  The 
body is a phase of being.  It is a relative fact.  Every phase comprises individuation and the 
pre-individual.  These two cannot be thought singly according to Simondon.  Individuation is 
an unfolding process and the force of the pre-individual reminds us that life is neither in the 
individual nor outside it but in what surpasses it while accompanying it.  It is the germ of 
potential in every activity.  This means that all resolutions - as body, as individual, as object - 
are more than the forms they inhabit.  A body is always more than one: it is the how of the 
multiplicity of its emergence, not the what of its form. 
 
Daniel Stern emphasises that tendencies developed in early infancy do not build toward a 
contained view of self, but rather lead toward the creation of a multiplicity of layers each of 
them differently expressive under variable conditions.546  Therefore a core sense of self 
involves a non self-reflexive awareness.  Preverbal awareness is linked to direct experience 
where direct experience is of the order of the event.  Like William James’ concept of ‘pure 
experience’, defined as the virtual or unconscious edge to all lived experience, direct 
experience can be likened to an immanent wave formation through which events become 
experience.547  Direct experience takes place not in the subject or in the object but in the 
relation itself.  Unlike the idea that the self rests in a containment of skin, Stern proposes 
that selves build onto and through one another in intimate relation with a changing 
environment: ‘…[several] senses of the self do exist long prior to self awareness and 
language.’548  There is no stable identity that emerges once and for all.  Becoming human, 
although a momentary cohesion, is nonetheless a sense of self that remains coloured by the 
interweaving of forces that both direct and destabilise the self’s development into an ‘I’.   
The infant is not a passive slate into or onto which the world can be written.  The infant is an 
emergent experience, an individuation of interweaving layers active in the creation of  
 
                                                          
544 Simondon, G., (1995) p23 
545 Manning, E., (2013) p16 
546 Stern, D., (1985) The Interpersonal World of the Infant: a View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental 
Psychology, Harper Collins, New York, p6. 
547 James, W., (1912) Does Consciousness Exist in Essays in Radical Empiricism, Longmans Green and Company, 
London. 




physical, psychological and social development, as Gilles Deleuze states: 
 
The life of the individual has given way to an impersonal and yet singular life which 
foregrounds a pure event that has been liberated from the accidents of internal and 
external life, that is from the subjectivity and objectivity of what comes to pass.549 
 
When we speak about subject formation, Judith Butler argues we invariably presume a 
threshold of susceptibility or impressionability that may be said to precede formation of a 
conscious and deliberate ‘I’.550  This being that I am is affected by something outside of itself, 
understood as prior, activates and informs the subject that I am.  I am already affected 
before I can say ‘I’ at all.551  As discussed in Chapter 6, the senses are primary.  We feel 
things, undergo impressions prior to forming any thoughts, including any thoughts we might 
have about ourselves.  So norms, conventions, institutional forms of power are already 
acting prior to any action I may undertake.  Prior to an ‘I’ that thinks of itself, from time to 
time, as the seat or source of its own actions.  I am not only already in the hands of someone 
else before I start to work with my own hands, but I am also in the hands of institutions, 
discourses, environments, including technologies and life processes, handled by an organic 
and inorganic object field that exceeds the human.  ‘I’ am nowhere and nothing 
consequently without the nonhuman.  ‘The unwilled character of this dependency is not 
itself exploitation but rather open to it.’552  Furthermore susceptibility alone does not explain 
passionate attachment or indeed falling in love or a sense of betrayal or abandonment.  Yet 
all of those things can follow depending on what happens in relation to those who move and 
affect us.  We do not always know or cannot always say who touched whom first or what 
was the moment of being touched and what was the moment of touching.  The moment is 
fluid and dynamic or ‘transitive.’553  It is a becoming through momentary occurrence. 
 
The body as multiple and relational 
 
The ‘other’ is critical to human nurture and development, for as Butler proposes problems 
occur if the ‘I’ is separated from the ‘you’ or indeed the ‘they’ - that is from those without 
whom the ‘I’ has been unthinkable - for doubtless severe disorientation will follow.554  Who 
becomes this ‘I’ after such a break with those formative relations and what if anything can 
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that ‘I’ still become?  If dependency on those others was once a matter of survival and now 
continues to function psychically as a condition of survival then certain kinds of breaks will 
raise the question of whether the ‘I’ can survive.555  The ‘I’ may undergo radically conflicting 
responses as a consequence of its separation from those formative relations but 
paradoxically only with such a break does it now stand to survive.  Such ambiguous 
relationality demonstrates that the ‘I’ is multiple and not easily separated from those 
relations that made the ‘I’ possible, but the possibility of that break becomes part of the 
history of ‘I’ which ‘actually opens up a liveable future.’556 
 
The crucial difference between those patients requiring a replacement hip for example and 
those requiring a transplanted organ, as I have maintained throughout this thesis, is the 
necessary intervention of a third person, the donor, to alleviate the problems of organ 
failure in most cases.  The ‘I’ is thus blended with the anatomical part/s of an ‘other’ be they 
visceral or mechanical and this raises ethical questions of the value and identity of the 
person, either as patient or donor - for both, bodily integrity becomes an issue.  If the donor 
is not a ‘formative relation’ how does the removal of a kidney for example and its transplant 
into a different body impact on the lives of those affected?  Is there any difference to the 
structure and functioning of the body at some level far beyond merely its anatomy and 
physiology?  Does gender have any significance for transplanting female organs into male 
bodies?  Does the donor grieve in some sense for the organ they have lost?  And what about 
organs grown in pigs or sheep for transplant?  Should we be concerned for the animal?  Of 
course we should.557  But questions remain largely unanswered save for scant anecdotal 
evidence recording transient changes in the form of drinking habits or changes to dietary 
choice and personality.558  In her book The Transplant Imaginary, Sharp comments: ‘Involved 
professionals - be they surgeons, transplant nurses or social workers, or organ procurement 
specialists - invest significant effort in denying the strange uncanny, and troubling aspects of 
organ transfer, a stance facilitated by elaborate forms of rhetorical policing, word play, and 
metaphorical representations that both objectify “fleshy” parts and obscure their troubled 
human origins.’559  That the body is multiple is undeniable, how it is conceived and treated is 
another matter. 
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Multiplicity thought through bodies demands a different kind of conceptualisation than the 
generalities that categorical ideas allow because bodies fail to be general.  Multiplicity itself 
is a language of its own.  It is a hybrid, a heterogeneous mix of the body in a constant state of 
flux.  Could this mean that the body can easily assimilate the transplanted body parts of 
another however?  For the body perceived as a wholistic entity where each anatomical 
system at the particle level is intimately interrelated with every other, transplantation 
becomes problematic.  According to medical professionals, a transplanted organ never truly 
adapts to its ‘new’ environment.560  Multiplicity entails an understanding of change in 
relationship, it is not a ‘disintegration into disconnected manyness.’561  Always context 
dependent, rather than absolute, multiplicity is tied to existence in every way - tied to time, 
space and experience and thus forever changing.  Not static it extends outwards and 
adaptively encompasses a great deal.  Multiplicity breaks with long held concepts of unity 
and oneness, but sits in opposition to the ontological status of stasis prevalent in universal 
monotheism that ‘opposes fluidity, change and partiality.’  As Schneider suggests, universal 
monotheism requires ‘strong claims’ of infinity, inconceivability and eternity in order to 
maintain its universality in a world of difference and particularity.562   
 
The fluid nature of humanity is beyond the one/many divide, opposed neither to oneness 
and unity but limited by both.  Unity does occur in partial and temporal ways.  Without unity 
there would be no possibility of societies.  Functional unity for instance is necessary to 
survive and create meaning.  A human being is a meaningful unity as well as a continuous 
stream of change.  And oneness is significant for each person, impossible to exchange 
because of the uniqueness of elements intertwining and thus contributing to rendering that 
person a distinct identity.  Consequently relating to an other in her own in-exchangeability 
and distinction through categories such as doctor, patient and co-worker is unrealistic.  We 
might define doctors and so on as ‘categories of convenience’, because they compress the 
other distinctions into abstraction and make actual presence meaningless.563  Categorisation 
prompts us to ask - what do you do? - rather than relating meaningfully to the person in our 
presence.  On the other hand to be fully present to the bodies of others, to the body of the 
world, in others words to being fully there, embodied presence breaks open static categories 
of persons and things, or more importantly of persons as things.   
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The epistemological assumptions raised by the concept of multiplicity have profound 
consequences for the language/meaning used in transplant medicine.  A donor given this 
awareness is not merely a donor and neither is the process of donating.  These are complex 
multiple interrelationships sharing certain common characteristics but differentiated when 
the donor having undergone surgery becomes a patient.  Whilst the donor as person is far 
more than medical terminology can either express or the professional might have fully 
thought about, the transition from a participant in the transplantation process to a 
patient/person post-operatively thereby chimes more readily with the transition which the 
patient/recipient/person undergoes when the new organ has been implanted.  The loss of 
information and identity between these diverse positions and ethical interconnections is 
potentially immense.  The question of how transplant procedures have impacted upon the 
donor and the recipient as persons is surely not only extremely valuable for future healing 
and wellbeing in terms of how patients manage their lives, but also for those carrying out the 
procedures in order for improvements in learning, caring provision and subsequent decision-
making to be consolidated.  In short an approach to care seen through the lens of narrative 
appears even more compelling. 
 
According to Schneider, multiplicity is the embodiment of love through a certain god-like 
presence.  Love in the name of multiplicity is temporal, present, embodied, transient, 
creative, and thus ethically instantiated.  It is the result of an intentional presence; an 
encounter that Bonhoeffer describes as authentic and is the very foundation of change when 
people show up openly and risk it all.  It is the possibility of connection and so of becoming 
and thereby is both coming into intimacy and irretrievably passing away.  Bonhoeffer argued 
for authentic encounter as the ‘event’ of divine presence.564  And Buber suggested that 
authentic encounter is recognition that another is not an ‘it’, not even a ‘you’, but a ‘Thou’, a 
presence of absolute worth, utterly in-exchangeable for another.565  This kind of love is the 
being of divinity and so it cannot be severed from the question of ethics - because when it is 
separated we too become separated from ourselves, from others and from the world, a 
world in which we exist and live.  Multiplicity always returns to the fluid, ephemeral 
experience of being present in this world - a being present that is mandated by renewal or 
incarnation.  Witness, accompaniment, protest, comfort, solidarity, the courage to see and 
the courage to sin - the sum total of more than who we are - these ethical stances can be 
understood through the gaze of multiplicity.  Thus ethics understood from the notion of 
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being present cannot be summed up in simple rules but it can be characterised by focussing 
on the presence of and importance of others.566   
 
Utilitarian ethical models such as Principlism built on simplicity of societal norms and mores 
is an economy of identity because sameness becomes the basis for establishing real from 
unreal.  Something therefore is real if it confirms the same as the known.  As Schneider 
maintains otherness or difference especially otherness that cannot be somehow resolved 
into a recognisable frame of sameness indicates an error in knowledge or in judgement 
precisely because by this reckoning otherness cannot be real.  Thus if to be is to be the same, 
Schneider argues ‘to be other is a dreadful loss of existence.’567  Irigaray moves past this 
reasoning to actually think the other as the other, to imagine a rationale that is not bound to 
this universe.  She suggests we do so by ‘thinking the body’ since despite everything we try 
to effect to control, repress, deny, or compress them, bodies do tend to flatly resist oneness 
or simplicity.568  Phrases such as ‘we are all in this together’, or ‘we are far more united, and 
have far more in common than the things that divide us’569 are symptomatic of a reduction 
of thought, and a simplicity which denies the complexity of humanity as multiple.  Within a 
fluid multiplicity, there is no One (as for instance God or indeed any power) against which 
the one can be compared or measured.  And as Rosi Braidotti points out ‘the only constant at 
the dawn of the third millennium is change’ so that the aim of trying to search out a logic of 
multiplicity is not to locate a universal and final closure for thought that will always and 
everywhere successfully resist reduction.570  Multiplicity is not the same as the many.  It does 
not refer to a bunch of separable units - many ones.  Multiplicity results when the ones so 
constitute each another that they come to exist because of one another.  Multiplicity is 
complexity writ large.  The whole is constituted by the parts, but then the parts themselves 
are also constituted by their participation in the whole.  As Jean-Luc Nancy explains: 
 
The One as purely one is less than one; it cannot be, be put in place, or counted.  
One as properly one is always more than one.  It is an excess of unity; it is one-with-
one, where its Being itself is co-present. 571 
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In other words a ‘pure’ one is logically/mathematically impossible because as such it implies 
no other, no relation and therefore can neither be ‘seen’ nor counted since counting 
requires the defining presence of others. 
 
Medicine and otherness  
 
Whether being ill or giving care, act without judgement on your body or the body before you: see it 
and know it only as what is, as much divinity as dust, part of a cosmos you can trust.572 
Marcus Aurelius 
 
Medicine involves a deep appreciation of ‘the other’ of otherness.  Part of the remit of 
physicians concerns how to encounter patients who are radically different in the material, 
intellectual and spiritual conditions of their lives for they differ in the choices that express 
their values.  The doctor and the patient may not share the same values and since these are 
so embedded in human being, difficulty arises in imagining how each could find their own 
individual values compelling.  In such an instance dialogue potentially breaks down and 
either disagreement or the diminishing of trust ensues. 
 
What would it mean for physicians to practice identification with the ill?  How the physician 
conceives of the patient would shift surely, and part of that shift would be a corresponding 
change in how physicians imagine themselves.  Mikhail Bakhtin links any understanding of 
the other with an understanding of the self.573  For many patients, the standard medical 
response as they are sat before the physician is not of the person per se, but rather a 
question of patient attributes, beginning with vital signs, moving through diagnosis and 
treatments and finally the possibility of a social history consisting of family status and 
employment.  Recall however that multiplicity entails that she exists only in relation to ‘I’ and 
thus who she is depends on who I am, as I address myself to this other.  Thus to talk about 
people, not with them closes some passageway that ought to remain open.  The patient is 
after all a person with all the attributes personhood entails.  Identification with the ill is not a 
burden added to what physicians already bear: it potentially lightens what they must bear.  
Since people exist on the boundary with others, ‘who am I?’ is always changing in response 
to ‘who are you?’ - our identities can never be stable.  Identification with anyone means, 
paradoxically, recognising that they are perpetually not identical to what I believe them to 
be, for instance in a specific role that defines them as ‘ill’.  For Bakhtin’s trope of the moral 
                                                          
572 Chase, M., (1998) (trans) The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 




life there is ‘no final, finalizing discourse that defines anything once and forever.’  No last 
word can be said about this you, whose horizons of possibility remain open.  ‘As long as a 
person is alive, he lives by the fact that he is not yet finalized, that he has not yet uttered his 
ultimate word.’574   
 
Patients grow through others’ embodied dialogues with them, how others touch them, 
speak with them and stimulate their senses.  Their capacity to outgrow emanates from 
between themselves and others, not only from within.  Patients remain unfinalised even in 
disagreement so long as others sustain dialogical relationships with them.575  Speaking with 
the other, not about her, is one way to recognise the unfinalisability of the other.  Speaking 
about shuts down the dialogical interplay reducing communication to monologue.  Most 
physicians are taught monological medicine.  According to Bakhtin the doctor is the one 
cognitive subject in the consulting room and the patient is the object for that cognition.  
Thus he asserts that physicians discover for themselves that this model doesn’t work for 
them personally.  Identification with others requires giving up such a stance.  Dialogue on the 
other hand creates the possibility of becoming a person: 
 
Everything that pertains to me enters my consciousness, beginning with my name, 
from the external world through the mouths of others (my mother, and so forth), 
with their intonation, in their emotional and value-assigning tonality.  I realize 
myself initially through others: from them I receive words, forms, and tonalities for 
the formation of my initial idea of myself… 576 
 
Frank observes that the physician often feels the monological authority of being the single 
unquestioned voice.577  The patient feels the monological passivity of having this other 
pronounce their truth.  But healing requires an equality of input to the discussion.  For the 
patient, the physician’s healing presence lies in her dialogical capacity to take raw and 
solitary words of pain and suffering and, dropping the tone of professionalism, express those 
words through a human voice, creating something new between them.  For the physician, 
the patient’s healing presence elicits a new response to the question ‘Who am I?’ that 
understands ‘I’ as coming to be for the first time as the subject of the patient’s address, 
which is the patient’s face - her vulnerability.578  For Irigaray that ethical relation will be 
represented by the question, ‘Who are you?’ which seeks to cross the difference that divides 
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the doctor from the patient, but not to cross that difference through a substitution that 
presupposes the equivalence and interchangeability of their positions.  In other words ‘Who 
are you?’ is the definitive question for the doctor.  In crossing that divide, it seeks to know 
what is different, but to know it in such a way that what is different is not assimilated or 
reduced to the one who wants to know.579 
 
Bakhtin uses suffering as his example to propose a different way to understand how people 
relate to each other.  Like Irigaray, he does not believe in the ‘exact passive mirroring or 
duplication of another’s experience within myself.’580  Recall that Broyard did not expect his 
doctor to suffer with him for instance.581  So long as ‘suffering with’ is understood as 
mirroring or duplication it isn’t possible, but a dialogical suffering with is.  Instead Bakhtin 
proposes a different way to comprehend how people understand each other.  The other’s 
suffering as co-experienced by me is in principle different from the other’s suffering as she 
experiences it.  This distance cannot be bridged.  But between them a completely new 
interrelationship can be developed.582  There can be a co-experienced suffering that is not 
the same as that which either person individually experiences - consciousnesses do not 
merge but exist as a new formation, a new wave I would suggest that is available, as a space 
of consolation, between self and other.  In contrast, agony is being locked within, unheard 
and unmoving.  Going to the space of co-experienced suffering can be consolation.  The 
doctor who creates this alternative space of co-experienced suffering does not pretend to 
know what the patient is going through.  Rather she allows the patient access to the space of 
what they are going through together, the space that doctor and patient can create in the 
limitations of illness. 
 
Dialogue in a medical setting 
 
Individual experiences brought to medical meetings and procedures will have significant 
input into the decision-making process and the prognosis of the patient.583  Symptomatic of 
the traditional way that some professionals deal with patients is exemplified by a BBC 
Breakfast TV article broadcast in September 2017, when a hospital doctor discussed how he 
dealt with traumatic incidents at work, admitting that he just got on with the job at hand and 
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dealt with the emotional outcomes post-trauma subsequently.  Thus finalising of interaction 
and discourse becomes a real issue.  Charon argues that many health professionals are 
uncomfortable around emotion and uneasy when the medical interview is not crisply and 
evidently focused on the physical problem at hand.584  They structure the conversation as it 
unfolds by interrupting the patient so that she furnishes only medically relevant information.  
And Howard Waitzkin reasons why interruption and finalising might occur: ‘the story may 
not contribute to the doctor’s cognitive process of reaching a diagnosis; the patient’s version 
of the story may be confusing or inconsistent; telling the story may take more time than is 
perceived to be available; or parts of the story may create feelings that are uncomfortable 
for the doctor, the patient, or both.’585  The point is that stories that are uncomfortable are 
all the more reason for them to be narrated, otherwise the interrupted voice remains 
silenced and the self as suffering proliferates.  Genevieve Lloyd suggests: ‘It is a matter 
rather of seeing everything that happens - whether it be grand or unbearably petty, as 
integral to the being of a self which, if it were to recur at all, could do so only in its 
entirety.’586  Whether the story is uncomfortable or not for illness stories to be worth 
listening to there is a mutuality of responsibility that is new both to illness experience and to 
medicine.  This entails discovering the truth in the narrative and telling that truth.  The 
physician equally must be the witness and take the complementary responsibility for 
receiving the story.  It requires the patient to tell the physician not what they want to hear 
but what the patient knows to be true because they have lived it.  Since the story is known 
already within the body, truthful recounting allows the ill person to begin healing by 
reclaiming their own self. 
 
Illness stories are told by bodies that are themselves living testimony.  Others have the story 
as content, but only the ill person herself can be the story that is the fullness of the 
testimony and what that testimony demands.  Illness stories require the interplay of mutual 
presences: the listener must be present as a potentially suffering body to receive the 
testimony of the suffering body as embodied teller.  The disease that sets the body apart 
from others becomes, in their story, the common bond of suffering that joins bodies in their 
shared vulnerability.  As Charon remarks: ‘wounded people may be cared for but as 
storytellers they care for others.  The ill and all those who suffer can also be healers.’587  
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Their injuries or diseases become the source of the potency of their stories.  Through their 
stories they create empathic bonds between themselves and their listeners.  However, 
seriously ill people are wounded also in voice.  They need to recover the voice that their 
illness in effect takes away.  The voice speaks the mind and expresses the spirit, but it is also 
a physical organ of the body.  The mystery of illness stories is their expression of the body; ‘in 
the silences between the words, the tissues speak.’588  What we reveal through silence or 
story is the deepest level of the self. 
 
The philosopher Hilde Lindemann Nelson argues that being fully human requires ‘the ability 
to reveal through [one’s] actions who [one] is as a person,’ a revelation she calls ‘normative 
self-disclosure.’589 For her moments of normative self-disclosure are moral moments.  In 
these moments like it or not, what we do reveals who we are; the values we uphold and how 
well we hold them up becomes evident to ourselves and to others.  As we see others react to 
this self-disclosure, we come to know ourselves.  Normative self-disclosure thus requires 
dialogue; the person who we see ourselves revealed to be is seen most fully in others’ 
responses to us.  However, self-disclosure that dialogue makes possible can be impeded 
when some people refuse to accept others as partners in dialogue. 
 
Principal among damaging conditions is others’ unwillingness to hear stories in which 
storytellers place their actions within worthy, significant moral frameworks, treating others’ 
actions as indicative of a less than fully mature human consciousness.  Those treated in this 
way Nelson suggests develop an ‘oppressive identity’ - that is they are oppressed because 
their identity is rendered oppressive to them.590  They are finalised.  Thus they are 
humiliated before they have acted - before the story has begun, because they have 
internalised other people’s stories about who they can and cannot be.  Medical patients 
acquire oppressive identities when others cut off their telling of stories.  In these stories 
people living disrupted lives seek to place their experience within significant moral 
frameworks.   
 
As the philosopher Charles Taylor remarks: 
 
Our identity is partly shaped by recognition, or its absence, often by misrecognition 
of others, so that the person or group of people can suffer real damage, real 
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or  
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demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.  Non-recognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone 
in a false, distorted and reduced mode of being.591 
 
Jodi Halpern, a physician, believes that the primary question lies in how not to think with the 
other’s story, it is how to think with your own story.  The other’s story is merely the trigger 
for an ethics of reflexive monitoring for both patient and physician.592  Thus the moral 
moment occurs when we who imagine ourselves as a single cognisant judging ‘I’ must decide 
whether to give equal weight to the other cognisant ‘Is’ around us.  We acknowledge, or not, 
that the very possibility of our self and thoughts has always depended on others.  And thus 
we enter into dialogue or not. 
 
Without dialogue however, Bakhtin suggests: 
 
[Dialogue] is not the means for revealing, for bringing to the surface the already 
ready-made character of a person; no, in dialogue a person not only shows himself 
outwardly, but he becomes for the first time that which he is - and, we repeat not 
only for others but for himself as well.  To be means to communication dialogically.  
When dialogue ends, everything comes to an end.  Thus dialogue by its very 
essence, cannot and must not come to an end.593 
 
A medical moral moment inhibited by cutting off dialogue renders both the patient and the 
physician unheard, unrecognised and unremembered.  Escape from dialogue is also critically 
an escape from oneself with a consequent hiatus in the process of healing.  A physician’s 
responsibility therefore is not only to diagnose and treat patients’ diseases but also to 
witness patients’ attempts to understand themselves as morally responsible despite their 
dependence.  Narrative ethics cannot offer people clear guidelines or principles for making 
decisions as a result.  Instead what is offered is permission to allow the story to lead in 
certain directions - without prescription.594  Speaking about and speaking with is what many 
physicians fail to truly understand.  Testifying to illness as a communicative body may be an 
individual moral choice, but this testimony implicates a wider social ethic.595  
 
Due caution must be exercised in doctor/patient relationships however.  Medicine and 
therapeutic work generally are especially at risk of committing symbolic violence because 
professionals in these fields speak with an authority deriving both from their expertise and 
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their claim to be acting in the patients’ best interest.  People come to doctors because they 
want their medical problem made better, cured or improved - they seek this type of 
authority.  It becomes all too easy for professionals to forget that authority is two-way and 
patients also want to be respected for who they already are.  For doctors it is easy to see the 
patient’s need or lack, move to some remedy or solution and miss their ‘face.’596 
 
For Levinas, the basis of dialogue is a relationship of otherness, sufficient difference and 
distance so that there can be space between two.  Levinas refers to this distance as non-
contingent otherness or alterity.597  Alterity does not depend on contingency or any 
agreement of when and where someone is born or what life choices she makes.  Alterity is 
an intrinsic quality of being human.  It precedes such specific differences: 
 
It is not because your hair is unlike mine or because you occupy another place than 
me - this would only be a difference of properties or of dispositions in space a 
difference of attributes.  But before any attribute, you are other than I, other 
otherwise, absolutely other!  And it is this alterity, different from the one which is 
linked to attributes, that is your alterity.598 
 
Levinas believes that to infringe on the other person’s alterity is to commit violence against 
the other.  Symbolic violence comprises the often subtle ways that alterity is challenged.  
Such violence claims to object to specific choices and decisions, but the objection shifts from 
the choice to the person choosing.  It is the violence of telling people that they should not be 
who they are, or that they fail to understand who they ought to be. 
 
Levinas’s ethic begins with seeing the face of the other - the other’s vulnerability and 
weakness.  Seeing the face often begins with the empathic imagination of how the other 
feels, but empathy risks the symbolic violence of telling the other how to feel better.  Alterity 
as such is not opposed to empathy or to feeling better for that matter, but empathy as an 
end in itself can be dangerous to alterity.  Empathy tends towards unification: either my 
projecting what would make me feel better onto you, or my fusing with your suffering.  
Alterity is the opposite of unification with the other.  Seeing the face of the other requires 
respect for alterity: a recognition that there are aspects of your suffering that can never be 
imagined or touched.  It is that difference which makes dialogue possible, however it is also 
what makes dialogue difficult, simply because the other is the other.  Emotional pain is one 
such instance for it is a pain that frequently exceeds any physical suffering, making it difficult 
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for a patient to express their needs.  The patients’ emotional pain is what sets them apart 
because in fact they are apart.599   
 
Like Levinas, Frank, believes that within a medical setting alterity with its demand for 
specification and explanation risks finalising discourse and thereby closing it down.  To 
specify a person’s alterity is to assimilate them into a unifying voice that claims to explain 
them.  In the unity of that explanation there is no space for unexplained difference: so 
difference - along with the patient - evaporates, and therefore is explained away.  Alterity is 
not ineffable - it is not that of which it is impossible to speak.  Alterity turns into symbolic 
violence of finalising the other when it reduces personhood to some set of inherent 
properties that explains the patient as a problem and why that problem could not be 
solved.600  Human moral essence is people’s acute ‘sense of their own inner unfinalizability’, 
their capacity to outgrow from within and to render untrue any finalising definition of 
them.601  The significance of care and compassion that leads to identification with the ill and 
disabled, respects this capacity to outgrow especially when the potential for growth can 
seem limited.  Speaking with a patient not about them, entering that space between the 
patient and medical professional in which both remain other, but in which each offer 
themselves to be changed by the other, is a sounder basis for a considered approach to 
caring. 
 
Medicine and the ethics of care 
 
Richard Zaner’s observation of individuality in patient care substantiates the thesis that due 
caution should be paid to an ethics of care model created either along utilitarian or 
deontological criteria that would once more lead to a static framework and remove the 
important focus on the individual.  And equally a model that is in danger of echoing the 
perceived problems associated within the Principlist bioethical framework devised by 
Beauchamp and Childress.  The fluid, porous nature of humanity that is the theme of this 
thesis demands an approach commensurate with a wholistic interpretation of life.   
Zaner explains: 
 
Wanting to know and wanting to be cared for are thus special appeals through 
which the person seeks recognition, affirmation and appreciation of this singular 
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person she is or hopes to be.  To want to be cared for, in this deeply personal sense, 
is to want fundamentally to be this self in the presence of those who take care of her 
precisely in her vulnerability and suffering.602 
 
John Reeder believes that care begins in the love of particular persons.603  Goods and evils 
are not necessarily allocated within a utilitarian sense of impartiality, since choice can 
intervene.  If the metarule ‘do no harm’ is brought into play it does not necessarily follow 
that bias is ruled out.  Thus care may be partial, weighing the good of some more than 
others, yet still aiming within these parameters to do the most good or least harm for those 
affected.  For Reeder care has its own reasons.  Love for one’s country can sometimes 
conflict with love for family, for example.604  Perhaps it is better to say that various 
constitutions of care have different distributive remits.  To understand what is happening we 
have to look and see and also listen and hear. 
 
Caring involves a firm disposition to account for the unique position of the patient in receipt 
of such care.  It is similar to though distinct from the value of beneficence.  Both involve a 
focus on advancing the ‘good’ of the patient.  A good ascertained by the involvement in the 
care process of the patient’s story.  However beneficence can be a detached paternalistic 
value.  A beneficent health care provider may strive to make a rational, objective decision 
about what is best for the patient or for those similarly situated medically.  In contrast an 
ethic of care stresses that a caring response is determined for each unique patient within 
that patient’s particular network of relationships and given their unique needs and desires.  
The response is ‘tailor-made’, customised. 
 
Careful sorting out of personal experience, partly through the construction of a narrative of 
that experience, is a means to better understanding the moral dimensions of medical care.  
According to Ruth Smith when responding and listening are understood to be key to 
bioethics, ethics itself is re-formed as an activity that is always located, always linguistically 
structured in particular ways and always in flux.605  Space and location are significant for they 
influence the manner in which moral action takes place.  As an experience of the senses, 
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place tells us ‘where we are equivocally and unequivocally as we make our way around.’606  
Place reaches out for the senses that extend further experiences of association, memory 
images with their familiarity and shock aspects ‘that may or may not take on the shape of 
narrative with a beginning, middle or end’.  The point here is that spaces considered outside 
of the medical arena are morally significant for both medicine and ethics since spaces 
actively reconfigure in varying ways moral notions of self, knowledge, action and place 
entailed in any one instance of events that happen to occur or not.  Every moment of 
decision never stands alone; it is invaded by all others that brought people to a place they 
find themselves in that moment.  Thus the influence of multi-vocality cannot be 
underestimated.  Morality shifts and turns and re-forms elsewhere, immediately moving us 
on to where we have never been before, to a place that was not even a ‘where’ before that 
moment.  Medical ethics is not the scene of the application of thought, medical ethics is an 
activity that cannot be identified with one kind of person, one kind of speech and one kind of 
space, because such identifications produce ethical criteria that may work to the detriment 
of patients as part of the ‘good’ being done.607  The question is how to work with what is 
going on for the patient.  The question that haunts every day of extended illness and raises 
every kind of question of living and dying is a territory much too large and bumpy to be 
limited to the practices that have dominated much of medical ethics and moreover ethics 
itself. 
 
Smith argues for a messier, more complex view that is not summarised by a principle or rule.  
For her ethics is highlighted by such human characteristics which involve saying, being or 
doing, that indicate the uncertain character of moral landscapes and discourses and the 
place of morality in action.608  Ethics is slippery and thereby traditional moral codes are 
called into question as an adequate way of describing moral activity in situations in which so 
much is unknown.  Margaret Walker elaborates the idea of context through narrative, 
arguing that ethicists who work in healthcare are better understood as architects of moral 
space than as masters of normative law and code.609  As a participant in a narrative, the 
ethicist helps design a way for things to happen through negotiation and mediation in the 
conversational space where different people meet.  Looking out for moral interaction takes 
place not apart from but amidst the process of design. 
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Diana Cates and Paul Lauritzen believe that focussed attention itself reliant on an acute 
engagement with affective influences is not only fundamental to care but also to 
mutuality.610  Within the context of mutual care individuals are best able to reflect on their 
moral responsibilities toward others when in touch with their own emotions, and are able to 
discern what should be done for others on their behalf.  For Noddings an ethic of care is 
motivated by an emotion-laden need to ‘remain in the caring relation and to enhance the 
ideal of ourselves as one-caring.’611  By contrast Andolsen612 in agreement with Pellegrino613 
asserts that medical professionals have a duty to provide competent care that flows directly 
from their claim as professionals to have mastered a unique body of professional knowledge.  
Such an understanding however is not encompassing enough.  Surely the moral ideal of 
caring integrates positive emotions with a commitment to care that results in caring actions.  
The ideal of caring is of professionals who convey generous, compassionate and warm 
concern for patients who are entrusted to their care.  
 
On the other hand, care also challenges ethics to assess realistically the ambiguity of caring 
as a positive affective state.  Caring requires taking into account issues with ‘difficult’ 
patients.  We hear frequently in the press of ambulance personnel and emergency unit 
doctors and nurses being attacked.  Thus there seems to be a complex relationship between 
morally admirable caring and positive affective states.  It is too simplistic to suggest that 
professionals have somehow failed to fulfil their moral duty if that so-called ‘warm-response’ 
is not forthcoming.  Noddings argues that it is the prior recognition of the other as worthy of 
care and a firm commitment to act in order to promote the good of the one cared for that 
are particularly important in an ethic of care.  She maintains that one of the most important 
experiences in human life is the experience of being cared for in a loving way.  Her depiction 
of the moral agent naturally attracted to the ideal of the self as a caring person fits closely 
with the professional and social ideal of the medical profession.614  And Helga Kuhse 
proposes ‘caring … is not primarily concerned with tasks and processes, but is a mode of 
being …a stance or attitude towards the object of one’s attention.’615 
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Abraham Verghese’s account of ethics is not to establish a backdrop for moral action but to 
explore and analyse how players transact situations of medical ethics at the stage of 
disease.616  Thus morality would include activities that expand moral traits to include respect 
and compassion together with assistance and courage, resistance and solidarity.  For Carter 
Heyward com-passion is a way of being in touch with others, a way of being connected; it is 
our passion with one another.  Compassion is a gift of our genuine involvement in one 
another’s lives.  ‘It is a radically relational blessing’ in which we realise that our own best 
interests and those of others coincide.617  The root of compassion is humility.  And if our 
humility is real, it is our embodied knowledge that our lives are connected and that no one of 
us is more or less human, greater or smaller than another.  Humility engenders empathy and 
tenderness among us and makes possible our emergence as compassionate people.  The 
public shape of our compassion is solidarity - standing with those who suffer.  We do not tell 
them what’s best for them, nor expect them to know what’s best for them; we stand with 
them in mutual relation, trusting that each has something valuable to contribute to all and 
that in mutual relation, their wellbeing and ours are inextricably linked.  It is   at its most 
pure.  It is an open invitation into right relation.618  Mutuality is our shared experience of 
power in relation.  By it we are called more fully into becoming who we are - whole persons 
with integrity, together.  ‘It is a calling forth, an occasion to touch each other’s lives, and an 
open invitation into the healing of common woundedness.’619  Loving is difficult however 
because learning to share our com-passion requires from us ‘revolutionary patience’ with 
one another, not renunciation of ourselves or others.  It takes a great deal of time and love 
for us to learn how to let go of our senses of separateness, isolation and self-control and risk 
not only reaching out to touch others but allowing ourselves to be touched deeply by 
them.620   
 
In hospitals, at the bedside where it counts, a health care system is people touching each 
other.  Everyone who touches anyone affects that person’s healing and affects the further 
demoralisation of medicine - or it remoralisation.  In the moral moment of that touch, there 
is no system.  Care can only be a relationship, a dialogue that may not only be of words but 
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of touch.  As one technician has put it ‘remember, everyone who touches you affects your 
healing.’621  Touching and being touched is fundamental to human being.  According to Frank 
in a clinical setting a life has been touched in so many ways and often by people who seemed 
indifferent to patients’ healing.622 
 
Elizabeth Wolgast asserts that modern organisational life has proliferated a style of being 
human that transforms a moral relationship into an administrative problem.  The 
responsibility of professionals is thus to carry out policies and to that end they are 
encouraged not to worry whether they ‘injure their moral souls’ by acting as they are called 
to act.623  In this vein, care can denote a quantity of services expended not a moral response 
of one person to another.  It becomes an allocation, increasingly determined by forms of 
management.  Care derives from the state, professional and private corporate organisations 
that reach into clinics and hospital rooms through multiple avenues.  As Wolgast states: 
‘Moral ambiguity…stems in part from the fact that those receiving the orders are in the 
circumstances of action while those issuing them stay at a distance.’624  The nurse or 
physician is face to face with the patients, while those determining conditions of treatment 
remain at a distance.  The orders include how much time can be spent with a patient, which 
patients will be referred to specialists and how long they will wait for appointments.  In 
these or other matters the nurse or physician is required to be an artificial person, speaking 
in the name of management.  Yet professional and personal ethics require responding to this 
face before them, accepting the obligation the face demands.  The key is to understand that 
the needs of the patient must be balanced against the good of the community of patients 
without losing sight of the face of each individual.  In 2017 with ever increasing costs in the 
NHS and ever-decreasing time and resources this is a tall order.  Medicine today comprises 
an unthinkably broad array of knowledge and skills, professions, coalitions and interest 
groups, fears and promises, fantasies and soon-to-be realities, concrete and virtual 
institutions.  Parts of this array enter people’s awareness and other parts affect them outside 
of that awareness.  The context if medicine is to have any meaning at all is crucial.  Stories 
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Communities of care 
 
This, then, is the basic pattern of caring, understood as helping the other grow: I experience the other 
as an extension of myself and also as independent and with the need to grow; I experience the other’s 
development as bound up with my own sense of well-being; and I feel needed by it for that growing.  I 




The training of doctors to listen and read signs of suffering beyond the medical symptoms is 
vital to patient outcomes.  Evidence has shown that the patient’s own understanding of the 
meaning of their illness interpreted through narrative is significant in activating the process 
of healing.  Furthermore long-term, patient prognosis has the potential to be far more 
positive and far less pressing on time and financial constraints that have continued to trouble 
medical professionals and institutions well into the twenty-first century.  In short although 
consultants would benefit from hearing patient stories to underpin their decision-making, 
they are afforded little time to engage in lengthy patient appointments that are not 
considered directly salient to the medical case.  Management of narrative if it is to be both 
useful for the medical professional and significant for patients’ continued wellbeing requires 
alternative means by which meaningful patient input may be included to enhance and make 
more robust the decisions taken which will deeply affect the rest of their lives.626 
 
Recipients and donors are assailed by a diverse range of highly technical information that 
potentially is bewildering at the very least and possibly frightening at difficult moments in 
the donation/transplantation process.  Tests for both donor and recipient extend for about a 
year according to NHSBT and the mean time for kidneys is just over two years before 
transplant takes place.627  What happens in the intervening period is of significance for 
future prognosis.  Patients die while on the transplant/organ waiting list.628  Suitable organs 
are not always forthcoming for various medical reasons even when available, thus recipients 
are sent home and expected to ‘wait for the phone to ring’ with little guarantee of a 
transplant after a possible protracted length of time.  It is equally not unusual for this 
situation to occur more than once.  Relatives all too often have to ‘pick up the pieces’ after 
many a disappointment and maintain a positive supportive and hopeful outlook throughout 
the waiting period.  It would seem important therefore that some further medical support 
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through this ‘agonising’ wait would not only be appropriate but also fundamental in 
reassurance and the kindling of hope and faith that things can turn out as anticipated for 
those concerned.   
 
Healing as becoming or being made whole again is a much larger and more complex concern 
than we ordinarily assume when we think of such sharply delineated therapies as medication 
or surgery.  Much of this often-ignored complexity consists in the understanding that many 
of the ways we foster healing are communal in nature.  For those communities integral to 
the healing enterprise, trust is crucial.  The threat to the patient’s integrity in illness is 
diffuse, giving rise to vulnerability on several levels and the possibility of the loss of self.  
Zaner captures this point when he writes  
 
With these telling glimpses of loss and death, illness confronts the person with what 
and who she is, was and hopes to be, with finality.  Wanting to know and wanting to 
be cared for are thus special appeals through which the person seeks recognition, 
affirmation and appreciation of this singular person she is or hopes to be.  To want 
to be cared for in this deeply personal sense, is to want fundamentally to be this self 
in the presence of those who take care of her precisely in her vulnerability and 
suffering.629 
 
Even when a condition cannot be fully restored and life becomes a different kind of ‘normal’, 
importance is attached to the greatest possibility to resume or sustain prior roles and 
relationships, restricted minimally by bodily dysfunction or discomfort.  The broader view of 
healing as regaining wholeness puts into larger context the patient’s dis-ease, when other 
dimensions of the patient’s situation are accounted for, prompting professionals to consider 
the fuller significance of the patient’s particular problem. 
 
Thus care as in caring for someone refers on the most basic level to being well disposed 
toward the one-cared for and provision of the means to carry out that caring.  As most 
commentators have argued, there is an attitudinal and affective dimension supported by 
action to caring.  Paul Camenisch believes one further dimension - the modal dimension - to 
be equally important.  It refers to the manner in which professionals carry out their activities: 
on the one hand with due attention, precision and deliberation - that is carefully - or on the 
other casually, indifferently and perfunctorily - in other words care-lessly.630    
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Primary amongst those who have the potential to transform the sick, vulnerable and often 
lonely, into a comforted, well cared for and already healing person are often the various 
people, besides the medical professionals, who drop by to offer support and caring at the 
greatest time of need.  Each bring a very individual and personal form of care that grows out 
of the carer’s identity and style and out of the relationship between the patient and the 
visitor.  Members of the community in which the patient is involved such as church, family 
and friends, serve to maintain the vital link to the community when sickness renders the 
patient alone and feeling isolated.  As Camenisch argues an association of people who are 
like-minded and share functional interconnections share commitments to each other and to 
certain valued tasks and goals, values that make community members who they are as 
personal, moral and even spiritual beings.631    
 
Although patients primarily look to technical care from the medical professional community, 
it is from the personal communities that the wider variety of needs is frequently addressed.  
Visits, the sending of cards, support for the family of the patient, together become the very 
important anchor that the patient needs to maintain their identity as the person they are and 
significantly to engender levels of trust, despite the havoc that illness has wrought upon 
them.  In recalling the possibility of the connection between wholeness and health, 
potentially the patient who is experiencing a threatening situation who can truly trust her 
care-givers, I argue, has already achieved a kind of wholeness, including a realistic 
acknowledgement of the illness state.  Equally an assessment of her resources and options 
confirmed through dialogue and narrative, fosters a cohesiveness of self despite the 
fragmentation illness brings, and gives rise to the patient’s permission to place herself 
trustingly in the hands of others.  Camenisch agrees that the patient ‘riven with doubts and 
uncertainties…and pulled in various directions simultaneously by competing hopes and fears, 
obviously suffers from a lack of wholeness at some level.’632 
 
Charon terms extended patterns of relationships ‘communities of care’.  Multi-vocality as 
suggested by Frank633 and de la Bellacasa634 are pivotal in deepening care relationships that 
are necessary for the patient to continue the healing process long after hospitalised medical 
treatment has stopped.  Interestingly many hospitalised patients themselves gather together 
those close to them locally - relatives, friends, doctors and nurses they trust and so on to 
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form their own support groups, even where none exists formally.635  Communities of care 
have proven invaluable over the years in many different organisations to the benefit of those 
in particular experiencing the lengthy process of donation and transplantation both pre- and 
post-surgery.  Valuable stories telling the deeply felt experiences of all concerned are useful 
emotional support.  Through access to authentic patient stories, medical professionals stand 
to gain from a deeper understanding of the experiences of those involved in accessing their 
care.  Potentially change in treatment protocols will be created in such a way as to progress 
skills that will ‘hold out the promise of a set of solutions to the hobbling isolation and 
divisions that currently plague and weaken medicine.’636   
 
However, illness or disability poses a threat to moral participation in the world.  People who 
are ill or disabled have problems staying in ‘networks of participation’ and participating on 
terms that are meaningful to them and are recognised as meaningful by others.  The body in 
trouble causes patients to be fearful.  Nancy Mairs, a sufferer of multiple sclerosis observes 
this fear as ‘[having] visions of enduring life at the hands of strangers; refused food or drink, 
shoved roughly into bed, allowed to slip from my wheelchair and abandoned in a puddle of 
my own urine.’637  Her fears however extend beyond the risks of institutionalisation.  The 
body is the vehicle for dialogical engagement with others and as it becomes more troubled, 
the very same moral paralysis that is her deepest fear is realised.  A friend of mine who 
underwent a total liver transplant (a very rare procedure) admitted that on waking after 
transplant surgery, cried because he realised he had survived such a serious procedure.  But 
subsequently was disheartened to learn that he had become diabetic.  At the same time he 
confessed that he would have loved to sit down with his doctors and discuss what ‘having 
someone else’s liver in my body means to me.’638  We need to ask deeper questions about 
the longer-term benefits of listening to patient stories. 
 
Mairs places care ‘at the heart of moral experience’ equating ‘downward’ care with failure to 
recognise the person being cared for as a moral presence, not a body in which the human is 
currently absent.  ‘Beyond cheerfulness and patience, people don’t generally expect much of 
a cripple’s character.  And certainly they presume that care, which I have placed at the heart 
of moral experience, flows in one direction, “downward”: as from adult to child, so from well 
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to ill, from whole to maimed.’639  The asymmetry that is inherent in much medical care 
means that care cannot be mutual in a material sense, but each party to a relation of care 
can imagine the other as having something to contribute to the needs of the world.  Bridging 
the gap between understanding patient needs for caring and compassion and praxis, 
requires moving forward in a different way for there to be any progress in putting the 
patient at the forefront of the medical enterprise - there needs to be a paradigm shift in the 
nature of how medical care is managed.640   
 
Institutional medicine provides multiple alibis for not entering into relations of care.  There 
are it seems many good reasons for truncating care, for circumventing or indeed finalising 
other people.  All these reasons are real in the sense that they reflect the actual demands of 
medical practice.  But these reasons are also unreal because in the interpersonal moment of 
practising medicine anyone can act differently.  The real question is whether any of the 
reasons for truncating or circumventing care are good reasons.  Do they create a medical 
practice that can be a template for the relations of care we want to prevail in a moral 
society?  Do they reflect rather medicine’s treatment of its patients as what Martin 
Heidegger describes as ‘objects on call for inspection, subordinates to the orderability of the 
clinic?’641  Stephen Lammers calls for teaching the patient something about the limits of 
medicine as a discipline believing that a moral agenda should begin where medicine stops.642  
Care should go beyond eradicating disease to caring about what sort of moral person a 
patient will become through their own experience of disease to enable patients to think 
beyond the person they have been.  
 
Evidence has shown that illness is a thick concept that includes the different social, cultural, 
communal and often psychological repercussions of the disease, and the ways the patient 
and their various communities perceive and respond to those dimensions of the patient’s 
situation.  As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 contemporary highly-tech medicine and 
moreover practitioners, have become so influential in the choice and delivery of the care 
required that ‘the rest of us feel like untutored and largely helpless lay-people…while the 
real action occurs in the surgical suite or other highly specialized, even exotic settings.’643  
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Yet accounts of traditional healings show that community involvement in care and support 
are crucial to the patient returning to the community whole.644 
 
Current communities of care such as transplantation groups generally set up and run 
through specialist hospitals are clearly an important source of information and support for 
patients and their relatives pre- and post-surgery, so too is the team of transplant co-
ordinators.645  Being patient led in many cases, these support groups have a significant role 
to play in dispelling some of the fears and fantasies that frequently accompany patients 
throughout their illness.  Critically patients have opportunities to be given time, to be 
listened to and reassured at stages when they feel the most ill at ease.  The sharing of 
information informally in a group of like-minded people, some of whom may have extended 
experience of the effects of transplantation medicine in allaying fears, may prove to lower 
costs and result in greater efficiency in outcomes in the long run, reducing the time for 
instance before a further transplant becomes necessary.646  
 
However, further questions need to be raised concerning the impact of siting communities of 
care within hospital environments.  According to Smith, place and context participate in and 
exercise considerable influence on the manner in which morality is implemented.647  A 
predisposition to denote space as a determining category that controls fundamental 
conditions of existence and meaning is a tendency in working practice within institutions 
especially within medical organisations.  A further inclination is to consider place as a 
determining category of the inertia within which no motion/change is possible.  Both of 
which naturally run counter to the understanding that bodies, be they organisations or 
human are dynamic, fluid and porous in essence, whether this is understood or not.  Any 
ethical framework is bound by such practices that inevitably will result in a limited view of 
the position of individual caring and the benefits that might accrue from a change of 
perspective. 
 
The place of context is problematic.  In supporting narrative theorists Frank and Charon, 
Smith argues that accounts of context are accounts of relations and so are active and not 
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passive.  They do not simply describe but attempt to persuade in terms of what merits 
acknowledgement and what does not.  Any notion that context is prior to morality she 
maintains suppresses moral arguments and perspectives that are themselves only available 
through considerations of the context in which they are debated.648  What passes for an 
appropriate narrative within transplant medicine has already been demonstrated by the 
variety of sanitised patient accounts of the successful outcomes of their procedure.  The 
marketing of such accounts through hospital and NHS websites are placed solely to 
‘advertise for’ organ donation in the hope of increasing organ supply.  More interesting 
however is the annual British Transplant Games involving living donors and transplant 
recipients that are run explicitly to demonstrate ‘the benefits of transplantation whilst 
increasing public awareness of the need for more people to join the NHS Organ Donation 
Register and discuss wishes with their families along with bringing together the transplant 
community to celebrate the gift of life.’649  Furthermore, each year Organ Donation Week is 
run as a marketing exercise to recruit donors.650  It’s a mixed bag of initiatives that hitherto 
has not produced anything like the increase that will unseat the long-held ratio that for every 
patient who has a transplant three patients die on the waiting list. 
 
Hospitals have become businesses with all that entails - effectiveness and efficiency in terms 
of finance and working practices therefore override the original caring intentions of 
medically associated organisations.  Organ transplantation is a ‘gold standard’ procedure and 
amongst the most expensive of treatments offered by hospitals specialising in such surgery 
and long-term care.651  It is surely time to consider how patients understand and 
communicate how their illness has transformed them as people by helping them to begin the 
process of taking responsibility for their own continued wellbeing.  Narrative has been 
proposed as a way forward for improved prognoses in the alleviation of suffering and its 
influence on healing illness and dis-ease.  Taking responsibility for personal health and 
wellbeing and lessening the time spent in doctors’ surgeries and hospitals is advancing at a 
pace with modern technological devices installed in the home.  Such progress will change the 
face of ethics as the blurring of the boundaries between technology and the body becomes 
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increasingly prevalent.652  Now more than ever support for each other in circumstances of 




It is important that doctors identify with their patients.  Time to listen and not finalise the 
patient in her attempt however haltingly to represent her illness as she sees it and think 
things through beyond the ‘norm’ of treatment protocols to reach into the needs of the 
patient have been shown to be paramount to recovery.  Such action restores faith and hope 
in the realisation that we are multiple beings, that to treat a diseased part of the body only is 
to ignore the impact on the rest of it.  That dialogue, listening, hearing, looking and seeing 
are infinitely more complex than a case history can ever represent.  It would benefit patients 
greatly when voices are heard of those faced with a long wait for an organ, or those who 
have received the prognosis of a grim outcome to their illness.  They may be assisted with 
suitable treatment and care if all the facts are known across the medical team involved so 
that their lives may be as purposeful as possible within the limits of their illness, even in the 
event that nothing can be done for them.  Patient input is not only beneficial to their 
progress and understanding but also to others who find themselves in a similar position, and 
to those responsible for their care.  More importantly if multi-vocality is to have any power 
in progressing and delivering change within bioethics, it is right that the wider community 
involved is given the opportunity to voice their individual approval or concerns.  As stated in 
Chapter 3, bioethical perspective underpins the law that has far-reaching consequences for 
us all.  With advancing technology and the merging of the body with both human and 
synthetic prosthetic parts, the urgency of examining progress in this area becomes crucial.  
As Gawande suggests ‘I’m more and more convinced that the power’s going to come from 
how human beings and automation come together.’653 Who will assume responsibility when 
things go wrong?  The discussion in Chapter 8 now turns to reflect speculatively on how the 
value and definition of the body will be transformed by the continuing relationship between 
and assimilation of humanity and advanced technology and how care might be integrated 
into aspects of human and non-human life in the twenty-first century and beyond. 
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Posthuman Bodies -  





This chapter turns full circle to the notion of the body discussed in earlier chapters and 
addresses the central issue of how the process of the fusion of technology with the body and 
its functioning will have impact on future bioethical approaches.  The discussion is positioned 
here not only because it encapsulates the ideas put forward in the Introduction and 
Background, but one glance at the Timeline in the Appendix shows just how far behind legal 
and ethical matters lag in contrast with technological progress.  With today’s rapid 
technological advances, bioethics and the law surely need at least to keep pace.  Thus it is 
both timely and vital to consider potential issues and future options for progressing 
alternative bioethical approaches.  Concepts including the nature and status of living matter; 
the fusion of the body with technology and non-human parts; the positives and negatives of 
biotechnological development; hybridity and the blurring of ethical boundaries and notions 





We are moving rapidly towards the merging of our ways of life with science and technology 
that inevitably will require a different perspective on human being or indeed becoming.  It 
will involve us in myriad ways, whether we are sick or healthy, primarily in reshaping the 
meaning of humanity.  The discussion in this chapter therefore considers the idea of the 
posthuman as a metaphor for progression towards the development of any ethical input 
concerning the body and the nature of being in general and within the medical profession in 
particular.  Such contemplation, albeit speculative (for we are not there yet) is timely, since a 
glance at the Timeline in the Appendices reveals just how far behind Acts concerning bodily 
matter become written into law in comparison with biotechnical progress.   
 
Devising new social, ethical and discursive schemes of subject formation to match the 
profound transformations of technology we are undergoing will become increasingly 
pressing.  Biotechnological advances potentially will change the form, function and meaning 
of the body in diverse ways with the result that learning to think differently about ourselves 
could be challenging.  In other words increasingly we will need to think critically and 
creatively about how we wish humanity to be seen in terms of who and what we are actually 
in the process of becoming.  Braidotti makes the point that the posthuman predicament 
rather than seen as a negative step is an opportunity to empower the pursuit of alternative 
patterns of thought, knowledge and self-representation of the body.654 
 
In turning to a central theme in this study, it is noteworthy that remarkable advances have 
been made in transplantation procedures over the last fifty years including: technology to 
keep solid organs more stable pre-surgery; elective ventilation; maintaining blood flow and 
control of the temperature of hearts pre-transplant for improved organ assimilation; the use 
of 3D printers for body parts and progress in keyhole surgery for faster and greater success 
in recovery for both donor and transplant recipients.655  The use of pigs and sheep to grow 
kidneys for human transplant, in the hope of lessening the impact of a shortage of organs for 
transplant for instance, is estimated to be available in 2019/2020.656  These advances 
certainly raise significant normative questions. 
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Gene splitting, mitochondrial splicing and stem cell interventions are the focus of continuing 
research projects and medical usage.  Indeed further progressive techniques are already 
possible but not yet harnessed, the use of advanced neural network techniques in robotics 
for complex decision-making is one such example.657  Robots are already used in industries 
such as car manufacture to provide car body parts more accurately and efficiently in a cost 
saving exercise that replaces sections of the workforce.  Moreover a number of organisations 
are implanting chips in the wrists of their employees in order for them to gain access to 
various items of equipment: to open security doors, log into printing equipment; log into 
sensitive data and so on.658  And even more mind-boggling - fast food in China can be paid 
for through face recognition, with just a smile.659  In short the use of digital and advanced 
forms of technology is intimately connected to the everyday running of our lives.  The 
question for bodily becoming is not whether such potential is acceptable - although this is an 
important issue, it is rather more critically a case of how we manage the use of such 
technology in the twenty-first century and beyond.  The question remains however of what 
an ethical approach to care will look like given the immense concentration of effort in 
creating technical artefacts of such sophistication and complexity.  The ideal of perfection, 
precision and efficiency remains foremost in every imaginary field and the issue of care and 
concern for the effects such technology will have on humanity is considered technologically 
as secondary. 
 
The nature and status of living matter 
 
According to Braidotti et al the ideal of bodily perfection as ‘the measure of all things’ is 
represented in Leonardo da Vinci’s universal model of Vitruvian Man that upholds a 
standardised view of what is human about humanity.660  It sets standards not only for 
individuals but also for their cultures.  Subjectivity as a civilisational ideal has been equated 
with masculinity, consciousness, universal rationality, and self-regulating ethical behaviour, 
whereas otherness or difference is regarded often as its negative counterpart.  In so far as 
difference spells inferiority, it acquires essentialist connotations for those who get branded 
and reduced to the less than human status of disposable bodies.  In short feminist ideals 
have been at best sold short or more likely suppressed or ignored.  We are all humans, but 
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some of us are just more mortal than others.  Braidotti suggests that such a restricted notion 
of what counts as human is one of the keys to understand how we get to a posthumanity.661 
When Foucault published his ground breaking critique of Humanism in The Order of Things 
the question of what, if anything, was the idea of ‘the human’ had set the anti-humanist 
agenda for an assortment of political groups.662  Individualism he argued is not an intrinsic 
part of human nature but historically and culturally specific, and shown to be increasingly 
problematic.663  Irigaray many years later argued that the philosophical and ethical stance of 
Humanism is neither an ideal nor an objective statistical average or middle ground, pointing 
out that the allegedly abstract ideal of Man as a classical symbol of humanity is exclusive.664  
It spells out a systematised standard of recognisability, of sameness by which all others can 
be assessed regulated and allotted to a designated social position.  And Vron Ware 
comments that such a standard as categorically and qualitatively distinct form the 
sexualised, racialised, naturalised others, results in passing off entire categories of human 
beings as devalued and therefore disposable others; to be ‘different from’ means to be ‘less 
than.’665  Structural ignorance about those who, by being others, are positioned outside of 
major categorical divides in the attribution of humanity in many public institutions remains 
prevalent it seems.666 
 
Change is necessary in order to engender inclusivity and reframe the otherwise limiting 
readings of humanity which those in positions of authority and power have traditionally 
fostered.  Thus systems of scientific validity, ethical values and representations that support 
restrictive forms of power, in the name of inclusivity would benefit from being 
deconstructed and dislodged from a belief in the natural foundations of socially coded and 
enforced difference.  Julia Kristeva in her book Strangers to Ourselves advocates the need to 
open up the ‘others within’ the social framework in such a way as to ‘re-locate diversity and 
multiple belongings to a central position as a structural component of subjectivity within 
diverse cultures.’667  She believes that power formations not only function at the material 
level but are also expressed in systems of theoretical and cultural representation, political 
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and normative narratives and social modes of identification.668  Thus it would seem that a 
more complex and relational subject is required, framed by embodiment, sexuality, 
affectivity, empathy and desire as core qualities and a profound understanding that power 
can be used as both a restrictive and productive force.  
 
For posthuman concepts to be validated a departure in scientific thought from the 
categorical distinction between the given (nature) and the constructed (culture), which has 
hitherto enjoyed widespread consensus, is vital.  Posthuman thought resists such a binary 
opposition having been superseded by the non-dualistic understanding of the interaction 
between nature and culture.  This consequential blurring of boundaries, paradoxically, 
results from the effects of scientific and technical progress.  As Braidotti argues the common 
denominator for the posthuman condition is an assumption about the vital self-organising 
and yet non-naturalistic structure of living matter itself.  Matter, including human 
embodiment is intelligent, it is not dialectically opposed to culture, nor to technological 
mediation, but continuous with them.  And so the nature-culture continuum is the shared 
starting point for reading and redefining matter through posthumanity.669  It is a speculative 
approach to bodily perception that has profound and wide-ranging implications for the 
future of bioethics in research.  Sharp believes that ‘it is a concerted attempt to uncover 
what scientists themselves think they are doing as a means, in turn, to inspire them to reflect 
more broadly and deeply on the complexity of what is at stake as they toil away in the 
seclusion of their laboratories.’670 
 
Matter and new materialisms 
 
Keller and Mary-Jane Rubenstein suggest that the new materialisms ‘currently coursing 
through cultural, feminist, political and queer theories seek to displace human privilege by 
attending to the agency of matter itself.’671  New materialists argue that matter, far from 
being passive or inert acts, creates, destroys and transforms, and thus is more of a process 
than a thing.672  Diana Coole and Samantha Frost write ‘matter becomes rather than matter 
is.’673  Calling on quantum ideas, general relativity, complexity theory and non-linear biology 
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to posit matter as mattering, theorists rally against much of what is often denigrated as 
‘mere’ materialism - rejecting the buying of endless unnecessary goods - to reveal ‘the 
vitality of matter’ itself.674  Proclaiming ‘the ontological equality of every discrete thing’ 
theorists affirm the epistemological strength of quantum argument that actual entities are 
multiplicities, assemblages, hybrids, intra-actions, complexities and viscous porosities.675  All 
terms which take their expression from quantum insight that each cell, organism and proton 
is irreducibly composed of an intra-active host of others.  And this fundamental alterity holds 
for humans as for everything else.  In this vein Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari state, ‘Each 
multiplicity is symbiotic; its becoming ties together animals, plants, microorganisms, mad 
particles, a whole galaxy.’676  And William Connolly proposes that the focus is on ‘our 
entanglements with heterogeneous entities and processes in a world in which humanity 
matters immensely.’677  Humanity matters for good and for ill from the perspective of the 
vast variety of nonhuman beings composing the life of the planet.  As Donna Haraway 
reminds us, ‘To be one is always to become with many.’678  In other words, we are entangled 
beings, and entanglement from the perspective of quantum concepts shows that all 
tangibility entails an infinite alterity, so that touching the other is touching all others, 
including the self.  According to Karen Barad, although we bring vast histories and habits, we 
bring them for the sake of an entangled becoming.679 
 
The relatively new attention to matter touches on deep levels of meaning.  Beginning ‘first 
agents’ which are the simplest biochemical systems in which we can distinguish ‘teleology’, 
Philip Clayton and Elizabeth Singleton discern each living thing as a network of intentions, 
environments, adaptations, communications, toxins, nutrients and porosities.680  In 
agreement with Barad they reveal living matter’s primordial entanglement with meaning.  
This systemic bio-semiotics entails therefore an ‘ethic of embodied responsibility.’681  After 
all, to recognise living beings as valuable, not simply in themselves but rather as participants 
in the entire system of life; bonded by networks of bodies and objects, and collectively 
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composing the interdependent biosphere through and in which anything that lives, lives, 
Barad suggests: 
 
[Is] an ethics of entanglement [that] entails possibilities and obligations for 
reworking the material [configurations of] the past and the future…it is not the case 
that the past - a past that is [allegedly fixed and] given can be changed - contrary to 
what some physicists have said, or that the effects of past actions can [thereby] be 
fully mended, but rather the ‘past’ is always already open to change.  There can 
never be complete redemption [in the sense of a full restoration of the way it was], 
but spacetimematter can be productively reconfigured, as im/possibilities are 
reworked.682 
 
In taking quantum field theory Barad explains that there is an important sense in which the 
eternal/infinite does in fact operate within and through matter in its very constitution and as 
a constitutive alterity.  The infinite touch of nothingness is threaded through all 
being/becoming, a ‘tangible indeterminacy that goes to the heart of the matter.’  Matter is 
not only iteratively reconstituted through its various interactions, ‘it is also infinitely and 
infinitesimally shot through with alterity.’683 
 
Equally Abhinavagupta’s theories of the entanglement of consciousness and matter lead to a 
reconsideration of the nature of the body.684  Not simply inert matter, the body’s parameters 
shift in this formulation to afford the status of ‘body’ with the mutuality of matter and 
consciousness.  That is his conception of the body incorporates both materiality and 
reasoning entwined together, understood as the subtle body.685  The subtle body is 
fundamentally made of matter, yet it links with consciousness that extends its capacities 
beyond the physical body.686  Invisible to sight even though it is connected to the five senses 
and is itself sensible, it is the subtle body that transmigrates from life to life for those various 
Indian philosophies that affirm re-birth.  In contrast the Western concept of soul - as a 
permanent and unique individual essence - is problematic for certain Indian philosophies 
that support the notion of the soul that outlasts the physical body, a soul which is subject to 
its own transformations and becomings.  Lorilai Biernacki argues for this unfamiliar map of 
the body as helpful since it allows us to gather unexpected and useful new formulations of 
the relation between body and mind.  Maintaining that the subtle body particularly 
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‘demonstrates a permeability in its ontological characterization, entangling both 
materiality/body and consciousness as productions of ritual performance.’687  
 
A significant posthuman development clearly comes from studies of science and technology.  
The pride in technological achievements and in the wealth that comes from them does not 
prevent us from seeing the great contradictions and the forms of social and moral inequality 
provoked by our advanced technologies.  What is striking about science and technology 
studies is the high degree of neutrality expressed about the posthuman predicament.  
Researchers Nicholas Rose, Sarah Franklin et al, however tend to dismiss a revised vision of 
the subject, they make it clear that the focus of their research is analytic, aiming to achieve a 
better, more thorough understanding of how new technologies function.688  For them, 
subjectivity is out of the picture and with it goes a sustained political analysis of the 
posthuman condition.  However, analytical attempts to moralise technology and sideline 
experiments with new forms of subjectivity neglect the current state of autonomy reached 
by machines.  A focus on subjectivity is necessary because this notion enables us to string 
together issues that are currently scattered across a number of knowledge domains.  Issues 
such as norms and values, forms of community bonding and social belonging as well as 
questions of political governance assume and require a notion of the subject.689 
 
Biotechnological developments as ethically problematic 
 
Coole and Frost maintain there is something unprecedented about our contemporary 
situation in which the prefix ‘bio’ proliferates.690  Molecular biology and its equivalents are 
achieving the sort of privileged status previously reserved for theoretical physics, fuelled by a 
revolution in biomedicine and biotechnology.  This in turn is propelling an unprecedented 
range of issues concerning the nature and status of living matter and defining what we see as 
a major development in the concept of materialism.  In life sciences as well as in physics 
material phenomena are increasingly being conceptualised not as discrete entities or closed 
systems but rather as open, complex systems with porous boundaries.  Such theories 
challenge earlier distinctions between physical and biological systems drawing attention to 
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their interaction and transforming the way scientists think of biological matter and its 
interrelation with social phenomena. 
 
Biotechnological developments that purport to enhance, extend or give us control over the 
hidden depths and minutiae of life have been considered negatively as merely contributing 
to a modern will to dominate nature.  Their negative aspects and their inability to control the 
forces they unleash are also apparent, opening up a minefield of ambiguous ethical and 
political possibilities - bio-disasters such as Chernobyl and biological warfare involved in bio-
terrorism being significant examples.  As both promises and threats such developments call 
us to confront pressing bioethical and bio-political questions about the nature of 
responsibility, the relationship of humans to the world, the very definition of the human in 
relation to the non-human and the way shifting definitions of nature and life affect 
subjective experiences of selfhood.  For while biotechnologies bring new tools and 
procedures for classifying, measuring, monitoring and modifying biological stuff within our 
daily routines, according to Rose so individuals’ experiences of themselves as subjects and 
agents of their own lives are also transformed.691 
 
Questions regarding the definition, the ethical value and the moral and political culpability of 
the human, the non-human and the virtual human become especially problematic since they 
prompt reflection upon who or what should be taken as subjects and objects of ethical, legal 
or political action: they also suggest a need for new ways of reflecting on risk and 
accountability as humans ‘tinker’ more readily in natural processes and thus become more 
materially, if not yet ethically responsible for the outcomes.692  The blurring of clear 
boundaries or distinctions between bodies, objects and contexts is evident in the myriad 
biotechnological and digital technological developments that are changing the landscape of 
the living.  Mind-boggling medical and digital prostheses now enable, enhance and enrich 
our physical and social lives in many ways.  As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
medical and digital technologies have become part of our lives and of who we are.  It is not 
merely the case that more people are becoming something akin to Haraway’s cyborg - a 
fusion of human and technology.693  More radically Katherine Hayles argues that we have 
been jolted out of the realm of the human into the realm of the posthuman and such 
changes have significant implications for our understanding of the human as a distinctive 
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biological or moral entity.694  It is becoming evident therefore that changes in living matter 
are rendering obsolete many of the conventional ethical categories used to evaluate them.  
As scientists succeed in bridging species, artificially creating and extending human life – 
including transplantation procedures, Coole and Frost maintain that the concepts and 
boundaries that are the ground for much ethical and political thinking are muddled.  
Synthetic life forms for example challenge the very conception of ourselves as persons since 
distinctions between intelligent and unintelligent life have prompted crucial efforts to 
distinguish humans from other animals and to justify humans’ instrumental commandeering 
of material resources.695  This raises questions of the kind of ethical value that should be 
attributed to synthetic life forms and according to what criteria. 
 
As evidenced in debates about foetal rights, abortion, stem cell research, the use of animal 
organs to transplant into human bodies, medical, scientific, or religious accounts of the 
boundary between life and death are currently becoming further entangled with issues 
surrounding autonomy and personal decision-making because increasingly the state must 
legislate on matters that were formerly left to God or nature.  Technological questions about 
biological life processes enter the political milieu because the state must frequently make 
decisions about the worthiness of different lives.  Artificially suspending death through 
ventilation in order to preserve organs in a better state for transplantation is one such 
example, since it has obliged legislators in certain countries to alleviate organ shortage and 
thereby redefine death by shifting the final border of life.696  According to Giorgio Agamben 
in the face of this ‘bare life’ that is sustained and controlled by human technologies, nature is 
no longer a reliable guide to the difference between life and death.  Instead the distinction 
becomes a scientific, medical and ‘ethicopolitical’ question.697 
 
Technological control over life and death 
 
Significantly the posthuman digital universe gives rise to its own inhuman variables.  
Manifested by the proliferation of viruses both computer and organic, illness is clearly not 
only a prerogative of organic entities, but includes a widespread practice of mutual 
contamination between organic matter and electronic circuitry.  Thus a rather complex 
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symbiotic relationship has emerged in our cyber universe - a sort of mutual dependence 
between flesh and the machine.  This brings forward some significant paradoxes namely that 
the corporeal site of subjectivity is simultaneously denied in practices of human 
enhancement and in fantasies of escape via techno-transcendence and all the while 
increasing our own vulnerability.  Anne Balsamo argues that digital technology promotes 
dreams of immortality and control over life and death:   
 
And yet, such beliefs about the technological future ‘life’ of the body are 
complemented by palpable fear of death and annihilation from uncontrollable and 
spectacular body threats: antibiotic resistant viruses, random contamination, flesh-
eating bacteria.698 
 
Spiritual death is also part of repositioning humanity.  The currency granted to both legal and 
illegal drugs in contemporary culture blurs the boundaries between self-destruction and 
fashionable behaviour and forces a reconsideration of what is the value of life itself.  Perhaps 
we need to re-think death altogether, the ultimate subtraction, as another phase in a 
generative process, and so we need to discuss more rigorously ways of dying as suggested.699  
Views on death depend on assumptions about life.  Death is the unrepresentable, the 
unthinkable.  Yet paradoxically death is a creative synthesis of the flow of energies and 
perpetual becoming.  Deleuze suggests that to make sense of death we need an 
unconventional approach that rests on the preliminary and fundamental distinction between 
personal and impersonal death.  The former is linked to the suppression of the individualised 
ego.  The latter is beyond ego: a death that is always ahead of me and marks the extreme 
threshold of my powers to become.  Because humans are mortal, death or the transience of 
life, is written at our core: ‘it is the event that structures our time-lines and frames our time 
zones, not as a limit but as a porous threshold.’700  Death is the event that has always already 
taken place at the level of consciousness.  As an individual occurrence it will come in the 
form of physical extinction of the body but as an event in the sense of the awareness of 
finality, of the interrupted flow of my being there, death has already taken place.  We are all 
synchronised with death - death is the same thing as the time of our living, in so far as we all 
live on borrowed time.  Life is passing and so we do not own it; we just inhabit it. 
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The relationship between body and self is thrown into question by the spread of virtual 
forms of embodiment and electronically mediated communities.  Human ontology is 
digitalised, yet if identity is reconstituted as pure data or information as text then the 
corporeal nature of embodiment becomes more problematic.  Elaine Graham believes that 
the absorption of bodily presence into a purely digital embodiment may well suggest the 
effacement of the body, such that participation in cyberspace is necessarily post-
corporeal.701  Thus if persons have no ‘fleshy’ substance in cyberspace, this raises the 
question of whether it is still appropriate or meaningful to link the traditional ideas of 
identity, freedom, agency or community with notions of corporeality or physical space.  The 
issue of the dissolution of the material into the virtual has proven contentious, especially for 
those who regard the immediacy of the body as constituting an ethical imperative.702   
Dan Thu Nguyen and Jon Alexander believe that: 
 
Our virtual life in cyberspace paralyses our bodies.  Cyberspacetime promises us 
liberation from the constraints of space, time and materiality.  However, without the 
experiences of our bodies, our thoughts, our ideas, our ethics and politics must all 
suffer.  We know ourselves and our world mainly because we live and move in the 
world through our bodies.703 
 
Such comments however, depend on an appeal to an essentialist body as any ground of 
ethics.  But any appeal to the body as an uncomplicated locus of identity renders 
problematic advanced medical and digital technologies that displace the givenness of 
corporeality.  
 
Arguably by contrast virtual reality still depends in a residual sense upon bodily 
proprioception and conventions of space movement and perspective transferred from 
embodied experience.704  Far from abandoning the body, forms of virtual interaction retain 
many of the conventions of face-to-face community.  In thinking of emails for instance, the 
emoticon has taken the place of gesture to enhance the comprehension of dialogue.  Thus it 
may be more appropriate to think of cyberspace as a transitional state where the subject is 
both materially and digitally embodied.  ‘The literal body may not be communicated within 
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the net, but it is possible to conceive of a multiplicity of ways of being a virtual body that 
reflect a subjectivity which inhabits many levels of corporeal presence.’705  Virtual 
interactions may simply accentuate the extent to which subjectivity has never been a 
constant.  Thus identity in a cyberworld is fluid and negotiable.  Just as various cybernetic 
and genetic technologies are dissolving the notion that bodies end at the skin, suggestive of 
physiologically and psychologically porous subjects, negotiations with the multiple domains 
of virtuality reveal decentred subjects for whom, as Graham states ‘unitary identity could be 
seen as a cumbersome and irrelevant fiction.’706 
 
The potential of biotechnological developments 
 
Recall the argument in Chapter 2 that human subjectivity cannot be equated with a single 
privileged aspect however, such as mental functioning.  Rather the mind and the self are 
themselves intertwined physically and proprioceptively.  The subject is always an organic, 
technological body in relation, both creative agent and created subject within its changing 
environment.  Therefore technologies need to be seen as co-evolving and intermingled 
agents in the construction of the posthuman.  This view is a shift from technophobia - and a 
view of technology for that matter as monolithic, undifferentiated, beyond human agency - 
towards the reclaiming of technologies as heterogeneous and primary in their capacities to 
mediate the human.  Equally there is no essential body.  The end of the human need not 
necessarily entail a choice between ‘impersonal, deterministic, technologised, 
posthumanism and organic, unmediated, autonomous natural subjectivity,’ as Graham 
proposes.707  Rather it may involve modes of posthumanity in which tools and environments 
are vehicles of, rather than impediments to the formation of embodied identity. 
 
In A Cyborg Manifesto Haraway terms the ‘blasphemy’ of cyborgs as transgressive, hybrid 
creatures who destabilise the very categories on which Western scientific logic depends.  Her 
vision encapsulates a digital, biotechnological age, and how advanced genetic, digital, 
biochemical, cybernetic and mechanical techniques have made possible countless new 
configurations of the organic body through prosthesis, permanent or temporary modification 
and therapies.  Cyborgs inhabit a world simultaneously biological and technological.  As living 
fusions of the human and non-human animal, the human, the mechanical, the organic and 
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the fabricated, they render transparent the ‘leakiness’ of modernity’s boundaries between 
species and categories.708  Haraway’s theorising is thus a patterned vision of how to move 
and what to fear in the ‘topography of an impossible but all too real present’ in order to find 
‘an absent, but perhaps possible, other present.’709 
 
We might say that the cyborg is a handy metaphor for posthuman experiences that defy 
models of technology as a deterministic, monolithic force or as a ‘quick fix’ whose social and 
political implications are somebody else’s concern.  Global techno-science reduces 
everything to an artefact, a thing made not born, while representing nature as primal, 
innocent and independent of human agency.  But what we call ‘nature’ is already heavily 
managed by techno-scientific interests, such that any notion of ‘nature outside of culture is 
not so much elsewhere as nowhere.’710  In other words it does not exist.  It would therefore 
be inappropriate to build an ethic on an imagined organic unity with such a construction, but 
the challenge is to express new forms of relationality that embody affinity and difference but 
not dominion.  Ethically and experientially, the cyborg is a heuristic that suggests the 
rejection of solutions of either denial or mastery in favour of a posthuman ethic grounded in 
participation with non-human nature, animals and machines.  
 
The sense that humans and machines are increasingly assimilated, that human nature cannot 
be realised apart from its tools and artefacts is, according to Graham, a more authentic 
understanding of posthuman ontology in a digital and biotechnological age.  It is also a 
profoundly materialist understanding because it refuses to believe either that ‘humanity can 
retreat to some pure unadulterated human nature independent of the world it makes; or 
that technologies can be exploited to transcend bodily finitude and limitation.  Humanity is 
actually constituted in reflexive interaction - even co-evolution- with tools, environment and 
artefacts.’711 
 
As Richard Doyle argues: 
 
The very success of the informatics paradigm, in fields as diverse as molecular 
biology and ecology, has paradoxically dislocated the very object of biological 
research…This postvital biology is, by and large, interested less in the characteristics 
and functions of living organisms than in sequences of molecules and their effects.   
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These sequences are themselves articulable through databases and networks; they 
therefore garner their effects through relentless repetitions and refrains, 
connections and blockages rather than through the autonomous interiority of an 
organism.712 
 
Posthuman concepts and humanity 
 
Life is post-vital in the same way that humans may be considered posthuman.  This is not a 
shift in life or humanity per se.  It is a shift in our way of thinking life and humanity.  Life has 
been blocked by a narrative of subjectivity that has hitherto held to a model of linear time 
that presupposes categories of meaning based on established representations.  According to 
Manning ‘the becoming-silicon of flesh and the becoming-flesh of silicon point toward not a 
radical change but an enactment of the manner in which the body has always been 
multiple.’713  The concept of posthumanity focuses on the relation between the body and 
embodiment, leading us toward ‘a body without organs’ that engages with the world not by 
means of pre-established limitations, but through an emergent network that overlaps 
prosthetic and organic devices.714  For Hayles ‘the posthuman view thinks of the body as the 
original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with 
other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born.’715  
Bodies exceed our knowledge of them.  Relationally we begin not to think in terms of the 
order of causes and effects, bodily processes and actions.  We compose with bodies.  Bodies 
emerge not only as what they are but what they expressively can become. 
 
Post humanity gives us a vocabulary to think through prosthetics in relation to the senses.  In 
a humanist vocabulary bodies are more likely to be thought of as unified and unique.  The 
posthuman on the other hand takes the prosthesis as a condition of the organism as its 
supplement.  Since the human does not become prosthetic but rather is already prosthetic, 
Hayles writes: 
 
…the posthuman view configures human being so that it can be seamlessly 
articulated with intelligent machines.  In the posthuman there are no essential 
differences or demarcations between bodily existence, and computer simulation, 
cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human 
goals…the posthuman subject is an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous 
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components, a material informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous 
construction and reconstruction.716 
 
The question is of how to think of the body as always already prosthetic.  I am an organism.  I 
breathe, my heart beats, my pancreas controls the sugar levels in my blood, my skin 
regenerates, my brain disseminates waves of information and so on.  But I am also much 
more than an organism.  ‘I breathe a smell that tastes like the morning.  The morning 
reminds me of the texture of the wood of the breakfast table, rough to the touch in 
places.’717  To ‘be’ a body is to become.  To sense is to live beyond the mere organism.  
Sensing is not essential to the organic body.  But without my senses I am not aware of the 
flesh as ‘body.’  It is in this manner that senses are prosthetic; they are in excess of the 
organic, yet they make the organic palpable.  To think the senses as prosthetic invites us to 
explore the surprising pathways toward which our senses lead us.  These movements are 
never direct.  They are interlaced, entangled, have a sense of location and are nonlinear.  In 
fact we cannot know in advance what the body can do.  Biology points toward the 
complexities of bodies in relation.  Biologically even the body is always less that what it can 
and will become and more than what we can imagine or foresee.  A body that is open to the 
processes of individuation is a posthuman body, one that remains ever in the process of 
becoming.  To think of the posthuman body is to open ourselves to thinking about the body 
that exceeds the norm.  ‘It is to begin to engage creatively with what a body can do, with 
what a body becomes.’718 
 
Classical emphasis on the unity of all matter central to Baruch Spinoza’s philosophy has been 
reinforced by an updated scientific understanding of the smart structure of living matter.719  
Smart concepts are supported by new advances in contemporary biosciences, neural and 
cognitive approaches and equally by informatics.720  Posthuman subjects are technologically 
mediated to an unprecedented degree.  A direct connection between Spinoza’s monism, the 
unity of all living matter and post-anthropocentrism could form a general frame of reference 
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for contemporary subjectivity save that division exists in mainstream public debates; the 
posthuman as a concept either overwhelms or engenders anxiety about the excess of 
technological intervention and the threat of job loss or climate change, or inspires elation 
about the potential for human enhancement.  Thus the post-anthropocentric turn linked to 
the compounded impact of globalisation and technologically-driven forms of mediation 
strikes humanity at its heart which consequently shifts too radically the parameters that 
used to define humanity.  The key question is what kind of understanding of contemporary 
subjectivity and subject-formation are enabled by a post-anthropocentric approach?721  How 
we relate to this change of perspective depends to a large extent on our relationship with 
technology.  One of the most pointed paradoxes of our era is precisely the tension between 
the urgency of finding new and alternative modes of political and ethical agency for our 
technologically mediated world and the inertia of established habits.  Donna Haraway once 
wittily remarked: ‘the machines are so alive, whereas the humans are so inert.’722 
 
Scientific advances in molecular biology have taught us that matter is self-organised - 
autopoietic, and monistic philosophy adds that it is also structurally relational and hence 
connected to a variety of environments.  These insights combine in defining intelligent 
vitality or self-organising capacity as a force that is not confined to human beingness but is 
present in all living matter.  Matter is conceived as intelligent because it is driven by such 
informational codes that interact in multiple ways with social, psychological and ecological 
environments.  So what happens to subjectivity in this complex field of forces and flows of 
data?  Braidotti infers that it becomes an expanded and relational self, engendered by the 
cumulative effect of all these factors.723  The relational capacity of the posthuman subject is 
not confined within our species but includes all non-anthropomorphic elements.  Living 
matter - including the flesh - is intelligent and self-organising, but is so precisely because it is 
continuous with the rest of organic life.  
 
Thus the posthuman dimension of post-anthropocentrism can consequently be seen as 
deconstructive.  What it deconstructs is not only the supremacy of the human being, but it 
also rends asunder any lingering notion of human nature as categorically distinct from the 
life of animals and non-humans.  What comes to the fore instead is a nature-culture 
continuum in the very embodied structure of the extended self and a massive hybridisation 
of the species.  This alternative becoming entails the displacement of anthropocentrism and 
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the recognition of trans-species solidarity on the basis of our being environmentally based, 
that is to say embodied, embedded and in symbiosis with other species.  It breaks open the 
division between humans and technology, introducing bio-technologically mediated relations 
as ground for the constitution of the subject.  Thus we need to apply this ‘matter realism’ as 
the foundation for a system of ethical values where life stands central.724  Post-
anthropocentrism displaces the notion of species hierarchy and of a single, common 
standard for ‘man’ as the measure of all things.725  As discussed earlier in this chapter, such a 
standard has been upheld by aesthetic and moral ideals - that is to say the status of man as 
the dominant species whose sense of entitlement includes access to the body of all others.  
The posthuman predicament is such as to force a displacement of the lines of demarcation 
between structural differences or ontological categories, for instance between the organic 
and the inorganic, male or female, the born and the manufactured, flesh and metal, 
electronic circuits and organic nervous systems.726   
 
Posthumanity and an ethical approach to care 
 
According to a report in the Economist - Morals and the Machine - humans will increasingly 
operate not ‘in the loop’ but ‘on the loop’ monitoring working with robots rather than fully 
controlling them.727  Only ethical and legal issues remain to be solved to grant responsibility 
to autonomous machines’ decision-making, while the supposed cognitive capacities are 
already in place.  Should robots be engaged in disaster relief for instance, or tell people the 
truth about the condition of their health thus possibly causing panic and pain?  Such 
questions involve the field of ‘machine ethics’ that aims to give machines the ability to make 
choices appropriately concerning the telling of right from wrong or even sick from healthy.   
The idea of morals and the machine raises some pertinent issues about the degree of 
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This is significant and in contrast to the modernist idea of the robot as subservient to the 
human, exemplified by Asimov’s ‘three laws of robotics’ formulated in 1942.729  A set of 
three laws which interestingly are reflected in Principlist ethics developed some decades 
later, and substantiating an inert rather than creative or fluid idea of morality at the 
everyday level. 
 
We are confronted with a new situation that could make human intervention peripheral if 
not completely irrelevant.  As robots appear to become more autonomous, the notion of 
computer-controlled machines facing ethical decisions is moving out of the realm of science 
fiction and into the real world.  The burning question remains whether machines are in fact 
capable of such autonomy when faced with the nature of soft or subtle problems.  Who or 
what is to decide?  Who or what will be the judge?  Problematic as this may be, the issue 
might rest on the management of advanced technology in terms of a responsibility and 
caring for the outcome of the fruits of such progress; understanding and acting responsibly 
on the kinds of transformation that the techno-body will potentially undergo has profound 
implications for creating a progressive vision of wider humanity - of the merging of science 
and nature-cultures. 
 
What does caring mean when we go about thinking and living interdependently with beings 
other than human, in more than human worlds.  Is it possible to think of care as an 
obligation that cuts across the nature-culture divide without simply re-instating the dualities 
and moralism of human-centred ethics?  How can engaging with care aid in thinking moral 
obligations in human-decentred worlds?  Care offers possibilities for considering 
commitment and obligation as non-normative forms of ethical engagement that could be 
more attuned to the de-centring of human agency and privilege in contemporary 
understanding of techno-science and nature-cultures.  De la Bellacasa argues that the 
problem will be of not falling back into classical humanist categories of thought, but will 
require ‘much speculative effort.’730  According to Sharp, ‘Involved bioengineers often speak 
of the “messiness” of the flesh as what drives them to perfect their mechanical devices.’731  
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And somehow mechanical implants such as heart pumps are ‘imagined as ethics free.’732  The 
reclaiming of care in approaches to more than human worlds established by techno-science 
defies traditional ethical boundaries that have hitherto marked critical thinking.  Following 
the image of care into ‘unexpected country’ of blurred boundaries - moral as much as 
material - requires opening up its possible meanings.733  Relocating caring in more than living 
ecologies will involve discussions of techno-science as knowledge and material production 
interrelated with socio-political processes including those of commodification.  As Barad 
theorises, it is through entangled agencies and practices of matter and meaning that techno-
scientific worlds come to matter.734  It involves thinking about how things could be different.  
It most certainly involves multi-vocality - a focus on protagonists and critics in advancing 
technological artefacts.  It involves how to care about the way artefacts are constructed, 




We might conclude that hybrids are the dominant social and cultural developments that are 
active throughout the social fabric of society.  Technological mediation is central to a new 
vision of posthuman subjectivity and provides the ground for new ethical claims.  Machinic 
vitality is not so much about having inbuilt purpose or finality, but rather about becoming 
and transformation.   
 
The emphasis on immanence allows us to respect the mutual dependence between 
bodies and technological others while avoiding the contempt for the flesh and the 
trans-humanist fantasy of escape from the finite materiality of the enfleshed self.735 
 
It involves a radical distancing from notions like moral rationality, unitary identity, 
transcendent consciousness or innate and universal moral values.  The focus is entirely on 
the normatively neutral relational structures of both subject formation and of possible 
ethical relations. 
 
Posthuman theory cuts to the core of classical visions of subjectivity.  It is about coming to 
terms with unprecedented changes and transformations of the basic unit of reference for 
what counts as human.  The problem remains however that the collapse of the nature-
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culture divide entails the need to devise a new vocabulary, with new configurations to refer 
to the elements of our posthuman embodied and embedded subjectivity.  We also need to 
reconceptualise the relation to the technological artefact as something as intimate and as 
close as nature used to be.  Unlike Hayles, Braidotti in agreement with Manning, believes 
that the technological apparatus is our new milieu and this intimacy is far more complex and 
generative than the prosthetic, mechanical extension that modernity has made of it.736 
 
Our public morality is simply not up to the challenge of the scale and complexity of damages 
created by our technological advances.  This gives rise to a double ethical urgency: firstly 
how to turn anxiety and the tendency to mourn the loss of the natural order into effective 
social and political action, and secondly how to ground such an action in the responsibility 
for future generations.   
 
The human organism is an in-between that is plugged into and connected to a variety of 
possible sources and forces.  ‘The minimalist definition of a body-machine is an embodied 
affective and intelligent entity that captures processes and transforms energies and 
forces.’737  Being embodied in a high tech manner entails full immersion in fields of constant 
flows and transformations.  Thus we need to investigate and experiment with new practices 
that allow for a multiplicity of possible instances of the different lines of becoming.  Lines 
that need accounting for in any ethical representation.  The specific temporality of the 
posthuman subject needs to be re-thought beyond the metaphysics of mortality.  The 
subject is an evolutionary engine endowed with his or her own embodied temporality both 
in the sense of genetic code and individualised memories.  Braidotti advises: 
 
If the embodied subject of bio-power is a complex molecular organism, a bio-
chemical factory of steady and jumping genes, an evolutionary entity endowed with 
its own navigational tools and an in-built temporality, then we need a form of ethical 
values and political agency that reflects this high degree of temporal complexity.738   
 
Such an ethical approach cannot be disassociated from considerations of power.  The 
egalitarianism that is potentially conveyed by the current technological transformations has 
dire consequences for human views of the subject.  Far from being merely a crisis of values 
we are confronted by a formidable array of new opportunities.  They converge through 
different perceptions on a re-composition of our shared understanding of the human as 
species.  But the image of post-anthropocentric thought goes much further in the 
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deconstruction of the subject, because it stresses radical relationality, that is to say non-
unitary identities and multiple allegiances.  As this shift occurs it opens up new approaches.  
It is entirely feasible that technologically mediated post-anthropocentrism can engage the 
resources of biogenetics, epigenetics, telecommunication, new media and information 
technologies, in the task of renewing perspectives on humanity.  ‘Posthuman subjectivity 
reshapes the identity of human practices by stressing difference and multi-faceted 
relationality, instead of autonomy and self-referential disciplinary purity.’739  The posthuman 
predicament enforces the necessity to think again and to think harder about the status of 
the human, the importance of recasting subjectivity and the need to invent forms of ethical 
relations, norms and values worthy of the complexity of our times.  
                                                          














In the Introduction and Background to this study I stated that my aim was to find an 
alternative bioethical approach to the dominant Principlist model developed by Beauchamp 
and Childress taught in numerous medical schools globally.  It is a model that has been 
heavily criticised for its lack of suitability in providing guidance for difficult medical decision-
making.  In order to frame a different approach I concentrated on four interrelated aims: 
firstly to focus attention away from Western approaches to medical interpretations of the 
body, to an alternative model which sees the body as complex – wholistic, meaningful, 
relational and constantly in a state of flux; secondly focused examination of the Principlist 
bioethical framework, which underpins the Western medical approach to healing and care, 
as fit for purpose; thirdly to propose a different approach to bioethics that will support not 
only ethical decision-making but place the unique needs of the patient at the centre of caring 
in medical praxis; and finally a return to understanding the body from an alternative 
perspective as a speculative examination of the recasting of subjectivity and caring.  I 
reasoned that as the blurring of boundaries between bodily existence and ever more 
sophisticated technology continues to evolve apace it will become vitally important to frame 
different bioethical questions and resolutions. 
 
I chose to read the issues in bioethics through the processes of organ donation and 
transplantation primarily because the topic is present-day, but more importantly because 
medical decision-making in this area sits at the extreme limit of the ethical spectrum.  




seen, treated and valued, a specialist area of medicine that I perceived would provide a 
robust example in arguing for an alternative to current bioethical thinking.  Given my views 
on the body, the key question ‘What do we mean by the body?’ became a critical starting 
point, a suitable end point and the pivot for the whole of the study.  
 
I perceived the problem in the Principlist model to be too simplistic in its consideration of the 
wider understanding of the body, basing this supposition on many years of experience as a 
kinesiologist, embracing narrative as a useful tool for accessing the healing process.  
Adherence to the Western medical model that favours an approach to the body as merely 
organic is too narrow and is rendered problematic.  Such a model exacerbates an already 
dualist, reductionist perspective of humanity resulting in restrictive bioethical models 
developed by a number of bioethicists.  The Principlist framework encompassing the four 
bioethical criteria of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice created by 
Beauchamp and Childress rather values rational and intellectual control over medical 
matters leading to norms that are prescribed and limiting.  The key issue lies in the notion 
that different kinds of body and different ways of enacting what it means to be human shifts 
the emphasis to the infinite variability of what bodies can become.  In addressing such fluid 
bodily becoming, it transpired that an incarnational approach offered insights that 
thoroughly underpin the concept of the body that I wished to put forward in challenging the 
Principlist framework.  Arguing for an incarnational approach that reveals our multi-faceted, 
embodied nature, the notion that a failure to love passionately all that we see, touch, taste, 
smell and hear, has significant implications for meeting the needs of humanity’s deeply 
embedded suffering in general but for those who are sick in particular.  Given a fluid 
interpretation of the body and the inherent attributes we all share that contribute to 
healing, restrictive bioethical criteria I believe underplay the kinds of care necessary to 
promote healing and consequent well-being.  I argue therefore that medicine’s limited view 
of humanity supported by simplistic bioethical criteria, have failed to prioritise relationships 
of care as a means for promoting recovery, or engaging with suffering, pain and to some 












Medicine exists to fight death and disease.740  Such a stark reality leads I believe to the 
urgency with which the demand for organs is regarded.  The persistently high ratio of those 
needing transplants compared with those willing to donate, works against medicine’s prime 
reason for existence and precipitates the kinds of discussions, debates and initiatives either 
to overcome problems associated with donation or to promote methods to encourage more 
individuals to donate.  Research into diverse textual sources reveals a plethora of academic 
papers and tomes that address the strengths and weaknesses of ownership of the body, 
trafficking and transplant tourism, payment and altruistic donation, and methods of consent.  
Merely tackling the problems of scarcity feeds into those arguments.  Therefore it isn’t 
surprising that many issues remain unresolved, because the reasons for the shortfall in 
donations are far more complex and interrelated than the piecemeal manner in which those 
topics have been developed and discussed.   
 
Due attention to the areas that have been examined, I felt, might shed some light on the 
difficulties that an alternative bioethical approach would need to take into account.  
Legalising ownership for instance has been put forward in order to offset the possibility for 
misuse of bodily materials for the purposes of financial gain and the global issue of 
trafficking and transplant tourism.  A person’s control over what is done to her body, or its 
parts, is important to her psychological development and wellbeing, therefore some kind of 
legal recognition could purportedly be helpful.  Ownership is considered to deal with ethical 
impasses concerning the lack of bodily materials.  Significantly the potential to ‘invariably 
fuel more and more extreme means of dealing with the deficit...’ remains an issue.741  In 
particular it affects those donors in resource poor settings who are least likely to benefit 
from medical care pre- and post-surgery.  The question lies in whether we ‘own’ the body in 
the sense of a material/saleable possession or whether God is the ultimate ‘owner’, or 
indeed whether we are stewards of the body for the state, at least from a health 
perspective.  The jury is still out on ownership however.  
 
Payment for organs continues to be illegal in the UK.  Certain bioethicists view payment for 
goods and services in general as routine, and question why the sale of organs should be 
treated any differently from the selling of any product.  Arguments against the selling of 
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organs on the open market globally underpin the difficulty in pricing strategies that would 
account for variations in legal policy in different jurisdictions; for the type of organ and 
variability in organ quality; in overcoming black market dealing and transplant tourism.  
Doubts remain concerning moral justification for any system of payment that favours those 
who could pay above all others.  Nonetheless the moral conundrum rests in the trade-off 
between the effects of illegal payment for organs and a legal system of ownership that might 
lessen global trafficking and transplant tourism.742 
 
The lack of organs for transplant results in difficulties particularly associated with obdurate 
and out-dated policy directives.  Firstly the insistence on altruistic and anonymous donation 
and gift giving is a historical position that does not support current facts and practices.  For a 
number of years directed donation has outnumbered anonymous, altruistic donation in the 
UK leading to questions over altruism’s viability.  Given the difficulty of establishing altruism 
as a concept, I would question whether insistence on it is useful.  And anonymity falls into a 
similar category.  Both are overtaken by events.  The fact that directed donation occurs more 
frequently and statistics show on average that fewer than one hundred altruistic donations 
have been recorded for the last five years or more, lends support to my view.  Detaching the 
insistence on altruism from the notion of charitable gift-giving would reduce the anguish for 
those ethical organisations attempting to put in place acceptable incentives for the donor 
that presently are fundamentally sidelining bioethical policy. 
 
Whether it is fair and acceptable for living donors to be financially recompensed for loss of 
time at work and miscellaneous expenses during the run up to donation, is moot.  But 
breaching anonymity seems justifiable since recipients are able to send letters of thanks to 
the donor or their relatives that could be emotionally significant to the healing of all those 
who have been involved.  However, incentives to promote donors a higher place on the 
transplant list for instance, or some form of payment for funeral expenses, would be morally 
questionable since those who do not donate could be disadvantaged.  Any form of payment 
in kind sends out mixed messages.743  Incentivisation schemes generally promote the intense 
focus on the need for organs rather than supporting the donor or the relatives in cases of 
deceased donation in what is a highly complex decision to donate in the first place.  Some 
kind of ‘carrot dangling’ I would suggest is ethically inappropriate.  It doesn’t add to the idea 
that people may regard organ donation as simply a ‘good’ thing to do or not. 
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There is a further but more pressing concern however.  The sanctioning of presumed consent 
is being progressed in Britain after many years of deliberation despite statistical evidence 
from Wales showing a marked shortfall in the annual donation figures, since they introduced 
opting-out legally in 2015.744  Yet the figures for those needing transplant in Wales between 
2015 and 2017 increased.  Although the evidence is still early years, nevertheless the bill to 
write presumed consent into law in Britain is going ahead.  It will affect us all.  The British 
government’s firm belief that many lives could be saved annually by moving to an opt-out 
scheme appears therefore to override current evidence within the UK.  Opting-out or 
presumed consent has been criticised for the removal of autonomy and thus individual 
control over life.745  It runs counter to the principle of protecting patients’ rights to fully 
informed agreement, and it could be argued that it clashes with the prevailing practice to 
involve patients fully in treatment decisions.  Indeed lack of agency is potentially part of the 
very reason why individuals in the UK either do not wish to donate after death, or more likely 
do not think of doing so - whilst believing organ donation to be worthy; each year some forty 
per cent of relatives refuse to give permission for donation after the death of their loved 
ones.  NHSBT have suggested certain procedures that will offset such a high refusal rate and 
have highlighted areas where relatives have given reasons for refusal to permit donation 
after the death of their relative.  I would argue that there are more profound reasons for 
refusal that surely require further research and would test whether presumed consent is 
considered ethically sound or not by the general population. 
 
The substantive conclusion from arguments associated with payment, altruism and 
presumed consent demonstrates the need to disentangle moral arguments from theological 
or significantly political and out-dated historically nuanced debates.  It is critical if 
recommendations are to progress with reliability and confidence that all sides of any 
discussion have been fully examined and more importantly are not unduly influenced either 
by policy precedence or political intervention.746  Such life-changing ethical decisions require 
a variety of voices to be heard in order to account for the interests of those who are likely to 
benefit or not from decisions made on their behalf.  Most assuredly at the very least, the 
input from the experiences of organ recipients, live donors and relatives is vital, and should 
be openly debated in issues that directly affect them. 
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My claim that ethical systems require criteria that reflect the body as fluid, porous and 
replete with meaning, led me to examine Beauchamp and Childress’s contention that their 
Principlist model achieves that purpose.  Given my understanding of the nature of the body 
together with feminist views of multiplicity, compassion and caring, my perspective is 
incompatible with the Principlist model in many ways.  In praxis the Principlist model is 
considered deficient.  Its reputation as a simple ‘tick-in-the-box’ exercise ‘to be gone 
through’ by medical professionals turns out to be a mere process to confirm that procedures 
have been followed appropriately according to prevailing legal and professional statutes.  
Whilst being ‘attractive’ to medical professionals for its simplicity I believe this misses the 
point and leaves the patient vulnerable to complex decisions in which they have been 
afforded limited input.  The distance that exists between the intellectual aspirations of a high 
level ethical model that purportedly underpins medical praxis and the everyday ideals of 
individual’s perceptions of goodness/morality is too great to be practicable.   
 
It is difficult to countenance Beauchamp and Childress’s intransigence over the inclusion of 
personhood within their framework, and its link with ‘common morality’.  Enough evidence 
from diverse sources has confirmed that perception and affect are closely interrelated in 
informing our everyday lives and choices.  Utilitarian values integral to the Principlist model 
result in a consequential loss of individual agency for the patient in general.747  Not to speak 
of a huge loss of information about the patient and their needs.  And claims to any kind of 
universal application do not hold up in the medical specialisms of donation and 
transplantation.  Autonomy has little part to play where choice for recipients rests on 
whether to approve surgery or not, in the organ recipient’s case choice is virtually irrelevant 
and informed choice is so complex that having to rely on professional recommendation risks 
paternalism - the very problem autonomy and informed consent were set in place to 
overcome.  In a climate of advanced biotechnology and a fluid interpretation of the body 
informed consent ‘cannot and should not, aim to be fully specific, or fully explicit.’748  Aiming 
for a communicative transaction between doctor and patient is central in recording patient 
need a prominent place in any medical consent, including permission for organ acquisition or 
transfer in live or deceased donation, since it has implications for the future care of all 
concerned in the process. 
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The criteria of non-maleficence and beneficence are basically not only covered by the law 
but are also integral to the propositions within the Hippocratic Oath, or more often to the 
standards set by individual medical organisations.  Equally, different patients have different 
views about what constitutes a harm or a benefit rendering it difficult to defend principles 
that are considered objectively independent of the patient’s judgement.  Moreover, doing 
‘good’ and ‘doing no harm’ are hard to uphold in medical environments where routine 
invasions of the body exist, often in harmful ways, in the guise of ‘doing good.’  Whilst 
necessary to the medical task, non-maleficence and beneficence appear to add little to the 
power and applicability of the overall framework in protecting patients from malpractice but 
rather would support the medical profession in instances where mistakes have been made. 
 
Patient need is most assuredly undercut in issues of justice in questions of receiving an 
organ.  Justice sits very awkwardly in the Principlist framework as it impacts on autonomy 
rather than being integral to it.  Hence decision-making in allocating an organ/s is 
problematic.  Whilst finance is naturally a consideration, it is troubling that the tools for 
guiding decisions to transplant sit more readily in a business environment.  Applying risk 
assessment or quality of life years to decision-making not only introduces bias and injustice 
by excluding those who don’t fit into the suitability category but rather favours those who 
are perceived as having potentially a long and useful/productive life, whatever that may 
mean.  Such criteria frequently rule out the elderly, very young children, smokers, drug 
users, and in some cases recovering cancer sufferers for example.  Paradoxically however, in 
the case where presumed consent is written into law, these people will have their organs 
removed unless they declare otherwise.  Thus quid pro quo remains questionable. 
 
Fairness and equality are fragile criteria on which to base life changing, life-saving decisions.  
Justice sits beyond the remit of the individual medical professional who has limited control 
over what counts as a virtuous/valuable life and moreover limited control over the allocation 
of financial resources.  For patients, loss of agency is significant when decisions go against 
their expectations of a transplant.  Much evidence exists of the feelings of hopelessness and 
dislocation when transplant is not viable or delayed.  The disappointment and dismay 
together compound both the patient and their relatives’ suffering and in serious cases lead 
to the prospective recipient’s death, a death that might have been avoided through an 





Nevertheless, despite vociferous criticism from a variety of sources, Principlism has proven 
itself by its sheer longevity.  Not surprisingly no other comprehensive method or indeed 
model has been forthcoming as Gillon has confirmed.749  In this vein one might ask whether 
anybody would want to attempt an alternative of such magnitude.  But this is the point.  
Ethics is context driven, messy and imprecise and moral codes become questionable as 
adequate to the task of engaging and dealing with moral activity.  Principlism it has to be said 
however does, in a limited way prop up the medical professional in circumstances when 
litigation becomes inevitable.  Interestingly, it also supports research proposals as Sharp has 
discovered.750  In contrast, the central aim of a bioethical model or approach I believe should 
be to undergird the life-critical decisions medical professionals have to make all the while 
assuring the well being of the patient.  To be fair it’s a difficult ask. 
 
Taking into account the criticisms levelled at Principlism I decided that a complete departure 
from it and any bioethical criteria that might resemble the prescriptive, static models 
developed as alternatives, was necessary.  Access to the source of suffering I believed would 
prove helpful.  Key for the patient is to be encouraged to hold on to the person they are, to 
not lose sight of embodied presence, to embrace illness and make sense of it, and to move 
forward differently but positively within the limits that chronic disease might bring.  In my 
experience, caring involves the skills of listening, touch and intense observation as 
paramount in offering the patient space for healing to occur.  Research confirmed that 
narrative and dialogue are foundational to an approach to caring and to a caring 
environment that enables patients to begin the process of self-healing and reconnection as a 
well and wholistically balanced person. 
 
The lack of pertinent information about the patient as a person rather than the role she 
takes on in the hospital environment - a role confirmed only by clinical case notes and 
histories - is problematic.  Narrative is a means to overcome such a limited role.751  
Maintaining the continuity of the person, rather than the temporary role of the patient, is 
critical.  Narrative fulfils this purpose.  In the process of storytelling the formation of the self 
is reaffirmed, thus in the flow of the story the self evolves and becomes differently.  Rather 
than being stuck in the world of pain and suffering the creative process of storytelling 
enables life for both the medical professional and the patient to move on through reflection 
on ongoing experience.  Narrative of what illness means to patients lends weight to my 
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proposition that medical professionals would benefit their patients in the longer term by 
focusing greater attention on accessing the ‘hidden’ elements of pain as the root cause of 
disease.   
 
In transforming the medical meeting into a dialogue rather than the traditional monologue 
of expert advice, the process of storytelling reveals what ‘good’ might mean to each 
interlocutor and how this impacts on their everyday lives and choices.  The outcome 
ultimately underpins the future care needs of the patient.  The challenge is to recognise that 
not only each participant in the dialogue must be afforded ‘full legitimacy’ in reaching 
workable solutions but their values should be respected too.752  Recognition of the 
vulnerability of the other engenders compassion and empathy necessary to heal suffering, 
and limits paternalistic notions of authority as ‘doctor knows best.’753  Recognition of 
patients as people is essential, otherwise patients become nothing but their illness, become 
faceless.  Facelessness has been shown to lead to lack of trust and increased hopelessness.754  
Thus what we think counts for ethical consideration depends on how it is represented.   
Conscientious sorting out of personal experience, partly through the construction of 
narrative, I believe is a means to better understanding the moral dimensions of medical care.  
Caring and relating are deeply resonant, and responding and listening have been shown to 
be key to bioethics.  Thus bioethics is transformed into an activity that not only takes 
account of the variation in context but like the body, is always in a state of flux, always 
becoming.755  An ethical approach to care is one that stresses a compassionate response to 
each patient given her unique needs and desires.  Care strengthens sustainable and 
flourishing relations, not merely survivalist or instrumental ones.  It is a wide concept that 
includes everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our world and all within.  A 
world in which we share a responsibility to ‘interweave everything in a complex, life 
sustaining web.’756   
 
It is self evident that medicine is on the threshold of mega change, since sophisticated 
technology is shifting the nature of medical praxis in myriad ways.  Progress in organ 
donation and transplantation alone brings into sharp relief the very idea that a 
transformation in the way the body is to be understood or even valued is already underway.  
There is a pressing obligation to think seriously about the ethical challenges such progress 
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will bring.  And we need a method for so doing.  The idea that we are becoming posthuman 
ethical subjects in our multiple capacities for relations both human and non-human is a 
valuable heuristic.  As the blurring of boundaries between fleshy existence and 
biotechnology evolves, the meaning we attach to bodily becoming will have wide-ranging 
repercussions, and will be keenly felt.  Careful examination of those lines of human/non-
human demarcation I believe will open out contentious debates about the nature of matter 
implicating biotechnological progress and necessitating a significant recasting of subjectivity 
and hence bioethics.  As technology advances and transplantation procedures become even 
more sophisticated, such debates will surely render Principlism unsustainable as a 
meaningful model for future bioethical guidance. 
 
What might a bioethical alternative look like? 
 
Creation of a framework of criteria that risks once more being treated as a list of measures 
to be gone through by medical professionals would be retrograde.  However, I am mindful of 
the necessity at least to suggest areas for more consideration.  I propose therefore two 
interconnected strands: a deeper appreciation of compassion, empathy, relationality and 
responsiveness accessed by the process of narrative as emotionally interrelated with caring 
for both the medical professional and the patient; and in praxis wholistic, egalitarian, co-
creative and co-operative treatment.  Together I believe they will offer a more robust 
alternative and represent the means to ‘bioethics in action.’ 
 
In practical terms the key lies in transforming medical meetings into a dialogue that will 
powerfully enhance clinical decision-making.757  Evidence has shown that narrative medicine 
builds trust in the process of listening.  A deeper level of understanding is reached from the 
surfacing of significant material through storytelling that might otherwise have taken 
multiple visits to expose.758  By the same token, compassion and empathy are engendered by 
not finalising the patient - cutting their story short or not engaging with their narrative 
because it doesn’t fit for some reason - but rather listening to their story however difficult 
and time-consuming that may be.  Both experience and research have reinforced the notion 
that the progression of patient’s disease gives rise to alterations in physical and emotional 
states, arguments that indicate the need for continuity of medical treatment particularly in 
chronic illness.  Thus the importance of regular meetings with the same medical 
                                                          
757 Charon, R., (2006) 




professional/team is vital in order to maintain effective intercommunication that will not 
only involve the patient at a deeper level of interrelationship but will inform with greater 
clarity any ensuing decisions around medical treatment and follow-up care. 
 
Limitations of the study 
 
The major criticisms of this study will be levelled at the idealistic manner in which I have put 
forward an alternative approach that I firmly believe resonates with the findings of the 
Francis Report as discussed in Chapter 6.  Those who have commented on my research have 
already voiced thoughts on how my proposals might well play out, particularly in terms of 
finance, and the management of resources.  Pushing boundaries however is imperative for 
introducing change that will keep pace with current progress.  With luck it propels people 
into thinking differently and provokes action of a different kind.   
 
The National Health Service is already under extreme pressure to fulfil its purpose through 
measures to cut costs all the while providing a high level of free access to care at the point of 
delivery.  The trade-off between the business end of medical care and response to the needs 
of the individual patient as person I am suggesting will prove difficult in the short-term.  
Limitations aside however, medical progress is advancing apace and whilst this is a blessing 
in one sense, it has important implications for issues of personal responsibility that will 
require teasing out.  It may be that a form of Hippocratic Oath will be considered mandatory 
in the future, as certain responsibilities for care are devolved to the individual patient and 
accountability for treatment is rendered unclear when monitoring of health through medical 
technology installed in the home increases.759  This will impact upon any bioethical model 
already in existence and any model developed in the future.  Changes to the tissue laws are 
inevitable.  The challenge will be in careful management to prevent paternalistic anomalies 
from creeping in.760  As greater technological control over health monitoring becomes 
established in the longer term, the prospect that this will free up time for the medical 
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Contribution of the study  
 
This study is unique in establishing an alternative view of the body that resonates deeply 
with the interrelationship of narrative and care in providing a robust, integrated ethical 
approach.  It will enhance medical caregivers’ recognition of the complexity of treatment 
decisions and enable them to deal with everyday ethical dilemmas with greater clarity.  In 
direct contrast to the static Principlist model, it is an approach that I believe will be flexible 
and fluid enough to encompass the changing needs that new technologies will bring.  It 
focuses attention away from the vicissitudes of a dualist interpretation of humanity, and 
from historical, legal and political opinion that have long worked against change, to a 
position that serves, I hope, to confirm the patient at the forefront of medical care.  
Moreover, in so doing such an alternative approach I believe rekindles much needed trust 
and faith in medical processes to the benefit of medical professionals as well as patients, 
enabling everyone to move forward to heal and flourish.  
 
That said the purpose of this study was to create an alternative space in which to 
contemplate what a change in ethical approach to patient-centred healthcare might look 
like.  However, the impending watershed of further technological progress in ever more 
sophisticated methods to preserve life, will transform the myriad ways in which medicine is 
delivered.  The blurring of science and nature will require a different approach to bioethics, 
so that the need to develop ethical norms and values that reflect a fluid view of humanity 
and morality ‘worthy of the complexity of our times,’ will be even more pressing.  This will 
entail further research as technological progress plays out.  The proposed approach 
contributes to the way forward and is flexible in seamlessly allowing for future 
enhancements.  Its value lies in prompting future bioethicists to resist looking back to static 
interpretations of morality that eschew the inexchangeable individual and risk underplaying 
the nature of the body, as fluid, wholistic, meaningful and relational. 
 
Directions for future research 
 
The ethics underpinning posthumanity is a very exciting area for future research.  The 
potential undoing of the traditionally conceived nature of humanity is imperative for coming 
to terms with the future in new fundamental ways.  This will mean the posing of vital 





Areas for future research that could prove worthwhile, include: the management of 
biotechnology in medicine and research; investigation of the ethical norms and values of 
organisations who develop and manufacture prostheses and robotics; an ethnographic study 
into the effect on care that advanced technology will engender, and a further study into the 
means to garner authentic patient views on its effects through future communities of care, 
and how those views will be disseminated; the training of all medical professionals in 
narrative medicine and appropriate counselling techniques leading to a revision of the 
medical curriculum; and finally research into the kinds of bio/ethical approaches that will be 
necessary to prevent forms of post/humanity from falling into the trap of gendered norms 
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Autografts are the transplant of tissue to the same person. Sometimes this is done with 
surplus tissue, tissue that can regenerate, or tissues more desperately needed elsewhere.  
Examples include skin grafts, or vein extraction.  Sometimes an autograft is performed to 
remove the tissue and then treat it or the person before returning it, such as stem cell 
autografting and storing blood in advance of surgery. 
 
Allograft and allotransplantation 
An allograft is a transplant of an organ or tissue between two genetically non-identical 
members of the same species.  Most human tissue and organ transplants are allografts.  
Further medical intervention in the form of immunosuppressants is needed in allografting to 
prevent organ rejection. 
 
Isograft 
A subset of allografts in which organs or tissues are transplanted from a donor to a 
genetically identical recipient (such as an identical twin).  Isografts are differentiated from 
other types of transplants, while they are anatomically identical to allografts, they do not 
trigger an immune response. 
Xenograft and xenotransplantation 
A transplant of organs or tissue from one species to another. An example is porcine heart 
valve transplant, which is quite common and successful.  However, xenotransplantion is 
often considered an extremely risky type of transplant because of the increased chance of 
non-compatibility, rejection, and disease carried in the tissues of porcine or bovine donors.  
 
Split transplants 
Sometimes a deceased-donor organ, usually a liver, may be divided between two recipients, 
especially an adult and a child.  This is not usually a preferred option because the 




In patients with conditions such as cystic fibrosis where both lungs need to be replaced, it is 
a technically easier operation with a higher rate of success to replace both the heart and 
lungs of the recipient with those of the donor.  As the recipient's original heart is usually 
healthy, it can then be transplanted into a second recipient in need of a heart transplant. 
                                                          
761 Information for this appendix is taken from various sources: 




Another example of this situation occurs with a special form of liver transplant in which the 
recipient suffers from a disease where the liver slowly produces a protein that damages 
other organs.  The recipient's liver can then be transplanted into an older patient for whom 
the effects of the disease will not necessarily contribute significantly to mortality. 
This term also refers to a series of living donor transplants in which one donor donates to the 
highest recipient on the waiting list and the transplant centre uses that donation to facilitate 
multiple transplants.  These transplants are otherwise impossible due to blood type or 
antibody barriers to transplantation.  The ‘Good Samaritan’ kidney is transplanted into one 
of the other recipients, whose donor in turn donates his or her kidney to an unrelated 
recipient.  Depending on the patients on the waiting list, this has sometimes been repeated 
for up to six pairs, with the final donor donating to the patient at the top of the list.  This 
method allows all organ recipients to get a transplant even if their living donor is not a match 
to them.  In February 2012, the last link in a record 60-person domino chain of 30 kidney 
transplants was completed in the USA.  
Paired and pooled transplants 
 
Donor-recipient pairs who are incompatible by antigen type or blood group and are unable 
to donate directly are registered in a national scheme to achieve compatible transplants with 
other pairs.  When two pairs are involved this is termed paired donation.  When more than 
two pairs are involved this is termed pooled donation 
 
ABO-incompatible transplants 
Because very young children who are generally under 12 months, but often as old as 24 
months do not have a well-developed immune system, it is possible for them to receive 
organs from otherwise incompatible donors.  This is known as ABO-incompatible 
transplantation. Graft survival and patient mortality is approximately the same between 
incompatible (ABOi) and ABO-compatible (ABOc) recipients.  While focus has been on infant 
heart transplants, the principles generally apply to other forms of solid organ 
transplantation. 
Limited success has been achieved in ABO-incompatible heart transplants in adults, though 
this requires that the adult recipients have low levels of anti-A or anti-B antibodies.  Kidney 
transplantation is more successful, with similar long-term graft survival rates to ABOc 
transplants.  
Transplantation in Obese Individuals 
Until recently, patients labelled as obese were not considered appropriate candidates for 
renal transplantation. In 2009, the physicians at the University of Illinois Medical Centre 
performed the first robotic kidney transplantation in an obese recipient and have continued 
to transplant patients with Body Mass Index (BMI)’s over 35 using robotic surgery.  As of 
January 2014, over 100 patients that would otherwise be turned down at other transplant 








Heart   deceased donor only 
Lung  deceased donor and living-related lung transplantation 




Kidney   deceased donor and living donor 
Liver   deceased donor and living donor 
Pancreas  deceased donor only 
Intestine  deceased donor and living-donor 
Stomach  deceased donor only 
 
Tissues, cells, fluids  (for interest) 
 
Hand     deceased donor only 
Cornea     deceased donor only 
Skin/face replant   autograft 
Islets of Langerhans   pancreas islet cells, deceased donor and living donor 
Bone marrow/ stem cell  living donor and autograft 
Blood/Blood Parts transfusion living donor and autograft 
Blood Vessels    autograft and deceased donor 
Heart Valve   deceased donor, living donor and xenograft  
Bone     deceased donor and living donor 
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